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between the two regimes. On the one hand, international climate policy is 
emphasizing the growing role of private sector investment in clean energy and 
sustainable development. On the other hand, international investment law is 
changing to take account of social and environmental goals, including climate 
mitigation. 
 
55. Nicolás Perrone 
Responsible agricultural investment: Is there a signification role for the law in 
sustainability? 
 
Today, the world food situation remains delicate. International investment and 
MNE involvement could be part of the solution to this problem. However, there 
are many concerns regarding the effects of these activities in host countries. An 
adequate interpretation of the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment 
could serve to promote sustainable foreign investment in agriculture. 
 
56. Lise Johnson 
Absent from the discussion: The other half of investment promotion 
 
Investment treaties can be tools for promoting the quantity and quality of foreign 
investment that furthers sustainable development. But to do so, they should move 
beyond their current focus on simply regulating the conduct of host states, and 
include appropriate home-country commitments to facilitate and encourage 
outward investment. 
 
57. Kathryn Gordon and Joachim Pohl 
Environmental concerns in international investment agreements: The “new era” has 
commenced, but harmonization still appears far off 
 
The authors present findings of a large-sample survey of references to 
environmental concerns in international investment agreements carried out by the 
OECD. 
 
PART V INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND ARBITRATION 
 
58. Axel Berger, Matthias Busse, Peter Nunnenkamp, and Martin Roy 
Attracting FDI through BITs and RTAs: Does treaty content matter? 
 
The authors analyze empirically whether the impact of bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) and regional trade agreements (RTAs) on bilateral FDI flows 
depends on the inclusion of two legal innovations: investor-state dispute 
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settlement (ISDS) and pre-establishment national treatment (NT) provisions. 
Indeed, they find strong evidence that liberal NT provisions promote FDI. ISDS 
mechanisms appear to play a minor role. Surprisingly, the impact of similar 
investment provisions on FDI depends on whether these provisions are contained 
in RTAs or BITs. 
 
59. Clint Peinhardt and Todd Allee 
Different investment treaties, different effects 
 
Until recently, quantitative assessments of IIAs have tended to treat them as 
interchangeable. Such assessments assume that the only measure of investor 
protections encoded in IIAs is whether a treaty had been signed and/or entered 
into force. However, the actual investment effects of investment treaties depend 
greatly on context. 
 
60. Elizabeth Broomfield 
Reconciling IMF rules and international investment agreements: An innovative 
derogation for capital controls 
 
In the absence of an international framework governing capital controls, a conflict 
has developed due to the different approaches toward such controls taken by 
various international organizations and IIAs. IIAs should incorporate derogations 
for countries when treaty obligations conflict with IMF recommendations to 
impose controls in response to severe economic hardship. 
 
61. Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen 
Political risk insurance and bilateral investment treaties: a view from below 
 
While BITs are basically aimed at reducing the risk of investing abroad, many 
agencies that price the risk of foreign investments rarely take them into account, 
as evidenced by a survey of political risk insurance providers. 
 
62. Jason Webb Yackee 
How much do US corporations know (and care) about bilateral investment treaties? Some 
hints from new survey evidence 
 
New evidence shows that top US corporations are surprisingly unfamiliar with -- 
and/or lack confidence in -- BITs that are designed to benefit their investments in 
other countries. To understand whether or not such treaties “work,” it is necessary 









63. Kevin P. Gallagher 
US BITs and financial stability 
 
The author, a member of the State Department subcommittee tasked with 
reviewing the US Model BIT, addresses the potential impact of BIT provisions on 
the ability of governments to prevent and mitigate financial crises and makes 
specific recommendations for the revised Model BIT. 
 
64. George Kahale, III 
The new Dutch sandwich: The issue of treaty abuse 
 
Years ago, international tax lawyers introduced us to the term “Dutch sandwich.” 
A different type of Dutch sandwich has emerged over the past fifteen years, this 
time not related to taxes. Companies from all over the world having little if 
anything to do with The Netherlands seek to acquire Dutch nationality to take 
advantage of the protections offered by Dutch BITs. However, this type of 
nationality planning is giving BITs a bad name. 
 
65. Luke Eric Peterson 
International investment law and media disputes: A complement to WTO law 
 
International investment law is a potentially powerful legal tool to protect 
freedom of expression, at least for foreign-owned media companies. 
 
66. Armand de Mestral 
Is a model EU BIT possible -- or even desirable? 
 
The author explores whether the EU is in a position to adopt a model BIT 
articulating a common policy on FDI. 
 
67. Susan D. Franck 
International investment arbitration: winning, losing and why 
 
This chapter reviews recent empirical research about investment treaty arbitration 
in order to help create a more accurate framework for policy choices and dispute-
resolution strategies. 
 
68. Gus Van Harten 
Thinking twice about a gold rush: Pacific Rim v El Salvador 
 
Drawing on the case brought against El Salvador by Pacific Rim, the author 
examines the tension in international investment law between encouraging 
stability and allowing adaptation to new circumstances and raises a number of 





69. Alexandre de Gramont 
Mining for facts: PacRim Cayman LLC v. El Salvador 
 
The author by briefly presents Pacific Rim’s case in Pacific Rim v. El Salvador 
and defends the international arbitration process by which this case is being 
adjudicated as fair, neutral and objective for both parties. 
 
70. Stephan W. Schill 
The public law challenge: Killing or rethinking international investment law? 
 
The current legitimacy crisis of international investment law results primarily 
from the friction investor-state arbitration creates with domestic public law 
values. As a response, arbitrators should enculturate public law thinking. They 
should draw on comparative public law when applying investment treaties and 
reconsider their role as public law adjudicators with concomitant responsibilities 
for the entire system of international investment protection. 
 
71. Hans Smit 
The pernicious institution of the party-appointed arbitrator 
 
Party-appointed arbitrators should be banned unless their role as advocates for the 
party that appointed them is fully disclosed and accepted. Until this is done, 
arbitration can never meet its aspiration of providing dispassionate adjudication 
by those with special skills and experience in a process designed to combine 
efficiency with expertise. 
 
72. Giorgio Sacerdoti 
Is the party-appointed arbitrator a “pernicious institution”? A reply to Professor Hans 
Smit 
 
The appointment of arbitrators by parties is an essential valuable feature of 
arbitration. Prof. Smit’s concerns regarding party-appointed arbitrators can be met 
by the application of conflict-of-interest rules, obligations to disclose and 
oversight by arbitral institutions.  
 
73. M Sornarajah 
Starting anew in international investment law 
 
There is a crisis in international investment law brought about by rapid changes in 
the economic order resulting in movements of capital from erstwhile developing 
countries like China and India into developed ones. This is accentuated by the 
stances taken in investment treaty arbitration that restrict regulatory control. The 
reaction has been to bring about so called "balanced treaties" that neither secure 
investment protection nor bring about clear rules on regulatory control. There is a 




74. Gus Van Harten 
The (lack of) women arbitrators in investment treaty arbitration 
 
Investment treaty arbitration appears to be a boy’s club. Just 4% of individuals 
appointed as arbitrators in known cases to May 2010 were women. This casts 
doubt on the system’s ad hoc and partly-privatized appointments process. A 
roster-based model would enable a more deliberative and merit-based process of 
appointments and ensure public accountability and independence in the system. 
 
75. Michael D. Nolan and Frédéric G. Sourgens 
State-controlled entities as claimants in international investment arbitration: An early 
assessment 
 
State-controlled entities, including SOEs and SWFs, are increasingly important 
participants in international investment flows and international trade. As 
claimants in contractual arbitrations, they may face some unique issues, since it is 
not always clear whether such disputes may be considered “commercial.” Until 
the status of such claims has been resolved, each case has to be examined on its 
merits. 
 
76. Mark Feldman 
The standing of state-controlled entities under the ICSID Convention: Two key 
considerations 
 
ICSID tribunals likely will need to address with greater frequency the 
fundamental issue of whether disputes arising from SCE investments fall within 
the scope of the ICSID Convention. To help preserve clear ICSID Convention 
boundaries -- which exclude public foreign investment disputes between states -- 
ICSID tribunals should consider not only the nature, but also the purpose, of SCE 
investments. 
 
77. Jo En Low 
State-controlled entities as “investors” under international investment agreements 
 
A review of the definition of “investor” and investor-state dispute resolution 
clauses in 851 IIAs reveals that, except in two cases, SCEs (including SWFs and 
SOEs) have equivalent standing to their purely private counterparts as “investors” 
under such IIAs. This article highlights the various ways in which SCEs are 
covered under the definition of “investor.” 
 
78. Hermann Ferre and Kabir Duggal 
The world economic crisis as a changed circumstance 
 
There is little evidence that the investment treaty regime anticipated the 
possibility of a worldwide economic crisis like that of 2008-2010. While claims 
against states responding to the crisis have yet to materialize, most investment 
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treaties are silent with respect to a limitations period. Such claims may appear 
long after the crisis. States have, however, another defense: changed 
circumstances. 
 
79. Anne van Aaken and Jürgen Kurtz 
The global financial crisis: Will state emergency measures trigger international 
investment disputes? 
 
It is possible that emergency measures countries are taking to mitigate the effects 
of the global financial crisis will give rise to liability under international 
investment law. 
 
80. Kathryn Gordon and Joachim Pohl 
The response to the global crisis and investment protection: Evidence 
 
The authors, presenting findings of the OECD, challenge the claim that 
investment policy measures taken during the crisis were driven by a protectionist 







Foreign direct investment by multinational enterprises continues to be a key mechanism 
integrating the production systems of individual countries. Not surprisingly, this process -
- which, in many ways, represents the productive core of the world economy and is more 
intrusive than trade -- gives rise to a range of issues. The purpose of the Columbia FDI 
Perspectives is to address these issues in a concise, easily understandable and policy-
oriented manner. The Perspectives are distributed widely. 
 
In January 2011, the Perspectives issued until then were brought together in the first 
edition of FDI Perspectives: Issues in International Investment, edited by Karl P. 
Sauvant, Lisa Sachs, Ken Davies, and Ruben Zandvliet, published by the Vale Columbia 
Center on Sustainable International Investment. Since then, nearly 50 Perspectives have 
been issued, covering a wide range of topics; they are all brought together (in addition to 
those contained in the first edition) in the present volume. 
 
This volume would not have been possible without the great cooperation of the authors 
and peer-reviewers, as well as Nancy Siporin, whose assistance in publishing each 
Perspective on our website (www.vcc.columbia.edu) and listserv has been invaluable. 
 
We are also very grateful to Professor Ge Shunqi (at Nankai University, Tianjin, China) 
and his colleagues for translating the Perspectives into Chinese and disseminating them 
in China. Additionally, we extend our sincere thanks to Natalia Delgadillo Saenz de 
Santamaria for designing the cover of this volume. 
 
We hope that our readers will find this publication of interest! 
 
New York and Dubai, November 2012 
Karl P. Sauvant, Editor-in-Chief 
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This volume is a welcome contribution to discussions on international business research, 
establishing important connections between that research and the world of policymaking 
and practice. Special emphasis is given to questions of the relationship between 
international business and national economic development and to how foreign direct 
investment (FDI) has affected -- and is being affected by -- recent trends and changes in 
the global economy. While the chosen format of brief articles concisely presents each 
subject, what is effectively a substantial series of executive summaries sets out key ideas 
on a wide variety of issues. What is more, the selection of topics draws our attention to 
principal areas of interest and debate in this field. 
 
The coverage of this collection is certainly impressive. It deals with a wide range of the 
most topical issues under discussion today, including, for example, the global economic 
and financial crisis, multinational enterprises (MNEs) in and from the emerging markets, 
the Arab spring, sovereign wealth funds, Chinese investment in Africa and its effects, 
inward FDI and various countries’ concerns over national security, and investment codes 
and regulations pertaining to corporate social responsibility. It is not only the broad 
coverage of issues that is noteworthy, but also that the long list of reputabable authors 
reflects a broad spectrum of views about the major issues at hand. The brief format of 
each Perspective, as well as the large audience to which the articles are distributed, 
provide a platform on which members of the FDI community can challenge each other by 
presenting rebuttal articles. Because of this possibility of dialogue, the present volume 
brings out debates in the field, including different ways of addressing policy questions, 
apart from simply putting forward different ways of addressing a given research question. 
 
Another attractive feature of this volume is that a number of articles revisit in a 
contemporary context some very long-standing questions in the field of international 
business and, as a result, generally add new gloss to our understanding. This applies in 
the case of the nature of FDI data and some of the practical difficulties in their use, 
whether the origins of ownership of firms matter to a host country, the networking of 
MNEs and their country of origin, the role of FDI in national and local economic 
development policy, the effectiveness of investment promotion agencies and investment 
incentives in attracting FDI, investment treaties viewed from the perspectives of firms 
and countries, and the creation of international investment law and policy. By their very 
nature, these are often issues worth revisiting from time to time, as the subject under 
investigation and the context within which it is set often change or become more complex 
over time. 
 
Various articles connect topicality and revisit ongoing issues, perhaps thereby giving us a 
taste of familiar old wine but in new bottles, influencing the flavor we taste. Here we can 
refer, among other things, to discussions of the role of state-owned enterprises, which has 
re-emerged as a key issue for the field in an emerging market context; how what used to 
be described as Third World outward FDI has given way to a literature on emerging 
market MNEs and to a re-evaluation of the aggregate geographic patterns of world FDI, 
in or beyond the so-called triad of mature industrialized regions (Western Europe, North 
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America, Japan); and the association between currency appreciation and outward FDI 
from China, which recalls the discussion 40 years ago of currency overvaluation under 
the Bretton Woods regime and outward FDI from the United States, in the work of Aliber 
and others. 
 
Finally, this volume offers us an updated refinement of some longer-standing concepts in 
the subject area of international business. These areas include the relationship between 
FDI and longer term paths of national economic development and the potential for 
countries catching up (most especially in the earlier work and the contributions here of 
Terutomo Ozawa, which are full of insight); and a re-working of the evolution of 
government-MNE relationships, such as in the reflections from many years of practical 
experience and knowledge of the co-editor of this volume, Karl P. Sauvant.  
 
All in all, this is a valuable set of topical contributions to the field, which reflects the 
current state of thinking on a variety of crucial issues and concerns for researchers and 
policymakers. 
 
Newark, October 2012                                                                  John Cantwell 
 
Distinguished Professor (Professor II), Rutgers University 







The Western financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009, from which recovery has been 
slow and with significant risks, has taken its toll on world foreign direct investment 
flows: from a historic peak of US$ 2.2 trillion of outflows in 2007, they almost halved to 
US$ 1.2 trillion in 2009, recovering only slowly since then, to US$ 1.7 trillion in 2011.1 
Given the continuing uncertainty in the world economy, flows may well not rise much, if 
at all, in 2012 and 2013. Still, world investment flows have remained at a high level 
compared to the 1980s, when they barely averaged US$ 100 billion. This reflects, among 
other things, the growing internationalization of firms: by the end of 2011, more than 
100,000 firms qualified as “multinational,” i.e., firms that control assets abroad. 
 
Importantly, however, as long as FDI flows remain positive, the stock of this investment 
continues to grow (at least as a rule). By the end of 2011, this (outward) stock had 
surpassed US$ 21 trillion. It represented at least 900,000 foreign affiliates, whose sales 
that year amounted to an estimated US$ 28 trillion -- distinctly a higher amount than 
world exports (of US$ 22 trillion) that year. Hence, foreign direct investment has become 
the most important vehicle to bring goods and services to foreign markets. This is more 
so the case because the actual reach of multinational enterprises is much wider than 
foreign direct investment data indicate, as these data do not capture the myriad of non-
equity relationships (management contracts, franchising, etc.) that bring the production of 
firms abroad under the common governance of multinational enterprises. 
 
As the flows and stock of foreign direct investment have grown, some of its salient 
features have changed. Particularly noteworthy in this respect is that emerging markets 
(all economies that are not members of the OECD) attract now more than half of such 
investment flows and (by the end of 2011) had attracted over one-third of the world’s 
inward foreign direct investment stock. Simultaneously, firms headquartered in emerging 
markets have become important outward investors in their own right: at the end of 2011, 
there were over 30,000 multinational enterprises headquartered in these economies, 
investing that year US$ 460 billion abroad, for a stock of over US$ 4 trillion. A number 
of important emerging market multinational enterprises are state-controlled entities 
(although the foreign assets controlled by such entities headquartered in developed 
countries are much higher than those controlled by multinational enterprises 
headquartered in emerging markets). Emerging market firms have become important 
players in the world foreign direct investment market. 
 
Given the importance of foreign direct investment, it is not surprising, therefore, that all 
countries, without exception, seek to attract such investment, as it can bring a range of 
tangible and intangible assets (including capital, technology, skills, managerial practices, 
access to world markets). Virtually every country has an investment promotion agency, 
supplemented often with similar institutions at the sub-national level. Also, countries 
continue to improve their investment climate for foreign direct investors. This is reflected 
in the fact that the majority of changes in national investment regimes have been in the 
                                                
1 Unless indicated otherwise, all data are from UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2012: Towards a New 
Generation of Investment Policies (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2012). 
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direction of making the investment climate more favorable for foreign investors and that 
countries continue to conclude international investment agreements that protect foreign 
investors and facilitate their operations. 
 
Still, the attitude of a number of countries toward foreign direct investment is becoming 
more differentiated, as a number of them pay more attention to undesirable effects of 
such investment or certain types of it. After all, for governments, foreign direct 
investment is but a tool to promote their own national interests, especially economic 
growth and development. As a result, the screening of incoming mergers and acquisitions 
(especially when they are being undertaken by state-controlled entities) from the point of 
view of national security and protecting national champions is becoming more frequent. 
While red tape has not replaced red carpet, market entry has become somewhat more 
difficult in a growing number of countries. Similarly, while the international investment 
regime is expanding and becoming stronger (including because it is being enforced 
through investor-state dispute mechanisms), some governments have begun to 
circumscribe, at least to a certain extent, the protection of foreign investors in the interest 
of preserving national policy space. 
 
Thus, a certain rebalancing of the national and international framework for foreign direct 
investment is underway, in order to put governments into a better position to pursue 
policies that maximize the positive effects of such investment and minimize its negative 
effects. In so doing, we may well also expect that governments will pay more attention 
not only to the quantity of incoming foreign direct investment, but also to its quality (or 
“sustainable foreign direct investment” -- defined as investment that makes a maximum 
contribution to a country’s economic, social and environmental development and takes 
place in the framework of fair governance mechanisms, without jeopardizing its 
commercial viability). 
 
While these developments unfold, many governments  -- including now also those of a 
number of emerging markets -- encourage their own firms to become multinational, in 
order to protect, or increase, the international competitiveness of these firms. In fact, a 
portfolio of locational assets is increasingly becoming an important source of the 
international competitiveness of firms in general. Thus, the regulatory framework for 
outward foreign direct investment is receiving more attention. Virtually all developed 
countries have removed regulatory barriers to such investment, and most of them have 
put in place frameworks that actually encourage it. The great majority of emerging 
markets, on the other hand, lag considerably behind in this respect -- which puts their 
own firms at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis their competitors headquartered in 
developed countries. At the same time, the question of to what extent encouraging 
outward foreign direct investment (especially when it involves special financial and fiscal 
benefits for outward investors, in particular state-controlled entities) might distort the 
working of the world foreign direct investment market and hence might negate 
“competitive neutrality” is becoming an issue on the international policy agenda. 
 
The importance that foreign direct investment has achieved, that it can have not only 
positive effects but also negative ones; that issues relating to such investment extend 
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beyond economic ones (e.g., the potential compromise of national security); that foreign 
direct investment is more complex and intrusive than trade (involving, as it does, the 
entire range of issues related to the production process); and that the whole subject raises 
all sort of policy issues are among the reasons for which the Vale Columbia Center on 
Sustainable International Investment launched, in late 2008, the Columbia FDI 
Perspectives. The Perspectives take an interdisciplinary approach, reflecting the multi-
dimensional nature of the growth and impact of foreign direct investment and its 
regulatory framework and implications. As a rule, the Perspectives seek to pay special 
attention to policy implications. They are deliberately short in order to present readers 
with a concise analysis of an issue at hand. And they can be provocative in order to 
promote a dialogue, stimulate further research or present policy options. 
 
This volume brings together all Perspectives published since the inception of this series 
until November 2012. It updates the first edition of this volume, released in January 
2011.2 This second edition is intended to provide an interesting overview of important 
contemporary issues relating to foreign direct investment and multinational enterprises 
for all those who are interested in this subject, but are not always in a position to follow 
diverse perspectives and what is being written in the various corners of this field. And, of 
course, we hope that this volume will spark further interest in the field of foreign direct 
investment and multinational enterprises. 
 
New York and Dubai                                                                       Karl P. Sauvant 
November 2012                                                                             Jennifer Reimer 
 
 
                                                
2 See, Karl P. Sauvant, Lisa Sachs, Ken Davies, and Ruben Zandvliet, eds., FDI Perspectives: Issues in 
International Investment (New York: Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment, 
January 2011), available at: www.vcc.columia.edu. 
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FDI stocks are a biased measure of foreign affiliate activity 
 
Sjoerd Beugelsdijk, Jean-François Hennart, Arjen Slangen, and Roger Smeets* 
 
Researchers often call the value added (VA) in a host country by firms based in another 
country FDI and use FDI stocks and flows from a country’s balance of payments to 
measure it. What FDI stocks and flows actually measure, however, is narrower, since 
they record long term financial transactions by which domestic firms exert control over 
foreign firms. French FDI stocks in Australia, for example, measure the value of shares 
and reinvested earnings of Australian firms owned by French firms and the net 
indebtedness of these Australian firms to their French parents. 
 
FDI stocks in a host country may diverge from the aggregate foreign affiliate VA in that 
country for three reasons. First, not all FDI in a country is used to generate VA there. Part 
of the flows may be sent on to other countries. Thus inward FDI stocks may overestimate 
affiliate VA in some countries, especially tax havens. 
 
Second, FDI only measures part of what foreign affiliates use to finance their activities 
because it excludes the substantial amount they raise from external sources, for example 
local banks. Local and third-country financing accounts for 40% of the funds used by US 
majority-owned affiliates in developed countries. 1  The larger the recourse to such 
financing, the more FDI stocks will underestimate actual affiliate VA. 
 
Third, FDI is a financial input, while VA is generated by both labor and capital. FDI 
stocks underestimate the amount of affiliate VA because they ignore the contribution of 
labor. The higher that contribution, the greater the underestimation. 
 
In a recent paper we showed that these three factors make FDI stocks a biased measure of 
affiliate VA.2 We argued that FDI stocks overestimate VA in tax-haven countries, 
undervalue it in most other countries and that that undervaluation is larger in countries 
where financial markets are more developed and labor more productive, i.e. in more 
developed countries. Hence the mismatch between FDI stocks and foreign affiliate VA is 
not random, but is systematically correlated with host country characteristics such as their 
level of economic development. This makes FDI stocks a biased measure of the relative 
level and change of the VA of foreign affiliates in a host country and suggests that studies 
of the determinants and consequences of affiliate VA that have used FDI stocks as their 
dependent or main independent variable may have reached erroneous conclusions. 
                                                
* The authors wish to thank Ayse Bertrand, Ned Howenstine, Robert Lipsey, and Someshwar Rao for their 
helpful comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on August 29, 2011. 
1 Alexander Lehman, Selin Sayek and Hyoung Goo Kang, “Multinational affiliates and local financial 
markets,” International Monetary Fund Working Paper 04/107 (June 2004). 
2 Sjoerd Beugelsdijk, Jean-François Hennart, Arjen Slangen and Roger Smeets, “Why and how FDI stocks 
are a biased measure of MNE affiliate activity,” Journal of International Business Studies, vol. 41 




In fact, the mismatch between FDI stocks and the actual VA of foreign affiliates in a host 
country is systematically correlated with specific characteristics of that country. This can 
be demonstrated by comparing US FDI stocks in 50 host countries and the sales and VA 
generated by affiliates of US MNEs in these countries over a period of 22 years in the 
case of sales, and 11 years in that of VA. 
 
If one regresses the country and year-specific mismatch between US FDI stocks and US 
foreign affiliate sales and VA on the size of a country’s stock and bond markets, the 
concentration of its banking sector, the level of its interest rate, its exchange rate 
volatility (all likely determinants of local external borrowing), whether the host country is 
a tax haven, and the labor productivity of its US affiliates, one finds that all these 
variables are statistically significant and take the right sign, supporting the view that the 
mismatch between FDI stocks and actual foreign affiliate activity is not random and 
hence that FDI stocks are a biased measure of that activity. 
 
Hence, one cannot safely infer from FDI stocks the true level of VA by foreign affiliates 
in a country. Finding that FDI stocks are twice as large in country A than in country B 
does not necessarily mean that the actual level of affiliate VA in A is twice as large as in 
B, since foreign affiliates in A may obtain much of their financing from their parents 
while those in B may rely mostly on local external sources. Similarly, a downward trend 
in a country’s FDI stocks can either indicate that it is becoming less attractive to foreign 
firms or that its financial markets are becoming more efficient and its exchange rate more 
stable. Because some of the hypothesized determinants of foreign affiliate activity are 
significantly correlated to the mismatch between FDI stocks and actual affiliate activity, 
studies that have used FDI stocks to measure the latter may have obtained misleading 
results as well. 
 
FDI stocks and flows are perfectly appropriate measures of a country’s inflows and 
outflows of financial capital and of their cumulative size, but they should not be used to 









In a recent Perspective,1 Beugelsdijk, Hennart, Slangen, and Smeets warned readers 
about biases in the measure of FDI stock. They are to be congratulated for pushing 
readers to be careful in the use of data. 
 
They note “researchers often call the value added (VA) in a host country by firms based 
in another country FDI and use FDI stocks ... to measure it.”2 They correctly insist that 
FDI stocks do not correspond with aggregate foreign affiliate value-added. 
 
Their Perspective opens up two important topics: the frequently very loose use of the 
term FDI in the literature (and the genesis of that loose use); and the various measures of 
MNE activities. 
 
For decades, the literature has often equated FDI and MNEs, using the words “FDI” and 
“MNE” interchangeably. A book on the “theory of FDI” can be expected to be on the 
“theory of MNEs.” So, too, if this very publication, Columbia FDI Perspectives, were 
renamed “Columbia MNE Perspectives,” it is doubtful that the contents would change. 
Virtually, every student of MNEs would agree that this is a false equation. The 
formulation should be, MNEs undertake FDI, but MNEs also do many other things, 
including transferring technology, undertaking research and development, and producing 
and marketing goods and services. MNEs expect a return on their investment in the 
business package, not merely on the FDI they undertake. 
 
The equation of the terms “FDI” and “MNE” is a short-cut -- with an historical genesis. 
Early collectors of foreign investment data realized that investments by MNEs were 
different from foreign investments in traded securities, bonds and stock. Paish’s work on 
British overseas investment before World War I contained fragments of this 
understanding.3 But the real understanding emerged in the late 1920s and 1930s as the US 
Department of Commerce began collecting balance-of-payments data. As such 
information was assembled in the 1920s, individuals in the Department became aware 
that investments by MNEs differed from capital moving through bond markets or monies 
arriving to fuel the rise in United States stock prices. By the late 1920s and 1930s, the 
Department started to measure FDI stock (as well as flows). Initially, the definition of US 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank the late Robert Lipsey and Ned Howenstine for help on this subject in the past 
and Jean-Francois Hennart, Geoffrey Jones and Raymond Mataloni for their helpful comments on this 
chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on January 9, 2012. 
1 Sjoerd Beugelsdijk et al., “FDI stocks are a biased measure of foreign affiliate activity,” Columbia FDI 
Perspectives, No. 45 (August 29, 2011). 
2 Ibid. 
3 Paish’s seminal articles in The Statist and the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society (1909-1914) have 




outward FDI included all US holdings in those “foreign corporations or enterprises which 
are controlled by a person, or closely identified group of persons (corporate or natural), 
domiciled in the United States, or in the management of which such person or group has 
an important voice;” control was loosely defined and minority interests were included 
when the US entity had “an important voice.”4 
 
There were also studies in the 1930s of US inward FDI. Beginning in 1941, some studies 
defined FDI as 25% holdings in equity shares, a cutoff that would subsequently be 
reduced to 10%. Throughout this time there was an attempt to try to define MNE 
activities. FDI required the possibilities of control -- or at least influence. There were 
questions on what to include and exclude. Issues of the Survey of Current Business tell 
the story and the changes. Gradually, US definitions became widely accepted by many 
governments and by the International Monetary Fund. Since 1981, the definition of FDI 
has been “an investment in which a resident (in the broad legal sense, including a 
company) of one country obtains a lasting interest in, and a degree of influence over a 
business enterprise in another country.”5 The phrases “lasting interest” and a “degree of 
influence” show the difficulties in determining the nature of “control.” The words are 
ambiguous, but retain the notion of FDI involving more than merely financial flows and 
involving the extension of the firm over borders. Over the years, other measures of MNE 
activities emerged, including value-added, employment, number of affiliates, size of 
assets, revenues, and market share. We have data on ultimate beneficial ownership, which 
aid in deciphering certain complexities. Each of the measures has its use, depending on 
the questions being asked. Each measure offers a different story line. 
 
Yet, biases notwithstanding, unlike these other measures, we have long -- albeit imperfect 
-- series on FDI stock for many countries. Handled with care, these series provide one 
very useful measure. If we are aware of what is included (and excluded) in the data, that 
is, the data limitations, FDI stock continues to be an excellent indicator of MNE activities 
and one that can be used as public policies are formulated. 
 
                                                
4 Robert L. Sammons and Milton Abelson, American Direct Investments in Foreign Countries – 1940 
(Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce, 1942), p. 2. 
5 Jeffrey H. Lowe, “Direct investment, 2007-2009: Detailed historical-cost positions and related financial 
and income flows,” Survey of Current Business, vol. 90 (September 2010), p. 57. See also US Direct 









When Opel invested in car assembly operations in Gliwice in 1998, Poland registered this 
project as German because Opel is headquartered in, and managed from, Germany. 
However Opel has been owned by General Motors (United States) since 1929. Such 
utilization of foreign affiliates for investment in third countries is indirect FDI. At first 
sight the term is contradictory, although it is not so: “direct” refers to the degree of 
control over a foreign affiliate, while “indirect” denotes the way the ultimate owner 
arrives at such control. 
 
Indirect FDI matters for host countries because an investor follows a distinct corporate 
strategy, which is influenced by the management culture of the investor’s home country. 
If projects are transparent, host countries face few problems with indirect FDI. There are 
however cases in which the ultimate owners conceal their identities to circumvent 
sensitivities about their nationalities, such as Russian firms investing through Cyprus. A 
special form of indirect FDI is round tripping: the ultimate owners come from the same 
country in which the foreign affiliates are located. Round tripping is important for 
example between China and Hong Kong (China) and between the Russian Federation and 
Cyprus. Indirect FDI can be financed through transshipment investment by using foreign 
affiliates in third countries or more transient constructions such as special purpose 
entities (SPEs).1 SPEs are concentrated in hubs, such as Luxembourg, Austria and 
Hungary, in that order. 
 
Indirect FDI distorts global FDI statistics (annex table 1), although it reflects well 
corporate financial strategies. In part due to round tripping, host countries’ statistics 
provide a misleading picture of the geography of FDI. For example, FDI by ultimate 
owners is reported by a handful of countries only. In one of them, the United States, the 
immediate and ultimate owners were different in at least 18% of inward FDI projects (in 
terms of value of investment) in 2010. UNCTAD data indicate that other countries 
provide less perfect proxies of the extent of indirect FDI.2 For example, in 2008, 60% of 
the outward FDI stock of Brazil was registered in three Caribbean offshore centers, to be 
transshipped to third countries. For the Russian Federation, Cyprus accounted for 30% of 
the outflows and 22% of the inflows over the period 2007-2011; for Hong Kong, China 
accounted for 37% of the inward stock and 42% of the outward stock in 2010. Finally, 
the combined inward and outward FDI stocks of each Austria, Hungary and Luxembourg 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank Christian Bellak, Gabor Hunya, Andreja Jaklic, and Magdolna Sass for their 
helpful comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on April 30, 2012. 
1 An SPE is a separate legal person established to pursue temporary objectives such as the financing of an 
affiliate abroad. Different from ordinary projects, it allows limiting the risk of the transaction to the value 
of the SPE. 
2 See, UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2012, launched on July 5, 2012. 
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in SPEs topped US$ 1.7 trillion in 2010 and their ratios to global FDI stocks exceeded 
8% (annex table 2). 
 
Companies undertake indirect FDI for various reasons. The most important is corporate 
strategy, that is, delegating investment decisions in third countries to geographically close 
regional headquarters or to foreign affiliates with cultural affinity. For example, MNEs 
ask their Slovenian affiliates to invest in the Balkans, due to their better understanding of 
local business conditions. Delegation to foreign affiliates may also make sense for 
managing global value chains. Tax advantages are another key consideration, since lower 
taxes can result from transshipment through financial centers and investment through 
countries that have favorable double taxation treaties (DTTs) with the target host country. 
Taxation matters also for round tripping: a company that is registered as foreign can 
benefit from incentives, and can also invoke the DTT signed with the transshipment 
country. Some firms undertaking capital-intensive and risky projects use indirect FDI to 
obtain protection from the bilateral investment treaties (BITs) of transit countries. As 
indicated, there are also firms that wish to conceal their origins as much as possible in 
order to avoid scrutiny by the host country. For round tripping, escaping from potential 
uncertainties in the country of origin could also be a motive. 
 
Indirect FDI has implications for development. Ultimate owners have a say in the 
operations of the affiliates they control indirectly. Indirect FDI influences the amount and 
distribution of taxes among countries. It also leverages protection for investors and can 
provide better access to dispute settlement. Finally, when there are sensitivities about 
ultimate investors, national security considerations may arise. 
 
In principle, host countries could formulate an effective policy response because often 
their own regulatory systems encourage indirect FDI. They need not fully suppress 
indirect FDI but rather deal with its negative consequences. Tax laws encouraging 
indirect FDI leading to welfare losses could be revised, especially through cooperation of 
the jurisdictions concerned. International action on transfer pricing also needs to be 
strengthened. The role of BITs and DTTs needs to be revaluated. Treaty shopping is 
difficult to contain; but one could envisage clauses limiting the importation of protections 
from other BITs, following the example of exemptions to the most-favored-nation clause. 





Annex table 1. Inward FDI stock of the United States from selected economies of origin, by 
immediate investor and ultimate beneficial owner, 2010 (billions of US$) 
 
Economy By immediate investor By ultimate beneficial owner Difference 
Bermuda 5.1 124.8 119.7 
United Kingdom 432.5 497.5 65.0 
Germany 212.9 257.2 44.3 
Canada 206.1 238.1 31.9 
United States – 31.6 31.6 
Ireland 30.6 61.7 31.1 
France 184.8 209.7 24.9 
Mexico 12.6 34.0 21.4 
Brazil 1.1 15.5 14.4 
United Arab Emirates 0.6 13.3 12.7 
Israel 7.2 19.5 12.2 
Belgium 43.2 52.2 9.0 
Netherlands Antilles 3.7 12.4 8.7 
Hong Kong (China) 4.3 11.6 7.3 
Italy 15.7 23.0 7.3 
Japan 257.3 263.2 6.0 
Norway 10.4 14.4 4.1 
India 3.3 7.1 3.8 
Spain 40.7 44.2 3.5 
Finland 6.6 10.0 3.5 
Australia 49.5 52.9 3.4 
New Zealand 0.6 3.3 2.7 
China 3.2 5.8 2.7 
South Africa 0.7 2.2 1.5 
Korea, Republic of 15.2 16.6 1.4 
Kuwait 0.3 1.5 1.1 
Taiwan Province of 
China  5.2 6.0 0.8 
Malaysia 0.4 1.0 0.6 
Denmark 9.3 9.9 0.6 
Venezuela, Bolivarian 
Republic of 2.9 3.1 0.3 
Bahamas 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Total difference (+) - - 477.7 
Singapore 21.8 21.3 -0.5 
Panama 1.5 0.8 -0.7 
Austria 4.4 2.5 -1.8 
Sweden 40.8 36.0 -4.7 
United Kingdom 
Islands, Caribbean 31.2 0.8 -30.3 
Netherlands 217.1 118.2 -98.8 
Switzerland 192.2 61.6 -130.6 
Luxembourg 181.2 24.4 -156.8 
Total difference (-) – – -424.4 
All economies 2 342.8 2 342.8 – 
Source: The author's calculations, based on US Bureau of Economic Analysis data.  
Note: Data for various economies have been suppressed; therefore the total value of differences (+) 
and (-) differ. 
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Annex table 2. SPE and non-SPE related FDI stocks of Austria, Hungary and Luxembourg, 2010 
(Stocks in billions of US$ and shares in %) 
 













Ratio of SPE 
to non-SPE 
(%) 
Austria 170 103 166  177 98 180 
Hungary 120 89 134  122 20 623 
Luxembourg 1 579 287 551  1 403 499 281 
Total 1 869 479 390  1 702 617 276 
Memorandum item:       
Ratio to world 
FDI stock (%)a 9.77    8.34    
        
Source: The author's calculations, based on UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database, and national statistics. 







The FDI recession has begun 
 
Karl P. Sauvant* 
 
With US$ 1.8 trillion (according to UNCTAD), world FDI flows reached an all-time high 
last year. All major regions benefitted from increased flows. But that was then. What is, 
and will be, the impact of the financial crisis and the recession on FDI flows this year and 
next? 
 
Several forces are at work, best discussed in terms of the three sets of FDI determinants: 
economic conditions, the regulatory framework and investment promotion. If we are 
lucky, as far as the first set of factors is concerned, global GDP will not shrink in 2009, 
although it is currently expected to do so a bit in developed countries offset however by 
expected growth in emerging markets (according to the IMF's latest forecasts). Moreover, 
with the present commodity boom cycle winding down, FDI in natural resources is posed 
to decline as well, affecting especially FDI flows into Africa, Latin America, Russia, and 
Central Asia. 
 
Since economic growth is the single most important FDI determinant for attracting 
investment (and developed countries having received some 70% of FDI flows in 2007), 
this economic slowdown, further accentuated by the financial crisis, makes key markets 
less attractive to invest in -- and hence depresses FDI flows. Even from the narrow 
perspective of FDI, the proposals by Jeffrey Sachs (Financial Times, 27 October 2008) 
and George Soros (Financial Times, 29 October 2008) on avoiding a global recession 
should be heeded.  
 
The financial crisis and the credit crunch adds to this impact as it severely restricts the 
ability of firms to invest abroad and finance cross-border M&As which are by far the 
most important form of entering foreign markets for many multinationals. Even where 
M&As do occur, they would involve lower values than, say, six months ago, as share 
prices -- and hence the values of companies -- have declined, depressing the value of FDI 
flows. The current economic difficulties will also entice parent companies to repatriate 
earnings if not to sell foreign affiliates to shore up their balance sheets, thus reducing net 
FDI flows. Earning downgrades and weak balance sheets make it more difficult for firms 
to finance deals, especially if they have to absorb other financial burdens (e.g., supporting 
the declining value of pension funds) and further deleveraging takes place. These 
considerations apply also to private equity funds, a number of which are in great 
difficulties. (These funds accounted for about one-quarter of the value of cross-border 
M&As in 2007.) The ability of firms to undertake outward FDI is therefore impaired. Not 
surprisingly, the value of cross-border M&As has declined by 28% during the first nine 
months of this year and is likely to decline further. 
 
                                                
* This chapter was first published as a Perspective on November 22, 2008. 
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But the decline could be softened. In particular, if Asian countries and especially China 
should further stimulate domestic demand it would be even more attractive for 
multinationals to increase investment in those markets (although China, with US$ 84 
billion of FDI inflows, was already by far the largest emerging market host country in 
2007).  Similarly, if Asian firms are less affected by the crisis, they may accelerate their 
outward FDI. Chinese outward FDI, for instance, which was US$ 23 billion in 2007, was 
US$ 26 billion during the first half of 2008 alone, possibly reaching US$ 50-60bn during 
this year. Add to that the potential FDI by sovereign wealth funds (SWFs); so far, such 
sovereign FDI has barely taken off (and, in the financial sector, was not very profitable). 
Moreover, undervalued or distressed assets in developed countries and elsewhere beckon, 
helped possibly by the strong currencies of some home countries and the weak currencies 
of some host countries. What this could mean is that important investors are sitting on the 
fence, waiting for the stock market to hit rock bottom, before investing abroad. If so, 
there is a chance that FDI outflows from emerging markets (which were US$ 300 billion 
in 2007) could possibly hold up, a least this year. 
 
This possibility depends on the continuous openness of the regulatory framework for 
FDI, especially in developed countries. While this is, grosso modo, most likely assured, 
there are mounting signs of a reevaluation of, if not distinct uneasiness about, at least 
certain forms of FDI. This is reflected, among other things, in the increase of national 
policy changes, as well as more restrictive review processes, that make the investment 
environment less hospitable, especially for cross-border M&As. A good part of such 
protectionist attitudes is directed against sovereign FDI by state-owned enterprises and 
SWFs from emerging markets -- precisely those entities that, at least for the moment, still 
are in a position to continue, if not increase, their outward FDI. It is actually surprising 
how little FDI SWFs have undertaken so far; the skeptical attitude in developed countries 
partly explains this. Regulatory risk could exacerbate the negative economic factors. 
 
It is here where investment promotion comes in: investment promotion agencies 
worldwide can be expected to make an extra effort to convince their governments to keep 
the investment climate welcoming. In fact, investment promotion agencies and individual 
firms seeking strong partners can be expected to make an extra effort to entice 
multinationals, private equity groups and sovereign FDI to come to their shores. How 
influential investment promotion agencies will be in their national decision-making 
processes remains to be seen. 
 
So what does this all add up to? In the current situation of uncertainty it is impossible 
precisely to predict how these various factors will play out. Moreover, they need to be 
seen against the long-term nature of FDI, undertaken in-line with broader corporate 
strategies, which makes this type of investment more stable than portfolio investment (as 
we have seen during the Asian financial crisis) and hence could mitigate some of the 
immediate negative effects.  In the past, a recession was typically followed in one-to-two 
years by a decline in FDI flows. This time, the credit crunch is accelerating the onset of 
the decline and it is likely to deepen it. It is quite certain that FDI flows in 2008, and 




The steepness of the decline will largely be a function of how deep, long and widespread 
the recession will be. The decline is likely to be at least 20% this year and could well 
reach another 30% or more next year -- making an already difficult economic situation 
even more difficult. If anything, the FDI recession puts a premium on maintaining a 






The global economic crisis and FDI flows to emerging markets: For the 
first time ever, emerging markets are this year set to attract more than 




The global economic and financial crisis has had a major impact on FDI flows. After 
declining in 2008 by 17% to US$ 1.73 trillion from US$ 2.09 trillion in 2007 -- the high 
point of a four-year long boom in cross-border M&As and FDI -- global FDI inflows are 
forecast to plunge by 44% to less than US$ 1 trillion in 2009 (annex table 1).1 The big 
drop in 2009 is occurring despite the improvements in the global economy in recent 
months. A notable feature of trends in 2009 is that, for the first time ever, emerging 
markets are set to attract more FDI inflows than the developed world (annex table 2). 
 
Global FDI plummets in first half of 2009 
 
Global FDI inflows are estimated to have contracted by 49% in the first half of 2009 
compared with the same period in 2008. The estimate is based on data for 54 countries 
(20 developed countries and 34 emerging markets) that accounted for just under 90% of 
total global FDI inflows in 2008. For 47 of the countries, FDI inflows in the first half of 
2009 were lower than in the first half of 2008; only seven countries recorded growth in 
inflows over this period. The decline in inflows to developed countries was significantly 
sharper than the drop for emerging markets -- by 54% and 40%, respectively. The 
declines were especially marked in the US and UK, by 68% and 85% respectively. 
Among emerging market regions, the sharpest decline, by 55%, was to Eastern Europe. 
Flows to Latin America and to emerging Asia declined by one third in each case (China, 
the main emerging market FDI recipient, had a decline of only 18%; FDI flows to Brazil 
and Mexico dropped by 25%). 
 
Only a modest improvement is expected in the second half of 2009. In particular, despite 
improved global economic trends in recent months, a significant recovery in M&As will 
not happen soon.2 Rising confidence and a rally in equity markets have failed to boost 
M&As as corporations remain very cautious and bank financing is constrained. The nine-
                                                
* The author wishes to thank Gary Hufbauer and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments on this 
chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on October 8, 2009. 
1 Unless otherwise stated, all FDI estimates and forecasts are from the Economist Intelligence Unit. The 
data reported here for 2008 are of more recent vintage and, because of that, as well as the use of different 
sources in some cases, the totals differ slightly from the data reported in UNCTAD, World Investment 
Report 2009: Transnational Corporations, Agricultural Production and Development (Geneva: UNCTAD, 
2009). The revised estimates for 2008 and forecasts for 2009 also differ slightly from data that appeared in 
the Economist Intelligence Unit, “The world economy and plunging FDI,” Viewswire, (2009). 
2 FDI flows are dominated by trends in cross-border M&As, and the correlation between global FDI 
inflows and the value of completed cross-border M&A sales is very high. This is not only because cross-
border M&As make up a large share of FDI, but also because even non-M&A components of FDI are 
affected by similar forces that affect M&As. 
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month 2009 data for M&As were not encouraging. According to data provider Dealogic, 
the value of M&A deals globally of US$ 1.62 trillion in the first nine months of 2009 was 
down by 37% on the same period in 2008.3 According to Thomson Reuters data, the 
value of deals totaled US$ 369 billion globally in the third quarter of 2009, down by 54% 
on the same quarter in 2008.4 Furthermore, the numbers would look much worse still 
were it not for crisis-related financial deals. Since the latter are mainly domestic deals, 
this means that the decline in cross-border-M&As in 2009 will be significantly sharper 
than the drop in total deal values. 
 
FDI to emerging markets to surpass 50% of global total 
 
Flows to emerging markets initially proved resilient to the impact of the global crisis. 
Inflows into the developed world declined by one-third in 2008, whereas flows to 
emerging markets increased by 11%. FDI flows to emerging markets will decline 
considerably in 2009, albeit by less than FDI flows to the developed world.5 In 2009, for 
the first time ever, emerging markets are likely to attract more FDI than developed 
countries. The forecast is obviously subject to considerable uncertainty. For example, a 
few large cross-border deals in the final quarter of 2009 could yet tip the balance back in 
favor of developed countries. But even should the emerging market share in global FDI 
inflows fall short of 50%, the share in 2009 will almost certainly be the highest on 
record.6 
 
Practice catches up with theory 
 
The overall decline in global FDI flows is thus being accompanied by a distinct shift in 
the pattern of FDI. Economic theory tells us that capital should flow from capital-
abundant rich countries to capital-scarce poor countries. In practice, that has not been the 
case as developed countries have consistently attracted the bulk of global FDI flows. 
High risk in many emerging markets, the benefits of advanced institutions and 
infrastructure, and a superior overall business environment in developed countries have 
                                                
3 “M&A sector: Too early to call a return to normal,” Financial Times, September 25, 2009. 
4 “M&A shows signs of life,” Reuters, September 29, 2009. 
5 The Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts that FDI flows to emerging markets will decline by 35% in 
2009 compared with 2008 (flows to developed countries are forecast to fall by 52%). See annex for 
forecasts for FDI inflows in 2009 by subregions. Although the definitions of emerging markets differ 
considerably, our forecast for the fall in FDI flows to emerging markets is similar to the forecasts made by 
the World Bank (for a 30% decline in Global Development Finance, June 2009, Washington, p. 38) and by 
the Institute of International Finance for a sample of 30 leading emerging markets (by 33%, in Capital 
Flows to Emerging Market Economies, October 2009, Washington, p. 2). 
6 The definition of what constitutes an emerging market, or the dividing line between developed countries 
and emerging markets, is rather arbitrary. Under Economist Intelligence Unit definitions, the developed 
world category is somewhat smaller than under the definition used by UNCTAD, which includes the eight 
new EU member states from Eastern Europe (all these are considered as emerging markets under most 
definitions). The emerging market share in global FDI inflows is set to surpass 50% in 2009 on both 
definitions, although by a narrower margin on the UNCTAD definition. The Economist Intelligence Unit 
classification is given in Laza Kekic and Karl P. Sauvant, eds., World Investment Prospects to 2011: 
Foreign Direct Investment and the Challenge of Political Risk (London and New York: Economist 




tended to outweigh the attractions of greater market dynamism and lower costs in 
emerging markets. 
 
This time, practice may be catching up to theory. FDI has tended to rise during recessions 
as slumps in M&As have hit the developed world disproportionately (and some 80% of 
cross-border M&A sales are still in developed states). However, other factors are also 
pushing up the share of emerging markets in global FDI inflows. 
 
FDI flows to emerging markets have held up better because their overall economic 
performance has been much better than that of the developed world, which has 
experienced its worst recession since the Second World War. Much of the superior 
performance of emerging markets is, of course, due to the continued fast growth of China 
and India. However, even if China and India are taken out of the equation, most emerging 
markets will have outperformed the developed world in 2009. Emerging markets have 
thus to some extent “decoupled” from the developed economies.7 
 
Globalization and increasing competitive pressure on companies have increased the 
opportunity cost of not investing in emerging markets.8 A recent Economist Unit survey 
provides evidence of a link between investing in emerging markets and corporate 
financial success. Among surveyed companies from developed countries that derive less 
than 5% of their revenue from activities in emerging markets, only 24% reported their 
financial performance as being better than their peers. By contrast, for developed country 
companies that derived more than 5% of their revenue from emerging markets, the share 
reporting better performance than their peers was just under 40%. 
 
The trend of improving business environments and liberalization in many emerging 
markets in recent years has also helped limit the recession-induced fall in FDI inflows. 
Finally, the increased share of emerging markets in outward investment is increasing the 
share of emerging markets in inward flows because a disproportionate share of outward 
investment by emerging markets goes to other emerging markets. 
 
The outlook for 2010 and beyond 
 
Although the global economy is still weak, conditions are now improving in many 
countries. Global growth resumed in the second half of this year, creating momentum that 
will carry into 2010. The recovery in 2010 will, however, be sluggish and fragile. Global 
growth is unlikely to return any time soon to the trend rate of recent years, as it will be 
constrained by the after-effects of the crisis in 2008-2009. As a result, although global 
FDI inflows are likely to grow in 2010, the recovery will be modest. The growth rates of 
                                                
7 The notable exception is Eastern Europe, which has suffered very badly and its average output is forecast 
to contract by 6% in 2009. 
8 Economist Intelligence Unit and UK Trade and Investment, Survive and Prosper: Emerging Markets in 
the Global Recession (London: Economic Intelligence Unit, 2009). The Economist intelligence Unit carried 
out a survey of 548 companies from 19 business sectors around the world in July and August 2009. Two-
fifths of the sample was made up of companies headquartered in emerging markets; the remainder were 
companies headquartered in developed countries. 
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FDI into the developed world and emerging markets are expected to be similar so that 
their shares in global FDI are unlikely to change significantly from 2009. 
 
Companies’ plans for the next five years, as reflected in the aforementioned Economist 
Intelligence Unit survey, Survive and Prosper, imply that emerging markets will attract 
considerable FDI and probably more than developed countries. Just under 60% of 
companies expect to derive more than 20% of their total revenue in emerging markets in 
five years' time – almost double the present proportion of 31%. This would suggest that 
the shift in the distribution of global FDI flows in 2009 is a longer-term development and 
not just a transitory phenomenon.  
 
Annex table 1. FDI inflows (billions of US$) 
 
 2007 2008 2009 
World total 2,092.4 1,730.9 975.2 
   % change 44.8 -17.3 -43.7 
Developed countries 1,355.0 914.7 441.3 
   % change 52.3 -32.5 -51.8 
Emerging markets 737.4 816.3 533.9 
   % change 32.9 10.7 -34.6 
 of which:    
Sub-Saharan Africa 38.0 49.7 30.3 
   % change 14.2 30.7 -39.1 
Middle East & North Africa 81.9 98.1 73.4 
   % change 13.6 19.8 -25.2 
Developing Asia 298.1 323.2 235.5 
   % change 38.9 8.4 -27.1 
Latin America & Caribbean 128.1 140.5 93.8 
   % change 37.1 9.7 -33.3 
Eastern Europe 165.7 183.3 90.4 
   % change 40.8 10.7 -50.7 
    
% share developed countries 64.8 52.8 45.3 
% share emerging markets 35.2 47.2 54.7 
Note: Emerging markets according to Economist Intelligence Unit definitions; see text. 





Annex table 2: FDI inflows (% of global FDI inflows) 
 
 UNCTAD definitions Economist Intelligence Unit definitions  





1992 69.4 30.6 67.3 32.7  
1993 66.7 33.3 64.3 35.7  
1994 59.7 40.3 57.7 42.3  
1995 65.5 34.5 61.8 38.2  
1996 61.0 39.0 58.3 41.7 
42.9 
 
1997 59.9 40.1 57.1  
1998 72.0 28.0 69.4 30.6 
23.1 
 
1999 78.7 21.3 76.9  




2001 69.7 30.3 67.3  
2002 71.9 28.1 68.0  




2004 57.8 42.2 52.5  
2005 66.2 33.8 61.6  





2007 68.3 31.7 64.8  
2008 56.7 43.3 52.8  
2009 48.4 51.6 45.3  






The Arab Spring: How soon will foreign investors return? 
 
Paul Antony Barbour, Persephone Economou, Nathan M. Jensen, and Daniel Villar* 
 
The events of the Arab Spring have dramatically increased the risk perceptions of foreign 
investors. In directly affected countries, these events led to disruptions in economic 
activity including plummeting tourism and FDI flows, all of which negatively impacted 
economic growth. While the economic impact was uneven across the MENA region, for 
the region’s developing countries the growth rate assumption underpinning survey 
analysis in the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency’s (MIGA’s) World Investment 
and Political Risk Report for 2011 was 1.7%.1 How much will these developments affect 
future FDI? 
 
The financial crisis in 2008 led to declines in aggregate FDI flows into MENA. As events 
unfolded in 2011, FDI flows into MENA plummeted further in the directly affected 
countries; for example, in the first quarter of 2011, FDI inflows turned negative in both 
Egypt and Tunisia, which were two of the most affected countries.2 The World Bank has 
forecasted FDI flows into MENA to decline in 2012, but to grow again in 2013. Over the 
medium and longer term, the region’s economic and demographic factors will continue to 
attract market-seeking foreign investors, more so under conditions of improved 
governance. 
 
The findings of a foreign investor survey jointly undertaken in 2011 by the World Bank’s 
MIGA and the Economist Intelligence Unit3 found that the turmoil did have a significant 
impact on corporate investors’ investment intentions concerning MENA: a quarter of 
investors put their plans on hold, while others reconsidered (18%), canceled (11%) or 
withdrew investments (6%). Only just below a third did not alter their investment plans 
(see the supporting data below). Despite heterogeneity among the different countries in 
MENA, on balance, the turmoil has stressed existing investments and dampened plans for 
expansions and new investments. While there are differences between investors in 
extractive industries, these differences do not affect the overall results from a 
                                                
* The authors wish to thank Seev Hirsh, Lilach Nachum and Pablo Pinto for their helpful comments on this 
chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on May 7, 2012. This piece summarizes data and 
analysis from MIGA, World Investment and Political Risk 2011(Washington DC: World Bank, 2011), 
http://www.miga.org/resources/index.cfm?aid=3227. 
1 The developing economies in MENA are Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, 
Syria, Tunisia, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. MIGA. 
2  Central Bank of Egypt, “Monthly statistical bulletin,” August 2011; Central Bank of Tunisia, 
“Development of main flows and balance of external payments receipts,” available at: 
http://www.bct.gov.tn/bct/siteprod/english/indicateurs/paiements.jsp#qqind. 
3 The survey covered a representative sample of 316 senior executives from MNEs investing in developing 
countries. The survey was conducted in June-August of 2011. Therefore, the particular questions on MENA 
involved a self-selection of firms active or intending to invest in MENA; however, these were compared 




representative sample of investors worldwide. Thus, the findings are probably less 
negative than they would be if the oil sector was excluded.4 
 
Some investors in the countries directly affected by the civil disturbances, especially 
investors in the energy and service sectors, have reported suspending operations.5 All of 
this has been amplified by the worsening state of domestic economies, as current account 
deficits and budget deficits have widened, private capital flows have weakened, inflation 
has risen, and production and investment have declined. Political violence -- especially 
civil disturbance and to a lesser extent war and terrorism -- ranked particularly high as the 
risk of most concern as did governments’ abilities to honor their sovereign financial 
obligations. 
 
The survey found greater confidence from MNEs investing in stable democracies relative 
to stable authoritarian regimes. This pattern has also emerged in the region: just over half 
of the firms surveyed would invest in MENA, assuming that there is at least a year of 
stability under a democratic government. Nearly half of the firms in the survey said they 
would decrease investments should there be significant and persistent instability, even in 
the presence of democracy. Only 8% of firms would increase their investments under 
such circumstances. The worst-case scenario would be a period of prolonged and 
significant instability, where nearly half of the firms surveyed would substantially 
decrease investments. In the event of a non-democratic regime that nevertheless succeeds 
in stabilizing the country for at least a year, 44% of the firms surveyed claimed that they 
would not change their plans for investment, essentially adopting a “wait and see” 
approach. This lesson is also supported by evidence from the private political risk 
insurance market, which stressed the difficulty in selling coverage in seemingly stable 
authoritarian regimes, but saw the demand for coverage in such countries (both in MENA 
and worldwide) rise as a result of the events in MENA. 
 
The findings of the survey provide evidence of both pitfalls and possibilities arising from 
the Arab Spring. Investors will return fairly quickly once stability returns given the vast 
opportunities in the region. Most investors would prefer this stability to be under a 
democratic regime. Thus there is long-run optimism that, if political transitions in the 
region are democratic and coupled with political stability, the Arab Spring could increase 
FDI and help contribute to economic development in the region. 
                                                
4 Due to sampling size of the MENA specific investors, the survey is not able to clearly draw this 
distinction. 
5 “Arab Spring cleaning: What regional turmoil has meant for Western investment,” Business Law 





Why and how least developed countries can receive more FDI to meet 




The 48 least-developed countries1 (LDCs), most of them in sub-Saharan Africa and a few 
in Asia, need FDI to help meet their development targets. The FDI they now receive, 
although inadequate, is enough to demonstrate that investors see potential in them. It is 
therefore realistic for LDCs to seek more FDI, but they need to enhance their investment 
environments to attract it in the much greater quantities required. Donors can help by 
targeting official development assistance (ODA) on investment in human capital and 
supporting governance improvements. Meanwhile, LDCs should establish effective 
investment promotion agencies (IPAs). 
 
Have MNEs shown any interest in investing in LDCs? Perhaps surprisingly, LDCs have 
recently been punching above their weight in bringing in FDI, despite their reputation for 
inadequate infrastructure and governance. In 2006-2009, average FDI inflows to LDCs 
were 1.7% of the global total -- over twice these countries’ share of world GDP and 
capital formation.2 The LDCs’ share in the world’s FDI stocks was 0.6%. FDI inflows to 
LDCs have increased sharply, averaging US$ 27 billion per year in 2006-2009 compared 
to US$ 10 billion in 2000-2005, US$ 2.5 billion in the 1990s, and US$ 506 million in the 
1980s. FDI inflows to LDCs in 2001-2010 exceeded portfolio and other private capital 
inflows and also exceeded bilateral aid inflows.3 FDI flows for the world as a whole in 
2006-2009 averaged 2.9% of GDP, while they were 6.3% of GDP in LDCs (compared to 
2.6% in developed economies, 4.6% in transition economies and 3.6% in developing 
economies). FDI flows were 13% of gross fixed capital formation globally in 2006-2009 
but 48.5% in LDCs; world FDI stocks were 131.7% of gross fixed capital formation, 
LDC FDI stocks 117.7%, not far behind, similarly indicating an upward trend. 
 
A major example of this trend is Africa, where most LDCs are situated. Africa is 
becoming increasingly attractive to international investors, particularly from emerging 
markets. FDI from emerging markets into Africa grew at a compound annual rate of 13% 
a year from 2003 to 2010. While investors from developed countries tend to be more 
cautious in their African investments, they still account for the largest share of FDI in the 
continent and are investing in a diverse range of sectors -- not just mineral resources -- 
including telecommunications, food, beverages and tobacco, transport, storage and hotels. 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank Laza Kekic, Michael Lalor and Padma Mallampally for their helpful 
comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on June 20, 2011. 
1 LDCs are defined by three criteria: low GNI per capita, weak human assets and economic vulnerability. 
2  Unless otherwise cited, the statistics in this Perspective are taken, or calculated, from the online 
UNCTAD statistical database, UNCTADstat, at http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ 
3 UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment in LDCs: Lessons Learned from the Decade 2001-2010 and the 
Way Forward (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2011). 
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But the most rapid FDI growth in Africa (a 21% compound growth rate from 2003 to 
2010) is being achieved by Africans investing in other African countries.4 
 
While the picture is improving, current FDI inflows to LDCs are still nowhere near 
enough to meet Africa’s needs. Total fixed investment in LDCs is now approximately 20% 
of GDP, insufficient to support the sustained growth needed to meet the Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG) of halving the proportion of the world’s population with 
incomes below a dollar a day and other MDGs such as universal primary education and 
basic health targets.5 
 
FDI is also distributed unevenly among LDCs: in recent years, over 80% has gone to 
resource-rich countries in Africa like Angola and Sudan, while inflows have stagnated or 
declined in some other LDCs, including Burkina Faso, Djibouti and Mauretania. Those 
LDCs that received FDI inflows in their extractive sectors tend not to have benefited 
from similar levels of FDI in services and manufacturing, where job creation, linkages 
and skills transfers are greater.6 
 
What can LDCs do to promote stronger FDI inflows to all sectors of their economies, 
especially those that have a strong positive impact on development, such as 
manufacturing and services? In the short term, LDCs should establish effective 
investment promotion agencies at national and subnational levels to ensure their visibility 
as investment destinations. Long-term actions, which should be initiated as soon as 
possible because of the long gestation period, include building physical infrastructure and 
investing heavily in human capital. Necessary governance improvements, which also take 
time, include building a transparent and rules-based regulatory framework to provide 
predictability in areas such as property rights, competition and anti-corruption. 
 
ODA still exceeds FDI inflows to LDCs, but is not easy to expand when there are other 
demands on the funds of donor countries and international bodies. On the other hand, 
MNEs have investment funds looking for a good home, so FDI is well placed to fill the 
gap between domestic savings and LDCs’ investment requirements and also find 
opportunities for investment in activities that might not attract less-experienced domestic 
LDC investors. It can also bring benefits like increased employment and improvements in 
technology, including via spillovers to local industry. LDC governments’ limited 
development funds can be supplemented by well-targeted ODA and by FDI, for example 
through public-private partnerships in infrastructure. If effectively and efficiently utilized 
to build a business environment that will attract and promote sustainable FDI, such 
funding will eventually facilitate self-sustaining growth. 
                                                
4  Ernst & Young, “It’s time for Africa: Ernst & Young’s 2011 Africa Attractiveness Survey,” 
(Johannesburg and London: Ernst & Young, 2011). 






State-controlled entities control nearly US$ 2 trillion in foreign assets 
 
Karl P. Sauvant and Jonathan Strauss* 
 
Developing country sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) as players in the world FDI market 
have received considerable attention. While outward FDI from emerging markets has 
indeed risen dramatically,1 that by SWFs has been negligible: their outward FDI stock is 
around US$ 100 billion (compared to a world FDI stock of US$ 20 trillion in 2010).2 
 
On the other hand, state-owned enterprises (SOEs)3 -- another class of state-controlled 
entities (SCEs) -- are serious players in the world FDI market. UNCTAD identified more 
than 650 SOEs that are MNEs.4 They hail from both emerging markets and developed 
countries.5 (There are also many important financial SOEs that are MNEs.) 
 
More specifically, research on the 200 largest non-financial MNEs identified by 
UNCTAD for 20106 yields 49 SOEs that are MNEs (annex table). The 2010 foreign 
assets7 of these 49 together account for US$ 1.8 trillion, with US$ 1.1 trillion in 
aggregate foreign revenue. Of these 49: 
 
§ 23 were at least 50% owned directly or indirectly by states; their foreign assets 
were US$ 570 billion. 
§ If the state ownership threshold is lowered to 10%, 26 more firms are added; their 
foreign assets were US$ 1.16 trillion. 
 
20 of the 49 SOEs are headquartered in developed countries and 29 in emerging markets, 
with foreign assets of US$ 1.4 trillion and US$ 0.4 trillion, respectively. They operate in 
                                                
* The authors wish to acknowledge the important cooperation of Jane Park in the preparation of this 
chapter, as well as the assistance of Martin Delaroche, Ge Shunqi, Stephen Gelb, Jens Klingfurt, Alexey 
Kuznetsov, Joanne Lim, Premila Nazareth, Rajah Rasiah, and Hsia Hua Sheng. They also thank Persa 
Economou, Curtis Milhaupt and Wesley Scholz for their helpful comments on this chapter, which was first 
published as a Perspective on April 2, 2012. 
1 See e.g., Karl P. Sauvant et al., eds., Foreign Direct Investment from Emerging Markets (New York: 
Macmillan, 2010). 
2  UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2011 (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2011). 
3 Following UNCTAD, ibid., p. 28, “SOEs” are defined as enterprises in which the government has a 
controlling interest, with “control” defined as a stake of 10% or more of voting power. Ownership can be 
direct or indirect (including through e. g. government-controlled pension funds, other government-owned 
firms) or involve special circumstances (e.g. golden shares). It can be passive, even if a government holds 
(directly or indirectly) more than half of the shares. “SOE” should therefore be read accordingly -- and it 
draws attention to the need for research on this matter. 
4 Ibid. 
5 The country classification follows UNCTAD, ibid. 
6 Ibid. The firms researched were the 100 largest non-financial MNEs globally and the 100 largest non-
financial MNEs headquartered in emerging markets, ranked by foreign assets. 
7 “Foreign assets” of MNEs are the current and fixed assets abroad that they control. They are usually much 





Thus, SOEs are among leading players in the world FDI market. They are more 
numerous among the leading MNEs headquartered in emerging markets, but the foreign 
assets of those headquartered in developed countries are considerably higher than those 
of the SOEs from emerging markets. 
 
FDI by SOEs is likely to grow further. For example, in the case of China -- in 2010 the 
world’s fourth largest outward investor in terms of flows (not counting Hong Kong) -- 
SOEs control the bulk of the country’s growing outward FDI; one prediction is that 
Chinese firms will invest US$ 1-2 trillion abroad over the coming decade.9 To that, one 
would have to add the likely growth of FDI by SWFs. 
 
Not surprisingly, regulatory attention has begun to focus on FDI by SCEs. It is fueled by 
the concern that SCEs may pursue objectives other than commercial interests10 (and 
therefore might constitute a national security risk for host countries) and that they receive 
benefits from their governments that put them into a competitive advantage vis-à-vis their 
private counterparts.11 To address the first concern, especially developed countries have 
passed laws or clarified regulations that foresee special treatment for SCEs, creating a 
separate class of foreign investors. An example is the Foreign Investment and National 
Security Act of the United States: it establishes a presumption that an investigation needs 
to be undertaken by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States if a 
merger or acquisition in the United States is undertaken by a SCE. (It remains to be seen 
to what extent this kind of distinction is permitted in light of international investment 
law.) The second concern has given rise to a discussion of “competitive neutrality.” 
 
FDI can make an important contribution to economic growth and development. There is 
no systematic evidence that such investment by SCEs cannot make the same contribution 
that private firms can make. The special treatment that seems to be emerging for these 
entities needs to be watched carefully, including from the perspective as to what extent 
such a fragmentation in the treatment of a certain class of foreign investors serves the 




                                                
8 The three most important are: natural resources (12); telecommunications (10); utilities (6). 
9 Thilo Hanemann and Daniel Rosen, “Chinese FDI in the United States is taking off: How to maximize its 
benefits?,” Columbia FDI Perspective, No. 49 (October 24, 2011), p. 2. 
10 See Karl P. Sauvant, Lisa E. Sachs and Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongbloed, eds., Sovereign Investment: 
Concerns and Policy Reactions (New York: OUP, 2012). 
11 However, non-SCE MNEs also receive a range of benefits. 
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Annex table. Non-financial MNEs with 50% or more government ownership stake, 20101 
 























































































































































































 TOTAL     2,056,015 569,857 996,353 316,468 3,052,599 464,878   
 
________________________ 
Source: The authors, based on UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of 
International Production and Development (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2011), annual reports, financial 
registration documents, company corporate websites, and Thomson Worldscope database. 
1 Whenever available, the table reflects the government’s share of voting rights. However, due to lack of 
information, the table uses in some cases shares in capital or other variables as reported by the companies 
(sometimes, however, it is unclear what variables are being used). Note, moreover, that recent information 
(especially on MNEs based in emerging markets) could not be obtained for all of the 200 firms contained in 
the sample, particularly as far as indirect ownership is concerned. Thus, there may be additional firms 
among the 200 that should be included in table 1 and/or table 2. Moreover, as a rule only state ownership 
stakes by the government of the country in which a MNE is based are reported here (and not ownership 
shares of foreign government entities, e. g. via SWFs). In some cases, government ownership may be 













There are no up-to-date systematic data on the size, composition, ownership structure, 
and economic weight of state-owned enterprises (SOEs),1 so we are unable to assess the 
impact of SOE performance on stakeholders in domestic and overseas markets. Yet there 
is sufficient evidence of their expansion, especially following the 2008 financial crisis. 
Emerging markets, led by China, are now increasingly encouraging their SOEs to expand 
globally as MNEs.2 
 
The competitive advantage of SOEs is enhanced by Treasury guarantees for financing 
from state-owned financial institutions. Governments as majority or full owners of state-
owned banks accept a lower rate of return on their invested capital than private investors 
and so can offer favorable borrowing terms. For example, Chinese state ownership and 
control over the entire banking sector, except for Minsheng Bank, is well documented.3 
Sixteen of eighteen Chinese MNEs–most or all state-owned–have apparently taken the 
lead in the country’s international expansion with “easier access to bank loans and 
financial markets.”4 Chinese SOEs in African markets are supported by other Chinese 
SOEs in banking and logistics.5 Chinese state-owned MNEs deter private competitors in 
African markets as they tilt the playing field to their advantage. Non-transparent 
government-to-government deal-making reduces the welfare of stakeholders.6 
 
Backing from state-controlled financial institutions is not confined to state-owned MNEs, 
but is provided to privately owned MNEs as well as they enter international infrastructure 
markets in the form of public-private partnerships (PPPs). Recently, for example, a 
consortium led by a privately-owned Turkish construction conglomerate won a 
competitive tender to build a  € 100 million airport in Kosovo -- raising 80% of the 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank Harry Broadman, Hans Christiansen, Jose Gomez-Ibanez, and John Nellis for 
their helpful comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on April 25, 2011. 
1 The single document that assembled and analyzed the latest data on SOEs in developing countries is a 
World Bank publication, Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politics of Government Ownership 
(New York: OUP, 1995), with no subsequent follow-up thereafter. The OECD has recently been trying to 
measure the dimensions of the state-enterprise sectors of its members. There are hardly any systematic data 
worldwide on the dimensions of enterprises owned by sub-national governments and municipalities. 
2 Ian Bremmer, The End of Free market: Who Wins the War Between State and Corporations? (New York: 
Portfolio, 2010), pp. 85-145. 
3 Working Group on Privatization and Corporate Governance of State-Owned Assets, “State enterprises in 
China: reviewing the evidence,” OECD, Occasional Paper, January 2009, pp. 6-7. 
4 Fudan University and Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment (VCC), “Second 
ranking survey finds strong growth in the foreign assets of Chinese multinationals,” December 17, 2009, p. 
3, available at: www.vcc.columbia.edu. 
5 Keith Campbell, “800 Chinese state-owned enterprises active in Africa, covering every country,” Mining 
Weekly, September 28, 2007, pp. 2-3. 




financing from a state-controlled Turkish bank and 20% from the consortium.7 Other 
bidders may not have enjoyed similar access to such bank loans. 
 
The international development community has begun to promote PPPs in infrastructure 
sectors, expecting the private sector to bring private investments and technical know-how, 
with competitive tenders delivering the intended development outcomes. This is doubtful 
if state-owned and controlled banks back privately-owned MNEs, hinder competition 
overseas and unintentionally reduce the intended benefits to domestic entrepreneurs as 
they fail to enter and win PPP concessions. 
 
We can only know how much SOEs impede competition if there is a single entity 
worldwide collecting and analyzing consistent cross-country and cross-sectoral data on 
all SOEs. Only with proper data and analysis we can measure the size, magnitude, 
economic weight, and performance of SOEs, including state-owned banks, worldwide. 
The World Bank does not engage in such data collection, but the IMF might. With such 
data, we can assess SOEs’ impact on consumers, labor, enterprise performance, owners 
and operators, taxpayers, competitors, communities, and the environment. We could then 
draw policy conclusions, maximize the development impact of the SOEs at home and 
overseas, and ensure that PPPs produce desired outcomes. 
                                                
7 Vakif Bank, majority owned by the Directorate of Public Foundations and managed by the Prime 
Minister, can afford to seek a lower rate of return on invested capital compared to private banks; the details 





Are SWFs welcome now? 
 
Veljko Fotak and William Megginson* 
 
Until the end of 2007, western media, governments and regulators often seemed more 
concerned about protecting domestic firms from investments by SWFs than about 
attracting capital inflows. Politicians in many countries called for the regulation of 
sovereign foreign investments at that time, when SWF investments were growing rapidly. 
In fact, during 2006 and 2007, countries that introduced at least one regulatory change 
(many of them related to such investments) making the investment climate less 
welcoming for MNEs accounted for 40% of all FDI inflows.1 
 
In early 2008, attitudes began to change, as SWFs temporarily rescued the western 
banking system by purchasing approximately US$ 60 billion of new equity issued by US 
and European banks. As the financial crisis deepened, western financial firms displayed 
an ever-increasing appetite for foreign capital. At the same time, sources of the latter 
dried up rapidly, with a decrease in total FDI in 2008 of around 15%. Investment in 
OECD countries by SWFs declined throughout 2008, totaling US$ 37 billion during the 
first quarter, US$ 9 billion during the second and US$ 8 billion during the third.2 A 
handful of factors brought about this decline. Low commodity prices and the 
underperformance of previous investments led to a shrinking asset and funding base even 
as a renewed emphasis on more conservative asset classes and domestic investments 
dramatically reduced the proportion of assets invested in foreign equity. 
 
The ongoing need for capital by the western financial system, coupled with the sudden 
drop in foreign investments by SWFs, is leading to a dramatic shift in attitudes. Rather 
than discouraging SWF capital inflows, Western governments and firms are actively 
seeking sovereign direct investment, and public calls for opening financial markets to 
SWFs now abound.3 Whereas observers once feared an excessive push toward the 
regulation of foreign investment and a consequent stifling of FDI inflows into OECD 
countries, these fears have been allayed in part by the adoption of the Santiago Principles 
by both the major SWFs and the principal Western countries that now seek SWF capital. 
 
Today, we are again facing the risk of overreaction, but in the opposite direction: security 
concerns, certainly overplayed in the past, are being sidelined. Yet, previous calls for 
                                                
* The authors are grateful to José María Serena Garralda and April Knill for their helpful comments on this 
chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on July 21, 2009. 
1 Karl P. Sauvant, “Driving and countervailing forces: a rebalancing of national FDI policies,” in Karl P. 
Sauvant, ed., Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 2008-2009 (New York: OUP, 2009), 
pp. 239-240. 
2 William Miracky et al., “Sovereign wealth fund investment behavior: analysis of sovereign wealth fund 
transactions during Q3 2008,” Monitor Company Group Publications (2008). 
3 For example, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Sovereign wealth funds and 
recipient country policies,” OECD Investment Committee Report (2008) and Warren Buffet, “Letter to the 
shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.” (2008). 
 
29 
protectionism and current appeals to open markets completely both lack the support of 
empirical evidence, as very little is known about the impact of SWF investments on target 
firms and recipient economies. Accordingly, we believe that the most important step for 
governments is to promote the analysis of SWF investments and their impact on target 
firms, with the goal of developing the body of knowledge necessary for the formulation 
of the proper regulatory response. In doing so, we recommend the following guiding 
principles: 
 
• The burden of proof should fall on those calling for restricting access to national 
markets. While we recognize the need for further investigation, we note that, 
despite over a half-century of SWF activity, there are no examples of politically 
charged or otherwise detrimental (to recipient economies) SWF investments. At 
the same time, the benefits associated with long-term, stable investments are 
obvious. 
• Beware of excessive transparency. Regulators have singled out SWFs for their 
lack of transparency. Yet, many other investment vehicles, such as hedge funds, 
are just as opaque. While transparency is, in general terms, desirable, transparency 
imposed on select market participants can put those at a serious disadvantage and 
lead to unprofitable trading; in fact, evidence indicates that SWF profitability is 
inversely related to their transparency. 4  Any measure aimed at increasing 
transparency should not be targeted at any specific class of investors. SWFs need 
to provide information to regulators, but should not be subject to any further 
transparency requirements in respect to other market participants. 
• Act multilaterally -- involve the World Trade Organization along with the IMF. 
Past experience with FDI regulation suggests that multilateral action is more 
effective than bilateral agreements. Accordingly, we urge regulators to act in 
concert. The IMF brokered the Santiago Principles last year, and should remain 
involved in negotiations between SWFs and investee countries. Another 
international body that naturally emerges as a candidate for assuming a true 
regulatory role is the WTO, as it already enforces the General Agreement on 
Trades in Services which covers most SWF investments. 
• Remember that SWFs are not all equal. Governments must realize that SWFs are 
a heterogeneous group. They vary dramatically in respect to size, funding, 
objectives, investment style and sophistication. Accordingly, regulators should 
resist the temptation to restrict SWFs unduly in the event of a fund 
“misbehaving.” Regulation should, a priori, treat all SWFs equally, but any ad-
hoc response should affect the offending fund, rather than the entire category. 
 
Formulating the proper regulatory response requires striking a fine balance between the 
need for foreign capital and the danger of foreign governments interfering in sensitive 
sectors of the economy. Yet, while the benefits are clear, the risks are not yet understood. 
Unfortunately, a global financial crisis and recession is not the best time for the 
development of a cool-headed, rational, regulatory response, but the actions of western 
governments during this period are likely to shape the landscape of FDI for years to 
                                                
4 Bernardo Bortolotti, Veljko Fotak, William Megginson, and William Miracky, “Sovereign wealth fund 
investment patterns and performance,” Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper, mimeo (2009). 
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come. In the short term, we urge regulators to rely on existing FDI restrictions, already 
ensuring the avoidance of the most pernicious scenarios, and on SWF self-regulation, 













The first sovereign wealth fund was established by Kuwait in 1953,1 and was followed by 
many others from 1973-1974, after the first oil crisis.2 Since then, each major jump in oil 
and gas prices increased the number and size of SWFs; after 2000, countries with large 
trade surpluses also began to establish SWFs. By April 2009, SWFs had grown to US$ 3-
5 trillion of assets under management,3 invested mostly in high quality bonds. Equity 
investments have been a much smaller part of their portfolio and began to grow only in 
the 1990s. This trend has since accelerated with at least 698 documented equity 
investments between June 2005 and March 2009.4 
 
These investments brought SWFs not only increased attention, but also their name, 
adopted by the Financial Times in May 2007.5 This has been unfortunate and misleading. 
The term has endowed SWFs with a special and even threatening aura, even though, 
under international law, they do not enjoy sovereign immunity, as they are just state-
owned entities, along with government-owned airlines, banks, shipping companies, etc. 
We have a long history of national and international jurisprudence for dealing with these, 
but, since reality is rarely a bar to fashion, the term is here to stay. 
 
The recent large investments by SWFs in troubled financial institutions brought these 
funds unprecedented publicity, and the increased attention of the governments of host 
countries and of International Financial Institutions. The former were interested mainly in 
the economic and security implications of SWFs’ investments, while the latter, and the 
OECD in particular, seem concerned that SWFs might face restrictions by host countries 
of the kind that many of the SWFs’ home countries have been applying against foreign 
investors.6 
 
How important in fact are the SWFs? Of course, 3-5 trillion dollars is a lot of money, but 
it is only a small part of the investment universe. This universe includes external 
                                                
* The author is writing in his personal capacity and wishes to thank Rudi Bogni, Mary Bonar, Veljko Fotak, 
Nanette Neuwahl, and Stephen Y. K. Pan for their helpful comments on this chapter, which was first 
published as a Perspective on October 1, 2009.  
1 Bernardo Bortoletti, Veljko Fotak, William L. Meggison, William F. Miracky, “Sovereign wealth fund 
investment patterns and performance,” MSS Draft, 13 July 2009, pp. 39 and 49. (Hereafter: BFMM). 
2 Singapore was the exception to this rule; it established in Temasek Holdings in 1974, and the Government 
of Singapore Investment Corporation in 1981. 
3 BFMM, op. cit., p. 37, listing 32 funds that meet Monitor-FEEM standards, with US$ 1,831 million in 
assets, while UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2008: Transnational Corporations and the 
Infrastructure Challenge (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2008), p. 20 reported US$ 5 billion as a headline number, 
but also noted US$ 3 billion+ as a credible estimate. 
4 BFMM, op. cit., p. 1. 
5 BFMM, op. cit., p. 50. 
6 See e.g., OECD, “Sovereign wealth funds and recipient country policies: report by the OECD Investment 
Committee,” (Paris: Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development, 2008). 
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sovereign debt of US$ 55 trillion, equities of at least US$ 40 trillion, plus even more in 
real estate, artificial financial instruments, precious metals, commodity trading 
instruments, and so on and on. SWFs are actually one of the smaller players, just above 
hedge funds. By way of comparison, pension funds, mutual funds and insurance funds 
each have approximately US$ 20-23 trillion of assets.  
 
Paradoxically, SWFs are least important with regards to FDI, defined by the IMF as 
equity investments that exceed 10% of the target company’s voting shares. Annual FDI 
flows in the past 10 years have ranged between US$ 600 billion to a record US$ 2 trillion 
in 2007. Meanwhile, the FDI from SWFs amounted to only US$ 10 billion in 2007: 0.2% 
of their total assets, and 0.6% of the FDI flows that year.7 
 
Clearly, the attention and concern generated by SWFs has been disproportionate to their 
systemic importance, and especially so regarding FDI. The reasons? SWFs are good copy 
for the media because most are from distant countries with dictatorial or authoritarian 
regimes, they are at least vaguely mysterious, and many of their transactions are 
genuinely newsworthy. The media’s focus has in turn generated hype and political 
attention, and much of what we are witnessing now is similar to the spectacles of the late 
1970s about Arab equity investments in the United States and Western Europe. 
 
The attention by governments has been partly a response to public and political pressures, 
but their concern about national security should not be underestimated. All foreign 
investment has been subject to national security considerations for a long time. SWFs are 
instruments of state, mostly of states with at best delicate relations with NATO member 
countries, and several belong to potential adversaries with a long history of extensive and 
effective espionage. SWFs are not the best vehicle for information gathering, influencing 
host countries, and for various economic and commercial mischiefs, and this is why 
national security related reviews cover all foreign investments. 
 
In the coming years, SWFs will grow in number and size, probably in an international 
arena more turbulent than now, and SWFs will continue to favor the major advanced 
economies. Although SWFs are unlikely to become a significant source of FDI, their 
importance in other equity investments may well increase along the lines of their recent 
acquisitions of up to 9.99% of several major financial institutions. Consequently, host 
governments will continue to be obliged to follow a fine line between the demands of 
national security, balanced against the desirability of increased capital inflows, and the 
goodwill of countries needed for the attainment of foreign policy objectives. 
 
This may well require a review process for SWFs that goes beyond the existing review 
mechanisms, and may even have informal aspects. Host countries will need to 
differentiate SWFs by their nationality and by their relationship with the host countries. 
Therefore, decision-making will need the direct involvement of the diplomatic, military 
and intelligence communities while still acting within the time frame required by 
investors. All this may seem daunting, but the United States and the United Kingdom in 
                                                
7 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2008: Transnational Corporations and the Infrastructure Challenge 
(Geneva: UNCTAD, 2008), p. 20. 
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particular have immense experience in dealing with foreign investment since the First 
World War. These experiences and modus operandi are readily transferable to existing or 
new monitoring entities. It remains to be seen whether SWFs will become a source of 
conflict or of responsible capital, but judging from past experience, a sensible and 
sensitive review process should serve well both the SWFs and the host countries as long 
as they are both aiming at a seamless and quiet settlement of actual and potential 
disagreements. After all, business is business, and host countries and SWFs have already 











Roll out the red carpet and they will come: Investment promotion and 
FDI inflows 
 
Torfinn Harding and Beata Javorcik * 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to developing countries are hindered by many 
factors. Two of these factors -- the mere lack of information and red tape -- could be 
easily remedied through investment promotion efforts. 
 
Prior to undertaking FDI in a foreign country, investors need to familiarize themselves 
with the rules and regulations prevailing in the host country. They need to analyze its 
growth prospects and obtain detailed information on labor costs. They may want to know 
about the availability of potential joint venture partners or suppliers of inputs. While 
information on developed countries is readily available and consulting firms can assist in 
this process, obtaining information on business conditions in developing countries is 
often tricky. 
 
Once an investment decision is made, investors need to comply with a series of 
bureaucratic procedures. As illustrated by the Doing Business Indicators produced by the 
World Bank, such procedures may be quite burdensome. For instance, the number of 
procedures required to start a business varies from 2 in Georgia to 21 in Equatorial 
Guinea. The number of days required to complete a registration process ranges from 2 in 
Georgia to 649 in Suriname. 
 
Investment promotion efforts can reduce the negative effect of the lack of information 
and the burden of bureaucratic procedures and in this way stimulate inflows of FDI.1 
Sectors targeted by investment promotion agencies receive twice as much FDI in the 
post-targeting period relative to the pre-targeting period and non-targeted sectors. 
Importantly, the effect is not driven by promising industries being targeted. 2  The 
magnitude of the effect is plausible, since the median sector-level investment (in country-
                                                
* The authors wish to thank Henry Loewendahl, Karin Millett and Stephen Young for their helpful 
comments on an earlier text on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on June 18, 2012. 
1 For details, see our "Roll out the red carpet and they will come: Investment promotion and FDI inflows,” 
Economic Journal, vol. 121 (December 2011), pp. 1445-1476. Our study took advantage of differences in 
investment promotion efforts across countries, sectors and time and the fact that most investment 
promotion agencies (IPAs) target particular sectors to attract FDI. It used information on sector-specific 
investment promotion efforts and detailed figures on flows of US FDI into 95 developing countries during 
1990-2004 to conduct a difference-in-differences analysis. 
2 The results hold when the sample excludes countries whose targeting decision was based on the past 
success or failure in attracting FDI to the sector. There is no evidence suggesting that targeting took place 
in sectors with relatively high or low inflows in the years preceding targeting. Finally, a strict exogeneity 
test does not reject the validity of the empirical strategy used. The analysis controls for changes in host 
country business environment by including country-year fixed effects, heterogeneity of sectors in different 
locations by including country-sector fixed effects and shocks to supply of FDI in particular sectors by 
adding sector-time fixed effects. 
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sector combinations with positive FDI flows) reached US$ 11 million in 2004. The 
estimated effect of investment promotion, therefore, translates into an additional annual 
inflow of US$ 17 million. 
 
How exactly does investment promotion increase FDI inflows? The process of selecting 
an FDI site typically involves four stages. First, a long list of 8-20 potential host countries 
encompassing popular FDI destinations, countries close to existing operations and 
emerging FDI destinations is created. The third group represents an opportunity for an 
IPA that, by advertising in the business press and participating in industry fairs, can draw 
attention to its country. In the second stage, about five sites are selected from the long 
list, based on the trade-off between costs and the quality of the business environment. 
The accessibility of the information about potential host countries plays a crucial role, as 
sites under consideration are rarely visited during this stage. IPAs that have up-to-date, 
detailed and accurate data on their websites and are willing to prepare detailed answers to 
investors’ inquiries can increase the chances of their countries being included in the short 
list. In the third step, the investor typically visits the host country, giving the IPA an 
opportunity to emphasize the advantages of locating there, present potential investment 
sites and facilitate contacts with the local business community. IPAs can also play a role 
in the fourth and final stage by providing information on investment incentives and 
offering help with the registration process. 
 
IPAs stimulate FDI inflows by facilitating access to information and reducing the burden 
of red tape. More specifically, investment promotion is more effective in countries where 
English is not an official language and in countries that are more culturally distant from 
the United States. These two findings are consistent with investment promotion reducing 
information and communication barriers between US investors and host countries. Also, 
investment promotion works better in countries with less effective governments, higher 
corruption and a longer time period required to start a business or obtain a construction 














One important novelty of the Lisbon Treaty, ratified by the EU in December 2009, is the 
inclusion of FDI within the scope of Common Commercial Policy, implying a transfer of 
certain FDI competences from the member states to the EU, which now has the ability to 
conclude international investment treaties. 1  Until now, member states had full 
competence over FDI, and the role of EU institutions was very limited. It remains to be 
seen how the new Treaty will be interpreted and implemented in light of the difficult 
legal and political questions that this development raises. 
 
While the Treaty does not propose any change regarding FDI promotion competences, 
perhaps this is also the opportunity to take a more active, coordinated approach to FDI 
promotion at the EU level. Within the European Single Market, member states fiercely 
compete against each other and have steadily increased the scale and scope of resources 
devoted to national and sub-national investment promotion agencies (IPAs). While 
competitive FDI promotion will remain, a critical challenge now is to increase 
cooperation among member states to attract more FDI into the EU as a whole. 
 
There are several reasons for this suggestion. There might be information failures to be 
addressed at the EU level: for example, the potential for cross-border activities by foreign 
MNEs across the EU, the incentive schemes available at the EU level or the mechanisms 
to engage in European research networks and to benefit from European R&D funding. 
The sharp decline in FDI inflows in recent years also supports a coordinated EU approach 
to FDI promotion: according to UNCTAD, in 2009, FDI into the EU fell by 28%, 
following a deeper 40% decrease in 2008. This does not necessarily mean that the EU is 
losing FDI competitiveness -- for example the US experienced a similar decline -- but it 
is still reason for concern. What’s clear is that the share of developed countries in FDI 
inflows has fallen significantly relative to the share of developing economies, within a 
context of shrinking global FDI flows.2 Moreover, the prospects for the near future are 
also worrisome; only four EU countries appear among the 15 most attractive FDI 
locations in 2009-2011.3 The most attractive country is China, followed by the US; the 
first EU country is the UK, in sixth position. Besides the necessary reforms to improve 
the business climate, it therefore seems clear that a more efficient promotion of the EU as 
a regional bloc would be desirable. 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank John Kline, Armand de Mestral, Manfred Schekulin, and Stephen Young for 
their helpful comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on March 4, 2010. 
1 See Armand de Mestral, “The Lisbon Treaty and the expansion of EU competence over foreign direct 
investment and the implications for investor- state arbitration,” in Karl P. Sauvant, ed., Yearbook on 
International Investment Law and Policy 2009/2010 (New York: OUP, 2010). 
2 For a detailed review, see chapter 5 above, Laza Kekic, “The global economic crisis and FDI flows to 
emerging markets.” 




In fact, several initiatives have emerged along these lines in recent years. For example, 
the European Attractiveness Scoreboard, launched in 2007 as a joint initiative of the 
governmental IPAs of France and Germany, gives insight into Europe's investment 
climate and provides a comprehensive overview of Europe's business strengths. The 
benchmark study compares Europe with competing investment locations, including the 
US, China, Japan, India, and Brazil, based on a comprehensive range of economic and 
social indicators. 
 
More recently, the EU chapter of the World Association of Investment Promotion 
Agencies (WAIPA) has also taken action. WAIPA brings together national and sub-
national IPAs from all over the world; its EU chapter, currently chaired by Invest in 
Spain, comprises all the EU member states except Luxembourg. Invest in Spain has been 
preparing a first draft of a promotional document entitled “Why Europe?” that has been 
presented and discussed with the other EU IPAs. This document aims at becoming a 
marketing piece for the EU as a whole and to serve as an investment guide for 
international dissemination. 
 
These initiatives should be seen as just the initial phase of intra-EU cooperation, focusing 
primarily on the elaboration of promotional documents and investment guides. The next 
(and more controversial) question is whether the EU should further develop common FDI 
promotion policies and tools. This could be done under the umbrella of an EU IPA, akin 
to the US’ Invest in America. 
 
Like Invest in America, the EU IPA should focus solely on efforts to promote the EU as a 
whole. It could develop a website and materials to provide information about the 
strengths of the EU in different sectors or about the regulatory regime and incentives 
available at the EU-level. It could provide support to foreign investors, for example 
helping to find suitable business partners or suppliers or to comply with EU-level 
competition regulations. It could also aim at stimulating collaboration and synergies 
among national IPAs, for example by organizing joint seminars and missions abroad. 
Finally, it could play an important policy advocacy role in Brussels, by suggesting 
possible solutions to the business climate concerns of foreign investors. It should always 
remain neutral and refer foreign investors to the different national contact points when 
asked about specific locations within the EU. This agency would not need a big resource 
structure; for example, Invest in America operates with around seven employees. 
 
The first priority of common EU investment promotion should be to communicate better 
the strengths of the EU as a location for innovation and R&D, since many of the recent 
developments of the so-called European Research Area remain obscure to foreign 
investors. The EU aspiration to become “the most competitive knowledge-based 
economy in the world” requires not only encouraging European companies to invest more 
in R&D, but also attracting the R&D activity of foreign MNEs. 
 
The key challenge ahead will be to balance the natural competition among member states 





Investment incentives and the global competition for capital 
 
Kenneth P. Thomas* 
 
Investment incentives (subsidies designed to affect the location of investment) are a 
pervasive feature of global competition for FDI. They are used by the vast majority of 
countries, at multiple levels of government, in a broad range of industries. They take a 
variety of forms, including tax holidays, grants and free land. Politicians, at least in the 
United States, may have good electoral incentives to use them.1 
 
The Philippines has been estimated to spend 1% of GDP on “redundant” investment 
incentives (the investment would have come without subsidy); Vietnam’s incentives were 
estimated at 0.7% of GDP in 2002; and US state and local governments spend 
approximately US$ 46.8 billion per year on location subsidies.2 This is just the tip of the 
iceberg, as most countries’ incentive spending is poorly reported. 
 
Like all subsidies, investment incentives tend to be economically inefficient and make 
income distributions more unequal (by transferring funds from average taxpayers to 
owners of capital). At times, they subsidize environmentally harmful projects, such as 
building a shopping center in a wetlands area.3 Incentives are not always a bad policy, but 
their use requires taking potential problems into consideration. 
 
Bargaining over incentives is characterized by major information asymmetries, leading to 
the likelihood of a government paying more than needed to attract an investment. 
Companies often conduct an incentives auction even when they have already made their 
location decision,4 a clear sign of rent-seeking behavior.5 
 
The past two decades have seen the spread of incentives to developing countries. 
Sometimes they find themselves in direct competition with industrialized countries for a 
particular investment. There are numerous cases in which developing countries have paid 
much higher incentives than those paid for similar investments in developed countries, 
reducing funds for infrastructure and education. A recent example is Goiás state's (Brazil) 
US$ 125 million subsidy to Usina Canada for a US$ 25 million investment in an ethanol 
facility in 2009, which came to over US$ 200,000 per job. In India, Gujarat state won a 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank Magnus Blomstrom, Marie-France Houde and Charles Oman for their helpful 
comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on December 30, 2011. 
1  Nathan M. Jensen and Edmund J. Malesky, “FDI incentives pay—politically,” Columbia FDI 
Perspectives, No. 26 (June 28, 2010). 
2 Kenneth P. Thomas, Investment Incentives and the Global Competition for Capital (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011). 
3 C.D. Selzer, “The low road,” Riverfront Times, August 18, 1999. 
4 Greg LeRoy, The Great American Jobs Scam (San Francisco: Barrett-Koehler, 2005), p. 54. 
5 Anne O. Krueger, “The political economy of the rent-seeking society,” American Economic Review, vol. 




2008 competition for the right to produce the Tata Nano. While subsidy estimates vary 
widely, they start at about US$ 800 million, far above the cost of Tata’s investment. 
 
Given the potential problems and risks of using incentives, many analysts have sought 
policies to control them. The most comprehensive approach is embodied in EU regional 
aid policy, which sets a maximum level of subsidy for every region in the European 
Union, with the highest subsidies allowed only in the European Union’s poorest regions; 
many richer areas are banned from providing regional aid to any company. Moreover, 
these maxima are progressively reduced for investments over € 50 million, which helps 
put the brakes on the size of incentives. EU state aid rules require subsidies to be notified 
in advance to the European Commission and provide the Commission wide discretion to 
approve, prohibit or modify a proposed subsidy. The notification rules ensure a level of 
transparency seen in few other parts of the world. The EU rules have meant that Member 
States have given much smaller subsidies than US state governments for similar 
investments. For example, Hyundai received incentives of about US$ 117,000 per job 
from Alabama in 2002, but only about US$ 75,000 per job from the Czech Republic in 
2007. Alabama’s per capita income in 2006 was US$ 29,414 while the Czech Republic’s 
was US$ 12,680 at current exchange rates and US$ 21,470 at purchasing power parity 
exchange rates. This and similar comparisons strongly suggest that EU regional aid 
control is effective in reducing investment incentives. 
 
At the global level, no comparable rules specifically address location subsidies, although 
the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures applies to all subsidies 
and the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises 
provides for consultations. Subnational agreements in Australia and Canada prohibit 
subsidizing the relocation of existing operations (more successfully in the former than in 
the latter), and Vietnam, like the European Union, has variable subsidy limits for its 
provinces based on their per capita income. 
 
Outside the European Union and several US states, information on incentives is only as 
good as a country’s press corps. Australia and Canada collect reports on incentives from 
their states and provinces, but do not make this data public. Thus, transparency is the first 
step to reform in most of the world. 
 
Beyond transparency, other reforms can make incentive policy more effective. This 
would include banning relocation subsidies, adopting job quality guidelines and 
“clawback” policies to reclaim incentives from firms that do not meet their investment or 
job creation commitments, requiring linkages with local enterprises, and adopting 











FDI incentives pay -- politically 
 
Nathan M. Jensen and Edmund J. Malesky * 
 
Despite broad skepticism about the benefits of globalization, the majority of US states 
have offered lucrative tax incentives to attract investment.1 The size of these incentives is 
generally considered too large to be welfare enhancing, and many economists are 
skeptical of the effectiveness of these policies. Yet despite the mounting evidence to the 
contrary, the incentives offered by US states (and foreign countries) continue and have 
actually increased in their generosity over time. 
 
In the fall of 2009, we sought to solve this puzzle by conducting an Internet survey of 
2,000 Americans as part of a Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) project. 
In this survey, we included questions to assess how individuals feel about FDI and the 
individuals’ efforts to hold politicians accountable for its attraction.2 Our central finding 
is that politicians can use tax incentives to take credit for investment flowing into their 
district, or deflect blame for losing the competition for mobile firms. Thus, fiscal 
incentives, while economically inefficient, may be a useful tool for politicians to win 
reelection. 
 
Our first question in the survey asked: “In recent years  ____ companies have invested in 
the United States. Do you think these investments are good for the US economy?” One-
third of the respondents had the above blank filled in with the word “foreign,” one-third 
with “Japanese,” and one-third with “Chinese.” When asked about foreign companies, 
the majority of respondents (55%) indicated that these investments are good for the US 
economy. A sizable percentage disagreed (22%) or answered “don’t know” (23%). 
Support for investment increased when asked about Japanese investment, where 61% of 
the respondents answered “yes,” and the remainder answered “no” (18%) and “don’t 
know” (21%). This support plummeted to only 35% when asked about Chinese 
investment, with 45% answering “no” and 20% “don’t know” (annex figure 1). 
 
These survey results reveal mixed support for FDI with sizeable minorities either 
skeptical or uncertain of its benefits. When asked about Chinese investment, the skeptics 
outnumber the supporters, likely due the perception of China as our closest foreign 
                                                
* The authors thank the Center for Empirical Legal Research and the Weidenbaum Center for the Study of 
Economy, Government, and Public Policy for funding this survey. They also wish to thank David Leblang, 
Glen Biglaiser, and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments on this chapter, which was first 
published as a Perspective on June 28, 2010. 
1 The 2008 Pew Global Attitudes Survey found that only 25% of Americans thought foreign investment had 
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negative” opinion. http://pewglobal.org/category/data-sets/. 
2 Nathan M Jensen, Edmund Malesky, Mariana Medina, and Ugur Ozdemir, “Pass the bucks: investment 
incentives as political credit-claiming devices. Evidence from a survey experiment,” Paper presented at the 
2010 Globalization and Governance Conference, (Washington University in St. Louis, 2010). 
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competitor. We imagine that a similar survey in the 1980s may have found skepticism 
toward Japanese investment, when Japan was seen as our closest rival. 
 
A second set of questions3 asked citizens about their voting intentions for governor. 
While many factors affect voting for governor, attracting investment (foreign or 
domestic) has become central to many governors’ economic development strategies. We 
asked respondents to imagine a 1,000-job manufacturing facility either choosing to locate 
in the respondent’s state or in another state, and how this affected voting intentions for 
the governor. 
 
Our results were striking. The attraction of investment, without knowing the firm-specific 
reasons for the location decision, led 20.9% more respondents to say they would vote for 
the incumbent governor than in states that did not receive the investment, after 
controlling for individual and state determinants. This was especially apparent for 
independent voters (23.6%), whereas partisan voters (strong Democrats or Republicans) 
were less swayed by this information (annex figure 2). 
 
We also provided information on tax incentives, asking respondents to consider a 
situation in which the state provided either above-average or below-average incentive 
packages. Again, our findings were clear. For states that received the investment project, 
the governor received an additional 5.6 percentage point vote bonus for offering tax 
incentives from independents. This bears repeating. Independent voters preferred 
governors that provided tax incentives to attract investment to governors who received 
investment without offering generous tax incentives. 
 
When states “lost” our hypothetical investment project, the contrast was even clearer. 
Governors who did not receive the investment were always worse off than governors 
from states who attracted the investment, but the “punishment” was much less severe if 
tax incentives were offered. Put another way, if you are a governor of a state and are 
certain that a firm is going to locate within your borders, offering a tax incentive gets you 
an extra 5.6 percentage points of votes from independent voters. Go ahead and take credit 
for the investment. If you know your state is going to lose the project, the decision is 
easier still. Offering the tax incentives provides an extra 5.3 percentage points of all votes 
and 11.2 percentage points of independents. “It’s not my fault, we offered them tax 
incentives!” 
 
The findings from the survey indicate two clear points related to public policy. First, the 
tax wars among states, and possibly among countries, are strongly driven by domestic 
politics. Politicians may be trying to take credit for investment that is going to come 
anyway and/or trying to minimize blame for investment that does not come. Even without 
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matching correction for Polimetrix has been shown to deliver highly representative samples and accurate 
forecasting predictions in repeated studies of this nature. See Lynn Vavreck and Douglas Rivers, “The 2006 




any tax competition, politicians may be taking advantage of voters’ perceptions (or 
misperceptions) of competition. 
 
Second, despite some popular rhetoric against FDI, and specifically Chinese FDI, we find 
strong evidence that there are massive political benefits to attracting FDI.4 Although 
many voters are skeptical of its benefits nationally, they clearly reward politicians for 
attracting investment to their state.  
 
Congressional pollsters have noticed a strange pattern over time. While nobody seems to 
like the institution of Congress or incompetent politicians, survey data (and the 90% 
reelection rate) suggest that voters like their members of Congress. Our findings point to 
an interesting parallel with the perceptions of Americans on FDI: there is some 
skepticism of the benefits of FDI, unless it is creating jobs in their state. 
 
Annex figure 1. FDI incentives: is this investment good for the US economy? (%)a 
 
 
a Results from all voters, sample size 1,944. “In recent years [foreign], [Chinese], [Japanese], companies 
have invested in the United States. Do you think these investments are good for the US Economy?” 
(Options randomized into three groups). 
  
                                                
4 One example is the increasing concern about FDI and national security. See Edward M. Graham and 
David M. Marchick, US National Security and Foreign Direct Investment (Washington D.C.: Peterson 
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Annex figure 2. FDI incentives: likelihood of changing vote for governor a 
 
 
a Results from independent voters, sample size 453. Horizontal Access likelihood of voters changing 
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Improving infrastructure or lowering taxes to attract foreign direct 
investment? 
 
Christian Bellak and Markus Leibrecht* 
 
A crucial challenge to all countries in the current economic crisis is to stimulate 
investment, including FDI. Countries striving to attract FDI often resort to two types of 
policies: improving infrastructure or lowering taxes, as a means of attracting new FDI, or 
keeping existing FDI. Indeed, recent empirical studies (e.g., Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2007; 
Bellak et al. 2009) confirmed that both lower taxes and improved infrastructure exert a 
considerable influence upon MNEs’ decision to invest in a particular country, when 
controlling for other important location factors (including market size and labor costs). 
 
Excellent infrastructure is not only a key determinant for foreign investors but also helps 
to improve the competitiveness of domestic firms. High taxes – corporate income taxes in 
particular – are often seen as a deterrent to MNEs, as they directly reduce their after-tax 
profits. Alternative locations with a lower tax burden – and otherwise similar investment 
conditions – can change the investment decisions of MNEs (e.g., de Mooij and Ederveen 
2008). 
 
Policy-makers are pressed by limited budgets to find the optimal policy-mix to maximize 
FDI at a minimum cost to the government and taxpayers. Given the important effects of 
improved infrastructure and lower taxes on FDI, policy-makers must consider two 
important questions when designing their policies:  
 
1. What is the relative importance of lower taxes and improved infrastructure for 
attracting FDI?  
 
2. How does the possible negative effect of high taxes on FDI change if a country invests 
more in infrastructure? This is an important question, since often both policies, (i.e., 
lowering taxes and investing in infrastructure), cannot be achieved simultaneously, since 
the former are required to fund part of the latter. It is worth noting though, that in most 
cases infrastructure is not funded solely by taxes on mobile factors but via general budget 
revenues including debt. 
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The empirical study by Bellak et al. (2009) revealed that taxes are somewhat less 
important as a location factor (standardized coefficient of -0.25) than infrastructure 
(0.27). Moreover, the study revealed that, among the various types of infrastructure, 
information and communication infrastructure is more important (0.45) than transport 
infrastructure (0.19) and electricity generation capacity (0.06). Moreover, the significant 
impacts of taxes and infrastructure are robust not only across different specifications but 
also with respect to countries included in the analysis. Concerning the latter, the study is 
based on FDI measured by bilateral FDI outflows of seven major home countries of FDI -
- Austria (AUT), Germany (DEU), France, Great Britain (GBR), United States (US), the 
Netherlands (NLD) and Italy (ITA) -- to eight important Central and Eastern European 
host countries -- Czech Republic (CZE), Hungary (HUN), Poland (POL), Slovakia 
(SVK), Slovenia (SVN), Bulgaria (BGR), (Croatia) HVN and Romania (ROM) -- during 
the period from 1995 to 2004. The gross national product at current market prices per 
head of population was as follows in 2004, in € 1,000: AUT: 28.3, DEU: 27.1, FRA: 
26.8, GBR: 30, US: 32, NLD: 31, ITA: 23.8, CZE: 8.2, HUN: 7.7, POL: 5.2, SVK: 6.1, 
SVN: 13.4, BGR: 2.6, HVN: 7.2, ROM: 2.7. The EU average value was 21.7.1 Therefore, 
the results are derived based on a set of countries with a wide range of development. 
Finally, it has to be stressed that the host countries of FDI included are rather 
heterogeneous in both key variables, the tax burden levied on FDI as well as the 
endowment with infrastructure. 
 
With respect to the second question, the study also measured the interaction between 
taxes and infrastructure, and the analysis shows that the negative impact high taxes have 
on FDI are negatively correlated with a country’s infrastructure endowment; in fact, the 
negative effect of taxes even vanishes for countries with relatively high levels of 
infrastructure (see also Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2007). Put differently, infrastructure 
generates specific advantages of a location, which allow higher taxes on profits from FDI 




The policy implications of this important result for a country seeking to attract FDI 
(especially countries currently debating the relative merits of cutting taxes versus 
increased spending, such as the United States) actually depend on the tax regime of the 
country. 
 
High tax countries should continue to invest in infrastructure, and do not have to 
participate in the “race to the bottom” in tax rates, as well-developed infrastructure will 
negate the potentially negative effects of high taxes on attracting and keeping FDI. 
Countries with an above average infrastructure endowment can – at least in part – afford 
to finance their infrastructure by taxing corporations. In other words, a policy of 
contributing to improvements in productivity investments in production-related 
infrastructure in fact compensates MNEs for higher taxes.  
 
                                                




The remaining policy issue for such governments is how much they should invest in 
infrastructure and which types of infrastructure should a country focus on. As mentioned 
above, information and communication infrastructure has been shown to be the most 
effective for attracting FDI, followed by transport infrastructure. Moreover, information 
and communication infrastructure is shown to be more important than corporate taxes as 
determinant of FDI (standardized coefficients of 0.45 and -0.25, respectively). Thus, it 
would be better to invest in information and communication infrastructure than lowering 
corporate taxes to attract and keep FDI. 
 
For low tax countries with an inferior infrastructure endowment, like many developing 
countries and transition economies, the importance of tax policy is still relatively 
important, since the infrastructure endowment does not compensate for the costs of high 
taxes. The silver lining, however, is that FDI does react to changes in tax rates, so such 
countries can adjust their tax policies to attract more FDI. In the short term, such 
countries will likely be most successful in attracting FDI by relying on a strategy of low 
corporate income taxes. In the longer term, however, these countries should harness the 
positive contribution of FDI in their countries to invest in improving their infrastructure. 
 
These results are of relevance to the current economic crisis, where countries have been 
scrambling to design stimulus packages that will increase investment, by domestic firms 

















From the FDI triad to multiple FDI poles? 
 
Persephone Economou and Karl P. Sauvant* 
 
Twenty years ago, in the inaugural issue of the World Investment Report,1 the United 
Nations highlighted a shift in the global pattern of FDI from bipolar, dominated by the 
United States and the European Community, to tri-polar (the FDI Triad), dominated by 
the European Community, the United States and Japan. 
 
This Triad needs to be revisited, given the rise of FDI from emerging markets (EMs).2 To 
qualify as a Triad member, a “pole” has to account for at least 10% of global FDI 
outward stocks and flows. While an arbitrary cut-off share, it is indicative of a 
considerable presence in the world FDI market. 
 
Since 1991, the share of the European Community (modified to include all 27 members 
of the European Union) declined from 85% in 1990 to 74% in 2009 in world outward 
FDI stock and from 85% during 1990-1992 to 74% during 2007-2009 in world outward 
FDI flows.3 Of the three poles of the original Triad, Japan’s share in the global FDI 
outward stock slumped from 10% to 4% between 1990 and 2009, while its share in global 
outflows fell from 16% during 1990-1992 to 5% during 2007-2009. According to the “at-
least-10%” cut-off share, Japan no longer qualifies as a Triad pole. 
 
The ascendancy of EMs makes them a candidate for a Triad pole. Their share in the 
world’s outward FDI stock rose from 7% in 1990 to 16% in 2009. Moreover, the 
momentum is on their side: their share of global FDI outflows jumped from 8% during 
1990-1992 to 25% during 2007-2009. 
 
Admittedly, EMs are a large group of economies at different stages of development. 
However, only 20 together accounted for 85% of FDI outflows from all EMs during 
2005-2009 (excluding tax havens). This smaller group is roughly comparable, at least in 
number, to the 27 members of the European Union, also a rather diverse group of 
countries at different levels of development. 
 
The share of the top 20 (all at least middle-income economies) EMs in global FDI stock 
rose from 6% to 13% between 1990 and 2009. Their share in global outflows grew from 6% 
in 1990-1992 to 14% in 2007-2009. With a share of over 10% in both outward flows and 
stocks, EMs (essentially the top 20) could be seen as having replaced Japan as a pole in a 
new FDI Triad, alongside the United States and the European Union. 
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Nations, 1991). 
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However, EMs as a Triad pole may be a short-lived phenomenon. The BRICs as a group 
are emerging as strong candidates for a pole. As of 2009, they had not made the cut-off in 
terms of stocks, together accounting for only 4% of global outward FDI stocks; even if 
Hong Kong, China and Macao, China are included in China’s stock, their share would 
reach only 8%.4 However, the BRICs may soon reach the 10% cut-off in terms of flows: 
over the period 2008-2010, their share in global FDI outflows jumped to 9%; if Hong 
Kong, China and Macao, China are included, that share becomes 13%. 
 
Furthermore, regional integration schemes (e.g. ASEAN), or individual EMs (e.g. China) 
-- could become FDI poles. This would signify a fuller transition from the old FDI Triad 
to a multi-polar FDI world, one in which smaller poles coexist with the dominant 
members of the former Triad. 
 
What are policy implications of these changes? On a practical level, investment 
promotion agencies need to target these new poles when attracting FDI. Also, the new 
players (and established investors) will need to understand that countries no longer look 
just for more FDI, but for sustainable FDI -- investment contributing as much as possible 
to economic, environmental and social development in the framework of mechanisms 
that ensures a fair distribution of the FDI benefits and on the basis of the commercial 
viability of individual projects. 
 
Most importantly, the rise of FDI from EMs, crystallizing moreover in multiple FDI poles, 
is likely to influence international rule-making. In particular, the perspectives of 
industrialized countries and EMs regarding the rights and responsibilities of host 
countries and MNEs under international investment law are likely to become more 
similar, now that the most important among these markets have become significant 
outward investors. Should this occur, the conditions could be ripe for negotiating a 
multilateral framework for investment. 
                                                
4 Double-counting probably still exists as an unknown share of outflows from Hong Kong, China and 
Macao, China consists of transshipment FDI from China and other countries or involves “round-tripping” 





How BRIC MNEs deal with international political risk 
 
Premila Nazareth Satyanand* 
 
Hitherto, political risk has worried developed country MNEs investing in developing 
country markets. But as more emerging market firms invest overseas, they too must 
grapple with this subject. World Investment and Political Risk 2009 looks at this issue for 
the first time and finds that Brazilian, Russian, Indian, and Chinese (BRIC) firms appear 
to worry more about political risk than global counterparts.1 Though these results are 
based on a small sample of 90 of the largest BRIC investors, they are thought-provoking 
nonetheless. 
 
Already, emerging market FDI outflows have tripled from US$ 100 billion in 2000 to 
US$ 350 billion in 2008 according to UNCTAD, driven largely by burgeoning 
investments from Brazil, Russia, India, and China.2 Although the bulk of this FDI has 
gone into developed economies, BRIC firms have also stepped up the size and spread of 
their investments in other emerging markets. 
 
Protecting against political risk 
 
As mentioned earlier, survey data suggests that BRIC firms see political risk as more of a 
concern than global counterparts when investing in emerging economies. This is not 
surprising, since BRIC firms invest heavily even in those developing economies they 
consider among “the world’s five most politically risky," in contrast to global 
counterparts who stay clear of the markets they consider most unstable. Brazil, for 
instance, lists Venezuela as one of its five key emerging markets, even while ranking it as 
one of the world’s five most high-risk markets. China does the same with Indonesia; 
India with Russia and Africa; and Russia with Kazakhstan and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States. Also important is that the BRIC sample also had a higher percentage 
of natural resource firms, which are more vulnerable to political risk. 
 
BRIC firms, like their global counterparts, worry most about breach of contract and 
transfer and convertibility restrictions. But Russian and Brazilian firms worry most about 
breach of contract; Chinese firms about war and civil disturbance; and Indian firms about 
transfer and convertibility restrictions. Also, while just 9% of Indian firms worry about 
expropriation, an average of 26% of Brazilian, Russian and Chinese firms do. 
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Russian from US$ 3 billion to US$ 52 billion; Indian from US$ 336 million to US$ 18 billion; and Chinese 




BRIC firms, like global counterparts, are confident about their ability to assess political 
risk and implement existing mitigation strategies.3 However, they are far less so about 
anticipating new political risks, evaluating new mitigation strategies and assigning roles 
for political risk management. They also rely on the same non-formal political risk 
mitigation strategies as global counterparts, according them different priorities. While 
global firms rely heavily on engagement with host governments and risk analysis, the 
Russian firms surveyed rely most on host country engagement, the Chinese on risk 
analysis and the Indians and Brazilians on local tie-ups. Half the Brazilian sample also 
relies on scenario planning. 
 
BRIC MNEs and political risk going forward 
 
Like global counterparts, few Brazilian, Indian and Chinese firms purchase political risk 
insurance (PRI), but Russian firms rely heavily upon it. More significant, 27% of the 
BRIC sample said they were unfamiliar with PRI products and 48% pointed to the lack of 
appropriate offerings, double the percentages in the global sample. Some BRIC firms said 
that current PRI offerings define political risk too narrowly to be of practical use. They 
had thus purchased it only under pressure from financiers. Some said they were deterred 
by PRI’s high cost and cumbersome contracting. 
 
Equally significant, some said that current PRI thinking does not take adequate 
cognizance of the types of “political” risk challenges they confront. Key among these is 
the fear of sudden policy and regulatory shift in developed markets, which are core to 
their global competitive strategy and where they have billions of dollars invested. India’s 
IT globalizers, for instance, have been hurt by sudden restrictions in US visa and 
outsourcing-related rules. Earlier, developed markets were completely “safe,” but they 
are now subject to worrying protectionist pressures. A sudden reversal in established 
business rules can abruptly disrupt a global business model, causing as much if not more 
of a loss as expropriation or terrorism in a less strategic emerging market. This said, 53% 
of BRIC firms said they would consider political risk insurance going forward, with 
Chinese and Indian firms highly enthusiastic, in contrast to just 40% of global 
respondents. 
 
Home country governments could respond in two ways. First, they could establish or 
expand political risk protection for their globalizing firms. While global private sector 
insurers and international donors offer such protection, many BRIC globalizers find their 
government agencies more responsive to their needs. They also need to more pro-actively 
market their PRI offerings, as do private PRI players. Second is to build local private 
insurers’ ability to provide PRI cover by permitting them to enter into reinsurance 
agreements with overseas insurers. As yet, few emerging market insurers have 
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independently offered such protection, given that PRI is a specialized product, their 






Is Chinese FDI pushing Latin America into natural resources? 
 
Miguel Pérez Ludeña* 
 
Chinese FDI in Latin America is a recent phenomenon. Although the China National 
Petroleum Corporation and other companies have been present in Peru, Ecuador and 
Venezuela since the early 1990s, large projects have been pursued only since 2006, 
following an extended period of high commodity prices. The Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) estimated that there were US$ 15 billion of 
Chinese FDI inflows into Latin America in 2010, 90% of which were in extractive 
industries.1 This further contributed to the already high percentage of Chinese FDI flows 
to the region that are in natural resources. At a time of high economic growth fueled by 
commodity exports and strong currency appreciation (particularly in Brazil), FDI into 
extractive industries strengthens the region’s specialization in primary products at the 
expense of manufacturing and other activities. 
 
Because of the size of their investments (and their potential to grow over the coming 
years), Chinese companies are singled out for aggravating this problem. Nevertheless, 
Chinese companies are still far from having a dominant position in the region’s extractive 
industries. The highest concentration so far is reached in copper mining in Peru, where 
Chinese companies will control 25% of production by the end of the decade if all planned 
investments are implemented. In the oil industry in Brazil, Sinopec will have access to 
one billion barrels of reserves, only a small fraction of the 30 billion that Petrobras will 
handle. In fact, China’s most important contribution to the region’s extractive industries 
is not through FDI but through trade: the county is the most important destination for the 
copper, soya and iron ore produced in the region. 
 
Another reason for focusing on FDI from China is the special role that its Government 
plays in the international expansion of its companies. Not only are the largest Chinese 
MNEs state-owned, but the Chinese Government vets investment projects abroad and 
promotes those that fit its development strategy with significant financial support. This 
means that Chinese MNEs could in principle respond to a centralized strategy that 
deliberately concentrates higher value-added activities in China, while pushing 
companies to expand mining and oil extraction in Latin America and Africa, in this way 
mitigating China’s lack of natural resources. However, this is difficult to prove, as a close 
look at the strategy followed by Chinese oil and mining companies in Latin America 
shows that it is similar to that of their European and North American peers: they look for 
vertical integration and a hedge against price fluctuations. 
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Beyond that, Chinese FDI in Latin America is not limited to oil and mining operations. 
There are investments in other sectors, and these are likely to increase in the coming 
years, offering Latin American countries opportunities to improve infrastructure and 
develop certain manufactures beyond today’s focus on the extractive industries. It should 
be remembered that Japanese and Korean outward FDI also started as primarily resource 
seeking, until rising local costs and technological progress pushed their companies into 
other types of investments.2 
 
Infrastructure construction is a sector in which important Chinese investments can be 
expected in the next few years. But Latin American Governments and Chinese companies 
should move away from commodity-for-infrastructure deals (as it is done in Africa and 
some Latin American countries), toward a more transparent and market-based framework 
for undertaking projects. 
 
In manufacturing, Chinese companies are attracted by the large and growing internal 
market in Brazil.3 Much as China did 30 years ago, Brazil and other large economies 
could leverage their attractive internal market by requiring Chinese MNEs to build local 
capacities through using local suppliers or setting up joint ventures with local companies. 
In the case of Mexico and other countries specialized in export-oriented manufacturing, 
Chinese investments have been very modest, but there is now a new window of 
opportunity as rising labor costs in China during the past few years are closing the wage 
gap with Mexico. The current focus on competition with Chinese exports in international 
markets can slowly shift toward integrating Mexican manufacturing into the production 
networks of Chinese companies. 
 
Chinese FDI continued to flow into Latin America in 2011, and the majority is still into 
natural resources. However, Chinese companies do not have different strategies from 
other mining and hydrocarbon companies, and Latin American governments concerned 
with excessive specialization in primary products should respond with integrated 
strategies that include macroeconomic management, fiscal measures and industrial 
policies. Attracting FDI into manufacturing or infrastructure (including Chinese FDI) can 
also help to expand capacities in other sectors. 
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Is China’s outward investment in oil a global security concern? 
 
Ilan Alon and Aleh Cherp * 
 
The motivations prompting China’s dramatic increase in outward foreign direct 
investment (OFDI) are not always clear, especially regarding OFDI by state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) in energy and natural resources. First, both commercial and 
governmental interests are intertwined, although not necessarily in lock-step. Chinese 
SOEs listed in the West may worry about the reputational risks to their global corporate 
citizenship, while government stakeholders may instead focus on diplomatic international 
relations. Second, subsidies for oil investments may be viewed as serving Chinese 
national interests and threatening the national security of the host countries. Whether 
China’s OFDI will benefit or harm global energy security, economic development and 
diplomatic relations is still hotly contested. 
 
China is acutely concerned about the security of its oil supplies. In the 1950s, the newly 
established People’s Republic of China was at the mercy of the Soviets for oil. The Sino-
Soviet split in the 1960s led to critical oil shortages and jeopardized the Chinese military. 
The Daqing Oilfield production starting in 1963 gave China temporary independence 
from oil imports. However, due to the depletion of Daqing and rising domestic 
consumption, China again became a net oil importer in 1993, sparking old anxieties and 
precipitating China’s national goal “to provide reliable and adequate supply of oil [to the 
Chinese people] at a reasonable price.”1 
 
Each of China’s three oil-related objectives -- adequacy, reasonable price, reliability -- is 
linked to OFDI in oil.2 First, such investment contributes to the adequacy of oil supply by 
increasing the flow of oil into the market. Second, supply by national oil companies is 
deemed to be more reliable than foreign-sourced supplies, especially in the event of crises 
when state-controlled assets (such as the tanker fleet) can be directed to serve national oil 
needs. However, national ownership does not protect from natural disasters, political 
instability in producing countries, terrorist attacks, or military intervention in the Straits 
of Malacca.3 Finally, subsidized investment may provide for more stable and predictable 
prices -- at least if it can be sustained in the long term and thus investment can be 
protected from market volatility. 
 
Thus, China’s investment in foreign oil assets is linked to the country’s national energy 
security objectives. It is not surprising that, in our recent survey of nine state-owned oil 
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56 
companies,4 government encouragement and resource security were among the top 
motivations for outward oil investment. But does this investment represent a security 
threat to other countries? 
 
There are two arguments supporting this concern: first, it is argued that the contest over 
scarce oil resources may spark confrontation between the US and China; and second, it is 
argued that China will exert military power to protect its oil assets, by, for example, 
developing a blue-water navy to shield its tanker fleet or assert its claims on disputed 
island chains or other territories with strong potential for energy development. Both of 
these arguments have been frequently challenged.5 For example, oil produced by Chinese 
SOEs abroad is sold on the global market and thus benefits all consumers, not only 
China. Also, China’s outward energy investments address a major global energy security 
concern, namely the lack of investment repeatedly highlighted by the International 
Energy Agency (IEA).6 Further, Chinese concerns about the vulnerability of sea lanes 
and chokepoints are shared by other nations; thus, Chinese efforts to protect them and to 
diversify trade routes should be welcome. 
 
There are, however, other reasons to be cautious about the rise of China’s OFDI in oil. 
Conventional oil is ultimately a limited resource that produces greenhouse gases. By 
funding oil exploration and extraction, China is subsidizing greenhouse gas emissions 
and diverting resources from needed investment in alternative energy technologies. In 
addition, investment in countries owning oil resources sometimes protects regimes the 
West considers unsavory. 
 
Investing in oil abroad is not the only Chinese strategy to enhance its energy security. 
Domestic investments in renewables soared to US$ 50 billion in 2010,7 as compared to 
fossil fuel subsidies estimated at US$ 40 billion in 20088 and OFDI in oil at US$ 18 
billion in 2009.9 It should also be in China’s best interest to see poorly governed oil-rich 
nations stabilize and more fully integrate into the global trading system. At the same 
time, the global energy organizations such as the IEA, largely influenced by European 
and US interests, should actively involve China in order to ensure more global 
cooperation and equitable distribution of power. 
                                                
4 Unpublished survey on Chinese SOEs going global, in collaboration with Euromed, Shanghai; data 
collected Summer 2011. 
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6 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2011 (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2011). 
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8 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2010 (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2010). 
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Will China relocate its labor-intensive factories to Africa, flying-geese 
style? 
 
Terutomo Ozawa and Christian Bellak* 
 
China has developed increasingly close economic relations with Africa in its quest for oil 
and minerals through investment and aid. The World Bank recently called upon China to 
transplant labor-intensive factories onto the continent. A question arises as to whether 
such an industrial relocation will be done in such a fashion to jump-start local economic 
development -- as previously seen across East Asia and as described in the flying-geese 
(FG) paradigm of FDI.1 
 
Many studies have examined China’s -- and other countries’ -- investments in Africa’s 
light industries (notably leather goods and textiles) and pointed out a host of difficulties 
they face because of poor local institutional conditions.2 Hence, this Chapter evaluates 
mostly China-side factors that may decisively induce a transmigration of labor-intensive 
factories, specifically to the sub-Saharan region. Judging from Asia’s FG model, three 
factors are the crucial inducements for FDI in low-end manufacturing: (1) labor costs; (2) 




Successful catch-up growth necessarily leads to a rapid rise in wages, rendering labor-
intensive exports uncompetitive. But how fast wages rise depends on the size of rural 
labor reserves that need to be shifted to industry. In this respect, unlike Japan and the 
newly industrialized economies (NIEs) that had a relatively limited reserve of rural labor 
because of their small geographical size, China has a massive rural labor force yet to be 
tapped. 750 million people still live in China’s countryside with the average rural income 
only one third of its urban counterpart. Nevertheless, the recent labor unrest and the sharp 
wage hikes in the coastal provinces will prompt a shift of factory jobs elsewhere. Here, 
China’s present income-doubling plan (by 2020) for its rural regions will promote intra-
country industrial migration. Thus, China’s own vast interior seems more attractive as 




Currency appreciation in effect “taxes” exports but “subsidizes” outward FDI and 
imports.  Japan and the NIEs submitted to swift and sharp rises in their currencies as they 
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succeeded in catch-up growth. True, the yuan has considerably appreciated over recent 
years -- but only slowly and not drastically enough to trigger a massive relocation of 
labor-intensive manufacturing overseas -- largely because China is not quite ready to 
dismantle labor-intensive industries that still provide much-needed jobs at home. This 
gradual pace of appreciation gives exporters more time to raise productivity or to relocate 




Institutional factors weigh on both sides. Infrastructural deficiencies (e.g., unreliable 
power and water supply, transportation, communication, poor governance, inhospitable 
regulatory environments, work ethic) in Africa are well known. This explains why 
foreign MNEs in general, let alone China’s, have not yet seriously advanced into the 
continent in search of low-cost labor. The governments of the Asian NIEs quickly 
realized the potential of Japanese and Western FDI and thus were prepared to provide 
relevant infrastructure, particularly special economic zones (SEZs). 
  
Since 2006, as part of its strategy to assist sub-Saharan Africa in attracting 
manufacturing, China has been helping establish SEZs, a scheme modeled on its own 
SEZs. Currently, the Chinese SEZ in Zambia serves as a model for such zones in Africa. 
At the moment, nevertheless, there exists China’s tendency toward ethnicity-bound 
groupism, as evidenced in the employment of Chinese construction workers in large 
numbers for aid projects, the settlement of Chinese migrants and petty merchants/caterers 
in host countries and the one-sided presence of Chinese consortia for overseas 
investments without much participation of local and other countries’ MNEs. 
 
In contrast, Asia’s SEZs succeeded in hosting not only foreign MNEs but many local 
firms as well, and host governments took proactive measures to use their SEZs as a 
learning conduit for modern technology and advanced business practices, a situation not 
yet commonly observable in sub-Saharan Africa. Lest China-sponsored SEZs that are 
presently in the early stages of development turn into “industrial Chinese diasporas,” so 
to speak, they would need multi-national participation, especially by African 
manufacturers themselves. South African MNEs, in particular, ought to participate in 
such zones. Recently, the International Finance Corporation decided to fund US$ 10 
million as a joint financier of a commercial complex project (worth about US$ 33 
million) in Tanzania with a Chinese company and a local non-profit organization, inviting 
a third party to fund an additional US$ 6.5 million3 -- an arrangement designed to 
encourage multi-national participation and adherence to internationally acceptable social 
and environmental standards. In addition, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD)-OECD Africa Investment Initiative aims to strengthen the capacity of African 
countries to design and implement reforms that improve their business climate and to 
unlock investment potential in the continent. Also, the US’s African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) may nudge China to invest more in democratic and market-
based economies. 
 
                                                





All in all, even though China may be serious about relocating low-cost factories to sub-
Saharan Africa, there are hurdles to clear on both sides. In the near term, China still can 
relocate labor-intensive manufacturing inland or to its low-cost neighbors, and sub-
Saharan Africa itself is institutionally not quite ready to host labor-seeking FDI on a scale 







The backstory of China and India’s growing investment and trade with 
Africa: Separating the wheat from the chaff 
 
Harry G. Broadman* 
 
The dramatic increase in recent years of trade and FDI in sub-Saharan Africa by firms 
from Asia -- notably China and India -- has become an emotionally charged issue. This is 
not surprising, since the resulting greater integration into international markets is 
exposing African firms and workers to greater competition, an inevitable by-product of 
development in today’s globalized economy. Most assessments of this topic, with few 
exceptions,1 have relied on anecdotes and subjective judgments. Meaningful policy 
recommendations require systematic, objective analysis. 
 
A critical starting point is to establish the proper context. What Chinese and Indian firms 
are doing in Africa is not unique or new. South-South commerce has been growing 
rapidly for over two decades. South-South trade doubled from about 8% of world trade in 
1990 to over 16% in 2007. The share of developing countries’ exports going to 
developing countries increased from 29% in 1990 to 47% in 2008.2 
 
Rigorous analysis of systematically collected data reveals several weak spots in the 
conventional wisdom about Chinese and Indian firms’ activities in Africa. Most 
observers believe Chinese (and to a lesser extent Indian) firms dominate Africa’s 
economies. This presumption does not fit the facts. About 90% of the stock of FDI in 
Africa still originates from Northern companies, especially those from the European 
Union and the United States. The confusion arises because FDI inflows in recent years 
have been dominated by Chinese and Indian MNEs (as well as other firms from the 
South). 
 
Received wisdom also has it that the “new” Southern investors in Africa are exclusively 
involved in natural resources. But Chinese and Indian MNEs in Africa are increasing 
their investments into other sectors, such as telecommunications, financial services, food 
processing, manufacturing, infrastructure, back-office services, and tourism. Although 
natural resource-based investments dominate Chinese and Indian investors’ portfolios in 
Africa in value, it is evident from the number of FDI projects that investment by these 
MNEs is beginning to diversify rapidly across many sectors. 
 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank Andrea Goldstein, Daniel Van Den Bulcke and an anonymous reviewer for 
their helpful comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on February 17, 2011. 
1  Notably Harry G. Broadman, Africa’s Silk Road: China and India’s New Economic 
Frontier (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2007), and Andrea Goldstein, Nicolas Pinaud, Helmut 
Reisen, and X. Chen, The Rise of China and India: What's in it for Africa? (Paris: OECD Development 
Centre, 2006). 
2 WTO, The WTO and the Millennium Development Goals (Geneva: WTO, January 2010). 
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Most press articles and the few recent books on this topic focus only on Chinese 
enterprises. But doing so raises serious methodological questions about the quality of 
these analyses’ policy conclusions and trend prognostications. Without including 
comparator or control countries, such as India, Brazil or others from the South increasing 
commerce with Africa, it is difficult to make meaningful assessments of the status quo, 
let alone of any counterfactuals. 
 
New business case studies and firm-level survey data on the African operations of 
Chinese and Indian firms show that, due to inherent differences in ownership and other 
facets, Chinese and Indian firms generally perceive investment risks differently, and this 
colors their business strategies in Africa.3 The average Chinese firm operating on the 
continent is a large state-owned enterprise (like most Chinese MNEs operating globally) 
and tends to enter new markets by building de novo facilities, is highly vertically 
integrated, rarely encourages the integration of its management and workers into the 
African socioeconomic fabric, conducts most of its sales in Africa with government 
entities, and (able to avail itself of its home government’s deep pockets,) exploits its 
ability to out-compete other bidders for government procurement contracts. 
 
The typical Indian firm, tends to be in the private sector, varies in size, enters African 
markets by acquiring established businesses, engages in vertical integration (but much 
less so than its Chinese counterpart), facilitates -- indeed, sometimes encourages -- the 
integration of management and workers into the African socioeconomic network (through 
informal ethnic networks or by participating in local political activities), and engages in 
large local sales with private entities rather than solely government agencies. 
 
These new data also show that Chinese and Indian firms have much in common in their 
African operations. MNEs from both countries have begun to play a significant role in 
facilitating mutually reinforcing links between trade and FDI in Africa. One consequence 
of their presence is that inward FDI is engendering an increase in Africa’s exports. 
 
Chinese and Indian businesses, by dint of their generic organizational structures, can 
achieve larger operations in Africa -- and thus greater economies of scale and higher 
productivity -- than their African counterparts. They can thus export goods from Africa 
that are more diversified and higher up the value chain than can African firms in the same 
sectors.  They are also integrating horizontally more extensively across Africa’s own 
internal market -- a critical objective for a continent comprising many landlocked 
countries with individual markets far below commercial scale. Chinese and Indian MNEs, 
increasingly in joint ventures with African firms, are fostering exports from Africa to a 
wider set of markets outside the continent. 
 
Much is at stake for the 800 million people in sub-Saharan Africa, especially the 50% of 
them who are among the world’s poorest, in the policy debate concerning the continent’s 
accelerated integration into the world economy through South-South commerce, now led 
by China and India. The quality of this debate needs to be improved. It could start by: 
                                                




development of systematic empirically-derived, cross-country and cross-sectorally 
consistent data; application of a rigorous analytical methodology; and use of an objective, 
coherent framework from which one can draw dispassionate policy conclusions for all 
concerned -- Africans (businesses, workers, consumers, policy makers), foreign investors 






What will an appreciation of China’s currency do to inward and 
outward FDI? 
 
Karl P. Sauvant and Ken Davies* 
 
What will an appreciation of the Chinese yuan do to China’s inward and outward direct 
investment? The discussion so far has been almost exclusively about the impact on 
China’s trade balance. But it is at least as important to see what effect it may have on the 
country’s inward FDI (IFDI), which plays such a crucial role in China’s economic 
development, and its outward FDI (OFDI), which is receiving increased attention 
worldwide.1 
 
China has been the developing world’s largest recipient of IFDI since the mid-1990s, 
attracting US$ 95 billion in 2009.2 A revaluation of the yuan will make it more expensive 
for foreign firms to establish themselves (or expand) in China (the world’s most dynamic 
market), giving an advantage to foreign firms already established there over new entrants. 
At the same time, exports of foreign affiliates, which account for 54% of total exports,3 
will become less competitive internationally, although the increased costs will be partly 
offset by lower costs of imported inputs. Foreign affiliates can also expect to repatriate 
higher profits from sales in China in terms of their own currencies. 
 
However, the most notable development of recent years has been the take-off of the 
country’s OFDI since the government in 2000 adopted the “go global” policy 
encouraging Chinese firms to invest overseas.4 China’s OFDI doubled from US$ 12 
billion in 20055 to US$ 27 billion in 2007, and then doubled again the following year, to 
reach US$ 56 billion.6 Outflows continued to rise to US$ 57 billion in 2009, even as 
world FDI flows collapsed by 50%. In 2009, China was the world’s fifth largest outward 
investor. 
 
The increasing international competitiveness of Chinese firms and an encouraging 
government policy have been the main drivers of this surge. The 20% revaluation of 
China’s currency against the US dollar in 2005-2008 undoubtedly provided a favorable 
                                                
* The authors wish to thank Laza Kekic, Al Litvak and Edward Turner III for their helpful comments on 
this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on October 18, 2010. 
1 For a most recent overview of China’s IFDI and OFDI, see Ken Davies, “Inward FDI in China and its 
policy context,” Columbia FDI Profiles, October 18, 2010, and Ken Davies, “Outward FDI from China and 
its policy context,” Columbia FDI Profiles, October 18, 2010. 
2 UNCTAD FDI statistical database http://stats.unctad.org/. 
3 Figure for the first eight months of 2010 from MOFCOM website: http://www.fdi.gov.cn/. 
4 See Qiuzhi Xue and Bingjie Han, “The role of government policies in promoting outward foreign direct 
investment from emerging markets: China’s experience,” in Karl P. Sauvant and Geraldine McAllister, 
with Wolfgang A. Maschek, eds., Foreign Direct Investment from Emerging Markets: The Challenges 
Ahead (New York: Palgrave, 2010), pp. 305-324. 
5 Not including financial FDI. 
6 Ministry of Commerce, 2009 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment (2010). 
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condition facilitating this in the case of host countries whose currencies did not also 
appreciate against the US dollar. There is ample evidence in the academic literature that a 
weaker exchange rate induces increased IFDI.7 
 
China’s OFDI is poised to grow sharply again in 2010, judging by the first half of the 
year, when it was rising at an annual rate of 44%.8 Revaluation would accelerate this 
trend. This is precisely what happened with Japan after the yen was revalued by over 
50% against the US dollar between 1985 and 1987, following the 2005 Plaza Accord.9 
Japan’s OFDI tippled from US$ 6.5 billion in 1984 to US$ 19.5 billion in 1986, peaking 
at US$ 48 billion in 1990.10 
 
A renewed yuan appreciation would boost China’s OFDI growth even further by 
lowering the cost of overseas assets for Chinese firms, which have strong cash reserves 
from both retained earnings and large-scale state credit allocations that put them in a 
position to invest internationally. Like competitors elsewhere, they need to invest abroad 
to acquire a portfolio of locational assets to protect and increase their international 
competitiveness through better access to skills, technology, natural resources, and 
markets. 
 
Revaluation would combine with already rising wage pressures inside China. Labor-
intensive firms in China’s coastal provinces are under pressure to seek lower labor cost 
by either investing in China’s interior of abroad. Already more than 700 Chinese 
affiliates have been established in Vietnam.11 Revaluation would push even more in that 
direction. 
 
Suspicions of non-commercial motivations behind China’s OFDI are widespread because 
most of the country’s OFDI is by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). However, there is no 
systematic evidence that China’s SOEs, like their counterparts elsewhere, are driven by 
more than normal commercial considerations. At the same time, private or semi-private 
entities have been investing abroad. As their operations are less visible, it is likely that 
their OFDI, and therefore China’s total OFDI, is understated. 
 
Fears of Chinese OFDI, as of Japanese and Korean investment in earlier decades, are 
misplaced. It is good for China and for host countries: Chinese FDI, like all FDI, can 
                                                
7 See e.g. Kenneth A. Froot and Jeremy C. Stein, “Exchange rates and foreign direct investment: an 
imperfect capital markets approach,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 106 (1991) 4, pp. 1191-
1217; and Kathry L. Dewenter, “Do exchange rate changes drive foreign direct investment?,” The Journal 
of Business, vol. 68, (1995) 3, pp. 405-433. 
8 Invest in China website: http://www.fdi.gov.cn. 
9 Announcement of the Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Governors of France, Germany, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States (Plaza Accord) September 22, 1985. University of Toronto G8 
Information Centre: http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/ .The yen went from 238 to the dollar in 1985 to 168 in 
1986, 145 in 1987 and 128 in 1988. See Zhang Zongbin and Yu Hongbo [张宗斌/于洪波], “Comparative 
research into China’s and Japan’s OFDI” [中日两国对外直接投资比较研究], World Economy and 
Politics [世界经济与政治] 2006. 
10 JETRO, Japanese Trade and Investment Statistics, JETRO website: http://www.jetro.go.jp/. 
11 China Daily, August 31, 2010, p. 14. 
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bring to host countries a bundle of tangible and intangible assets needed for economic 
growth and development. While a good part of China’s OFDI initially takes the form of 
trade-supporting FDI, it can be expected to lead relatively quickly to a shift of some 
production out of China, including to the US and Europe, thereby reducing exports from 
China. Moreover, OFDI is a key mechanism for integrating China into the world 
economy and making it a responsible stakeholder in it. 
 
However, Chinese firms will have to learn from the past mistakes of other emerging 
multinationals about how to operate in the highly sophisticated developed-country 
markets and in developing countries. They need not only to overcome the “liability of 
foreignness” that any multinational faces when establishing itself in a foreign market, but 
they also need to overcome the “liability of the home country.” In particular, they need to 
establish a good social brand name so that they are seen as making not only a positive 
economic contribution to their host countries, but are also seen as good corporate citizens. 
The Chinese government can play a crucial role by adopting a code of conduct for all 
Chinese enterprises investing abroad, in line with internationally accepted norms and 
taking into account the increasing importance of sustainable FDI. For their part, host 
countries need to accept the “new kids on the block” and not discriminate against Chinese 






The unbalanced dragon: China’s uneven provincial and regional FDI 
performance 
 
Karl P. Sauvant, Chen Zhao and Xiaoying Huo* 
 
Among developing countries, China attracts most FDI. Where is this investment located 
within China, what explains its distribution and what are policy implications? 
 
We used UNCTAD’s FDI Performance Index to answer the first question.1 Although 
developed for countries, it can be applied to sub-national units. It uses provincial GDP to 
ascertain whether a given territorial unit has received FDI inflows as expected from its 
economic size. Standardizing the data accordingly reveals three clusters of provinces for 
2007-2010 (see annex tabels 1 and 2; see annex figures 1 and 2): 
 
• The first cluster encompasses virtually all coastal provinces: they have an index 
value above 1, i.e. perform better than their economic size would lead one to 
expect. They account for 9 of the top 11 performers of Mainland China’s 31 
provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions (“provinces”). 
• The provinces in the middle cluster underperform (index value of 1-0.5). They 
include 5 central provinces, but also 3 western and 2 coastal provinces.  
• The provinces in the bottom cluster underperform significantly (index value 
below 0.5), comprising primarily the country’s western provinces (8 out of the 10 
provinces in this cluster). 
 
Clearly, the further away a location is from the coast, the less FDI it attracts: the Coastal 
Region over-performs, the Central and especially the Western Region under-perform. 
These three clusters roughly correspond to China’s administrative regions (Coastal, 
Central and Western Regions), respectively.2 
 
The Coastal Region has always been the best performer. Importantly, however, its share 
in China’s total FDI inflows declined from 89% in 1987-1990 to about 75% in 2007-
2010; that of the Central Region rose from below 4% to about 17%, and that of the 
Western Region fluctuated mainly below 10%. Still, the share of the Coastal Region in 
total FDI inflows remains higher than its share in China’s GDP (84% vs. 56%); for the 
Central Region (10% vs. 25%) and the Western Region (6% vs. 18%), the reverse is true. 
However, while the Coastal Region as a whole has always performed better than its GDP 
predicts, its index value has declined from an average of 1.6 in 1987 to 1.3 in 2010; the 
                                                
* The authors acknowledge the advice of Ge Shunqi, Robert Kapp and Pablo Pinto and the very helpful 
peer review feedback from Daniel van den Bulcke, Xian Guoming and Xue Qiuzhi. This chapter was first 
published as a Perspective on March 5, 2012. 
1 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2002 (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2002), p. 23. The Index has several 
limitations (ibid.), but it can serve as an initial benchmark that reflects the extent of success regarding a 
province’s FDI performance. 
2 See http://www.chinamap.com/html/baodaoshuoming2.aspx. 
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Central Region improved its index value, but remained under 1; the Western Region 
remained under 0.5 for most of the period 1987-2010. This shows a moderate shift of FDI 
flows away from the coast to the interior. 
 
Why this pattern and what to do about it? 
 
First, while China’s overall regulatory framework is the same for all provinces, the 
Coastal Region benefitted from early economic liberalization and the establishment of 
Special Economic Zones; this created an enabling environment for export-oriented and 
market-seeking FDI. Liberalization began only later for other parts of China. While the 
Central and Western provinces have advantages that apply only to them, more could be 
done, e.g. granting longer tax incentives (and compensating tax losses centrally). Also, 
the degree of ease of doing business in provincial capital cities shows a pattern (see table 
at www.vcc.columbia.edu) similar to our index ranking, pointing to a potential to-do for 
policy makers. Moreover, officials need to understand better what role enterprises play in 
economic development and how a law-based market system works. 
 
Second, the Coastal Region has the best economic determinants: high economic growth 
and mature markets, developed supplier industries, modern infrastructure, cheap skilled 
labor, and a favorable business culture; it also benefits from closeness to Hong Kong and 
strong links with overseas Chinese. Massive efforts are being made to improve the 
interior’s physical infrastructure, strengthen its science and technology capacities and 
upgrade its educational and skills offerings. These need to continue: they lay the 
foundations for attracting more investment. Supporting enterprise development and 
industrial clustering would also be important, as would be higher wages to create a 
demand-pull. 
 
Finally, all provinces in China have undertaken active investment promotion, but the 
coastal provinces could build on more favorable regulatory and economic conditions. 
Elsewhere, such promotion needs to be strengthened, by upgrading the capacity of 
investment promotion agencies (IPAs) to attract and service investors. The appointment 
of FDI Ombudspersons would help to identify areas for improvements and help mediate 
conflicts. Since coastal production costs are rising rapidly, the interior provinces could 
attract labor-intensive production from there, production that otherwise might move 
abroad. Twinning arrangements between coastal and interior IPAs could facilitate such 
internal relocation. 
 
China’s Government has recognized that the country’s uneven development is a 
challenge that must be met. Key is to increase investment by domestic and foreign firms 
in the Central and Western Regions. Since, in the end, all investment is local, production 
conditions there need to be made more attractive. All three sets of investment 
determinants therefore require further strengthening. At the same time, efforts should not 
only concentrate on attracting investment, but ensuring that the attracted investment 
makes a significant contribution to the economic, social and environmental development 























































With some delay, the internationalization of business R&D is following the globalization 
of production. Starting on a small scale during the 1970s and 1980s, the emergence of 
globally distributed R&D networks of MNEs accelerated rapidly in the 1990s. The 
“globalization of innovation” was facilitated and driven by a complex set of factors, 
including changes in trade and investment governance, improved intellectual property 
rights through TRIPS, the growing ease and falling cost of communicating and traveling 
around the globe, and the concomitant vertical industry specialization and unbundling of 
value chains. The growing and sustained level of cross-border M&As was one major 
direct driver, often having the effect that merged firms inherited multiple R&D sites in a 
number of countries. 
 
Until the end of the 1990s, the geography of (business) innovation was largely congruent 
with the triad of developed world regions: North America, Europe and Japan. Developing 
countries played a subsidiary role, either primarily supplying talent (brain drain) or 
functioning as sector specialists in smaller newly industrializing economies such as 
Taiwan Province of China, Singapore and Israel. Then, around the turn of the century, 
two interrelated strategies led to the “iron cage of the triad” starting to open: a R&D FDI 
shift to the two main emerging economies of China and India, and the upward move of 
Indian and Chinese vendors and contract research organizations (CROs) from providing 
routine services to knowledge process and R&D offshoring (Bruche 2009). 
 
By around 2001, the number of MNE R&D centers had only gradually grown to under 
100 in each of the two countries from the days of Texas Instruments’ early engagement in 
India in the mid-1980s and Motorola’s pioneering R&D investments in China in the early 
1990s. The subsequent upsurge in MNE R&D centers in China and India calls to mind a 
take-off situation. In a rather sudden shift, the number of MNE R&D centers in China 
rose more than tenfold to around 1,100 (representing 920 MNEs) by the end of 2008 and 
to 780 (670 MNEs) in India (Zinnov 2009). The internal MNE R&D offshoring growth 
took place in parallel to the learning processes of Indian and Chinese vendors and CROs, 
leading to a similar expansion of R&D offshore outsourcing. Most surveys point to a 
continuation of this trend as companies report plans to move future R&D expansion to 
these two countries.  
 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank John Cantwell, Torbjörn Fredriksson and Robert Pearce for their helpful 
comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on April 29, 2009. 
References: Gert Bruche, “The Emergence of China and India as New Competitors in MNCs Innovation 
Networks,” Competition & Change, vol. 13 (2009) 3, pp. 267-288; Barry Jaruzelski and Kevin Dehoff, 
“Beyond Borders: The Global Innovation 1000,” Strategy+business, (Booz & Co, 2008) 53, pp. 54-67; and 
Zinnov Management Consulting, "R&D Globalization: The China Chapter" (Bangalore: Zinnov, 2009). 
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Why has there been such a sudden shift to China and India? There are a number of clearly 
discernible factors. Toward the end of the 1990s, China had established itself as a global 
lead market and world manufacturing center in a number of high and medium tech 
industries. While this implied a growing need for local asset exploiting R&D, greater 
competitive intensity also required increasingly new product development for the local 
market. Compared to the primarily market and customer oriented R&D investments in 
China, the bulk of R&D offshoring to India is so far mainly asset seeking, designed to 
take advantage of India's large and growing low cost intellectual infrastructure. In India, 
especially US-based MNEs profited even more than in China from the large diaspora of 
highly qualified non-resident Indians in leading positions, and from return migration. The 
Chinese Government's skillful carrot and stick policy (trading market access for 
technology) and India's longstanding knowledge export promotion via privately owned 
science and technology parks are other important determinants. A push factor came from 
skill shortages in computer science and engineering in the US, and to some extent in 
Europe and Japan as well. 
 
While after 2000 China and India have become the most favored R&D destinations of 
MNEs outside of the triad (with the exception of Israel which does however not offer a 
sizeable market), they are in competition with other emerging economies like Russia, 
eastern Europe or Brazil for R&D FDI and R&D outsourcing contracts. Although their 
combination of comparative advantages like market size, the large low cost talent pool, 
English communication skills (India), very large highly qualified diasporas and 
reasonably developed R&D ecosystems is a difficult match for competing emerging 
markets, escalating wage cost and attrition of qualified R&D personnel recently seemed 
to endanger this position. The financial crisis can in this context be seen as a windfall 
helping to constrain escalating costs and providing the time and space for a restructuring 
and further advancement of the talent pools in both countries. 
 
To put the MNE R&D shift to China and India into a broader perspective, some other 
circumstances need to be taken into account. First, the bulk of business R&D in large 
triad countries is still carried out in the home country, and R&D FDI flows still take place 
predominantly within the triad (Jaruzelski and Dehoff 2008). Moreover, the new MNE 
R&D investment and offshoring to China and India is limited in sectoral scope: by far the 
largest share is accounted for by information and communication technologies, in India 
focused on software and engineering R&D; the remainder is more or less covered by the 
health sector (pharma, biotech and various chemical, preclinical, and clinical services) 
and the automotive industry. Finally, most MNE R&D work is concentrated in only a few 
regional clusters: taken together, Beijing and Shanghai and Bangalore/Pune/National 
Capital Region represent 60-80 % of all MNE R&D work. 
 
Even if the argument for a new geography of innovation today may be questioned, one 
can still ask whether the dynamics of the R&D shift herald the start of fundamental 
medium-term changes. Despite the dearth of systematic research on this issue, there 
seems to be a general consensus that the dominant share of MNE R&D in China and 
India comprises routine activities adapting existing designs or processes, or providing 
modular contributions transformed into innovative products and processes in the triad's 
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higher order R&D centers. However, scattered evidence points to fast learning and 
upgrading processes resulting in ever more centers and CROs taking on selective regional 
or global roles as centers of excellence within MNEs global innovation networks. It is 
still an open question whether this will also lead to a shift in the geographic loci of the 
eventual innovation – as long as the knowledge generated is globally transferable and 
China and India lack important complementary assets for its independent application and 
integration in new products (as, for instance, in pharmaceuticals and automobiles), the 
innovation may still be realized in the MNE home countries. In this sense, the R&D shift 
may strengthen rather than weaken the triad countries' economic position, and especially 
that of the US The argument that the catch-up of China and India can be accelerated by 
spillover effects of local MNE R&D to Chinese and Indian companies and institutions 
may have some validity. So far, however, the R&D investment levels even in more 
advanced Chinese and Indian companies are low and local challengers may even suffer 
from an in-situ brain drain to MNEs able to offer more stimulating and rewarding work to 
talented R&D professionals. On the other hand, emerging country MNEs such as Huawei 
from China or Tata from India have started to acquire or establish R&D centers in the US 
and Europe as a way to tap into advanced knowledge and technology clusters. 
 
It remains to be seen how far the financial crisis will trigger changes in the ongoing R&D 
relocation plans of MNEs. MNEs under pressure may have to cut R&D spending to 
maintain core operations in their home countries. Strong companies that closely track 
their innovation drive, such as, for example, Bosch or Siemens in Germany, or Cisco and 
Microsoft in the US, as well as companies in less affected industries like pharmaceuticals, 
may seize the chance to further enhance R&D efficiency and profit from a relaxation in 
the talent markets in China and India. They may also prepare for even stronger positions 
after the crisis when China and India may still be the fastest growing markets in the world 
economy. While the Chinese and Indian Governments will certainly welcome the 
emergence of a new geography of innovation the current global crisis may trigger a 
renewal of a more "techno-nationalist" stance among policy makers in the US and Europe 







Emerging challengers in knowledge-based industries? The case of 




The growth of outward FDI from developing countries and of a new generation of 
“emerging MNEs” (EMNEs) has stimulated a flurry of publications. EMNEs have been 
portrayed as on their way to adulthood, latecomers that leapfrog into advanced positions, 
emerging giants, and challengers of conventional MNEs from advanced economies. 
 
While some EMNE FDI can be classified as resource-seeking, often by state-owned 
enterprises, an increasing number of EMNEs, often in private hands, operate in 
knowledge-based industries. Most EMNEs in knowledge-based industries (KB EMNEs) 
are headquartered in India or China. They have tended to pursue interrelated asset-
augmenting and market-seeking strategies in North America and Europe. 
 
While much research has been devoted to KB EMNE’s internationalization and resource-
building, the particular structural characteristics of industries in which these operate have 
been neglected. As the case of Indian pharmaceutical companies demonstrates, the latter 
factor plays a significant role in whether and how fast KB EMNEs can close the gap with 
their competitors from advanced economies.1 
 
Some of the more prominent Indian pharmaceutical companies, such as Ranbaxy or Dr. 
Reddy’s Limited (DRL), have been cited as instances of a leapfrogging 
internationalization trajectory leading to fast catch-up in competitiveness with 
conventional MNEs. However, a closer look at the global pharmaceutical industry reveals 
a vast scale-gap between Indian pharmaceutical companies and major conventional 
pharmaceutical companies (“Big Pharma”). In 2009, DRL, India’s leading 
pharmaceutical company by worldwide revenues, was not ranked among the global top 
50 pharma companies. DRL’s worldwide revenues of US$ 1.5 billion fell far short of the 
US$ 45 billion generated by the market leader Pfizer (USA) or the US$ 37.6 billion by 
the Swiss company Roche, ranked fifth, and are still less than the US$ 1.7 billion 
achieved by the Swedish Meda company, placed 50th. 
 
Research and development (R&D) expenditure is a more specific indicator of global 
competitive resources. In a lengthy and risky process, more than US$ 1 billion are usually 
required to bring a new drug to market. Indian pharmaceutical companies spend far less 
than Big Pharma. The 2009 research spending of US$ 99 million (Ranbaxy), US$ 89 
million (DRL) and US$ 67 million (Sun Pharma) compares with US$ 8,570 million by 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank Florian Becker-Ritterspach, Christoph Doerrenbaecher and Peter Gammeltoft 
for their helpful comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on July 1, 2012. 
1 For a more thorough discussion see Gert Bruche, “Emerging Indian pharma multinationals: Latecomer 




the largest spender, Roche, US$ 6,286 million for the fifth largest (GlaxoSmithKline), 
and are still only roughly half of the 50th in the global ranking (Watson, a generics 
company). 
 
In addition to critical mass in R&D, other factors such as a worldwide sales force, 
relationships with key opinion leaders, worldwide regulatory experience, and ownership 
of intellectual assets present formidable entry barriers into the research-based segment 
which still dominates the more than US$ 800 billion global pharmaceutical market. Given 
the valuations of Big Pharma firms, overcoming entry barriers via acquisitions does not 
seem to be a feasible pathway for Indian pharmaceutical companies. 
 
In view of these barriers Indian pharmaceutical companies pursue more modest 
upgrading internationalization strategies. Based on location-specific cost advantages and 
reverse engineering, their FDI is primarily aimed at building international positions as 
generics (imitator) companies, often by acquiring smaller generics players in the US and 
Europe. So far they have not yet achieved leading positions in the global generics market 
partly due to rapid market consolidation and the increasing entry of Big Pharma. Most 
major Indian pharmaceutical companies have also engaged in manufacturing and R&D 
outsourcing for Big Pharma, exploiting growth and learning opportunities. 
 
Although leading Indian pharmaceutical companies such as DRL or Lupin Labs have 
invested in high-risk discovery research with some success, the enormous costs and risks 
of global development have often led to partnering with Big Pharma. In view of the 
considerable barriers and uncertain outcomes, a number of family-owned Indian 
pharmaceutical companies have sold out to Big Pharma in recent years. This sale of 
India’s crown jewels has prompted consideration in Indian Government circles of 
restrictions on inward FDI in the pharmaceutical industry and led to calls for industry 
consolidation. 
 
In comparing Indian pharmaceutical companies with other Indian and Chinese 
knowledge-based EMNEs, it may be useful to distinguish two extremes on a continuum. 
At one end, there are leapfrogging industries such as telecommunications equipment and 
IT services, in which knowledge-based EMNEs have captured globally competitive 
positions in relatively shorter time spans (Huawei or Tata Consultancy Services are 
prominent examples). At the other end, we have “fortress industries” such as 
pharmaceuticals, packaged software or certain branded consumer goods segments where, 
due to the interaction of global oligopolistic structures, complex and multiple 
complementary resource and capability requirements or intellectual property and brand 
walls, the catch-up process -- if left to market forces -- may take much longer. 
 
Emerging market government policies may influence this scenario. Massive support of 
selected state-owned champions may support a faster “invasion” into fortress industries, 
as the examples of China in wide-bodied aircraft or high-speed trains may indicate. 
Governments may also pursue infant industry protection of national private champions. 
Both cases raise important governance issues and may eventually trigger political 





Outward investment by Trans-Latin enterprises: Reasons for optimism 
 
Michael Mortimore and Carlos Razo * 
 
Despite the current economic crisis, outward FDI (OFDI) by Latin American and 
Caribbean enterprises continued its upward trend in 2008 (annex figure 1). OFDI by 
firms in the region reached nearly US$ 35 billion in 2008, an increase of 42% with 
respect to 2007 (ECLAC, 2009a). However, several of the factors that fostered such 
growth have recently changed, possibly affecting OFDI prospects for 2009. This Chapter 
briefly explores these changes and their potential effects on firms’ investing behavior, as 
well as some important countervailing factors that may cushion the effects of the 
economic crisis on Latin American firms’ investment plans. 
 
The recent increase is the result of the accelerated efforts of some Latin American 
companies (Trans-Latins) to expand operations beyond their borders (annex table 1). 
Brazilian firms led this trend, as their OFDI in 2008 accounted for over 60% of the 
region’s total. Chile was the second highest investor, followed by Venezuela (annex 
figure 2). In contrast, Mexico’s Trans-Latins were severely hit by the economic downturn 
in the North American market. This was manifested in the sharp contraction of the 
country’s OFDI from over US$ 8 billion in 2007 to US$ 686 million in 2008, although it 
did recover in early 2009. 
 
The internationalization trend of Trans-Latin enterprises resulted from a combination of 
factors: global and regional economic growth trends,1 increases in productivity and 
innovation, knowledge transfer, improved supply chain capabilities, high international 
commodity prices, improved access to credit, and strong corporate profits among others. 
A number of these conditions have now changed. GDP in Latin America is expected to 
contract by 1.9% in 2009 (ECLAC, 2009b) and, coupled with falling commodity prices, 
tightening credit markets and increasing debt levels, will undoubtedly make investment 
more difficult for most Latin American firms. 
 
The global crisis has already hit some of the iconic Trans-Latin corporations hard. For 
example, CEMEX, the Mexican cement giant burdened with a US$ 14.5 billion loan for 
the acquisition of the Australian firm Rinker in 2007 and most of its assets concentrated 
in the deteriorated North American market, was forced to cut capital investment by over 
50% in 2009 and attempted to sell assets to pay off its current debt (ECLAC, 2009a). 
Sudamericana de Vapores (Chile), the biggest shipping company in the region, searched 
for buyers for certain operations in order to acquire cash. Sadia (Brazil), the region’s 
biggest chicken producer, had losses of over US$ 800 million in the last quarter of 2008, 
                                                
* The authors wish to thank Harvey Arbeláez, Jerry Haar and Beatriz Nofal for their helpful comments on 
this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on August 17, 2009. 
1 In 2008, Latin America and the Caribbean achieved its sixth consecutive year of positive economic 
growth (see ECLAC 2008). 
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mostly as a result of investment in financial derivatives (America Economía, 2009). In 
other words, some Trans-Latins are feeling the effect of the current crisis quite severely. 
 
Nevertheless, there are some powerful countervailing factors that may keep the Trans-
Latin expansion going, especially by firms with low debt levels and good liquidity 
positions. For instance, Latin America, the main market of the Trans-Latins, has been 
contracting at a slower pace than other regions since the crisis began, making it more 
attractive for investment. 
 
Investment in natural resources, an important niche of Trans-Latin companies, usually 
focuses on long-run prospects. Projects in oil, gas and mining mature slowly, making 
some investments relatively less sensitive to the current recession. In the oil sector, 
Petrobras (Brazil) announced at the beginning of 2009 a rise in its investment plan for the 
next four years2 and Ecopetrol (Colombia) increased its planned investment by 35% over 
2008 (PODER, 2009). 
 
The expansion of Trans-Latins will also continue in sectors in which the income-
elasticity of demand is relatively low (e.g., products for mass consumption). For instance, 
Bimbo (Mexico) has acquired the assets of the baked products branch of Weston 
(Canada) in the US (annex table 2). New investment will take place in countries or 
markets with better prospects. As an example, the Chilean retailer, Cencosud y Falabella, 
will probably continue expanding its business to countries such as Peru, Colombia and 
Brazil. 
 
A third factor that may encourage Trans-Latin outward investment has to do with the 
steps taken by Latin American governments to confront the current economic crisis.3 One 
of the most widely used measures is the promotion of investment in infrastructure. Such 
measures may trigger investment not only by firms in the construction business, such as 
the Mexican firms IDEAL and ICA, or Brazilian companies like Odebrecht and Camargo 
Correa, but also by some natural-resource-based manufacturers, such as the iron and steel 
producers Gerdau (Brazil) and Ternium (part of the Argentine Techint group). 
 
Also worth mentioning because of its resilience in the current crisis, and the important 
role played by one of the biggest Trans-Latins in it, is the information technology (IT) 
sector. Digital convergence obliges providers to invest in mobile and Internet 
technologies and networks to remain competitive in the region. In this regard, América 
Móvil (Mexico) is expected to invest another US$ 3 billion in the region. 
 
All this said, it should nonetheless be emphasized that there are no guarantees that 
outward investment by Latin American firms will continue growing or will outpace 
investment by firms from other regions. Whether that happens depends largely on the 
                                                
2 The Petrobras investment plan for 2009-2013 amounts to US$ 174 billion, from which 10% is expected to 
be invested abroad in exploration and production in West Africa, Latin America and the Gulf of Mexico 
(ECLAC, 2009a).  
3 For more details about the different measures taken by the governments of the region to confront the 
crisis, see ECLAC, 2009c. 
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particular circumstances of a relatively small number of firms in a handful of countries in 
Latin America. This corporate concentration is greater than in other regions and the 
corporate response thus depends on fewer investors. 
 
Still, first indications are positive. According to the latest available figures, although 
OFDI from the top regional investors as a group is down by 28% in the first quarter of 
2009, compared to the same period in 2008, some countries (Argentina, Chile, Colombia 
and Mexico) have registered increases in their OFDI (annex tables 2 and 3). 
 
A number of favorable impacts of OFDI on the home country have been identified, 
especially with regard to international competitiveness. If governments in the region wish 
to see their OFDI increase they are advised to design and implement more focused 
national policies for that purpose. Such initiatives range from eliminating barriers to 
OFDI (relaxing controls and raising financial limits for investments abroad) to actively 
promoting OFDI as a strategic tool to integrate with global markets and production 
systems (by way of the provision of information, matchmaking, incentives and insurance 
coverage, etc.).4 In this, Latin America and the Caribbean is far behind the policy 
initiatives of many Asian developing countries. 
 
Annex figure 1. Latin America and the Caribbean: Net OFDI flows, 1992-2008 (US$ billion) 
 
 
Source: ECLAC (2009a). 
  
                                                
4 For further discussion of these points, see UNCTAD, 2006. 
References: “Especial Multilatinas: Ser global en una crisis global,” América Economía, May, 10 2009; 
ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean), Preliminary Overview of the 
Economies of Latin American and Caribbean 2008(Santiago, Chile: United Nations Publication, 2008); 
ECLAC (2009a), Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean 2008 (Santiago, Chile: 
United Nations, 2009); ECLAC (2009b), Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 2008-2009 
(Santiago, Chile: United Nations, 2009); ECLAC (2009c), The Reactions of the Governments of Latin 
America and the Caribbean to the International Crisis: An Overview of Policy Measures up to 31st May 
2009 (Santiago, Chile: United Nations, 2009); “Inversión en Uruguay hará de Arauco el primer productor 
mundial de celulosa,” La Tercera, June, 28, 2009; “500 Empresas más poderosas de América Latina y el 
Caribe,” PODER, April 13, 2009; and UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2006 − FDI from Developing 


















Source: ECLAC, 2009a. 
 
Annex table 1. The top 25 non-financial companies and groups of Latin America and the Caribbean 
with investments outside of their country of origin, ranked by 2008 sales (US$ million) 
 
  Company Sales Country Sector 
1 PDVSA 115,446 Venezuela Petroleum/gas 
2 Petrobras 111,967 Brazil Petroleum/gas 
3 América Móvil/Telmex 33,960 Mexico Telecommunications 
4 Cia Vale Do Rio Doce 30,184 Brazil Mining 
5 
TECHINT (Tenaris, 
Ternium) 20,598 Argentina 
Steel, steel pipes, construction, 
others 
6 Gerdau 17,932 Brazil Iron and steel/ metallurgy 
7 Cemex 17,582 Mexico Cement 
8 Codelco 14,425 Chile Mining 
9 GrupoJBS 12,983 Brazil Food products 
10 Ecopetrol 12,283 Colombia Petroleum/gas 
11 Coca-Cola FEMSA 12,147 Mexico Beverages 
12 ENAP 10,095 Chile Petroleum/gas 
13 Cencosud 9,459 Chile Commerce 
14 Grupo Alfa 8,400 Mexico Various diversified 
15 Grupo Camargo Correa 7,175 Brazil Diversified 
16 Cia. Siderurgica Nacional 7,118 Brazil Iron and steel/ metallurgy 
17 Falabella 6,132 Chile Commerce 
18 Grupo Bimbo 5,951 Mexico Food products 
19 Embraer 5,725 Brazil Aerospace industry 
20 Grupo Modelo 5,448 Mexico Beverages 
21 Sadia 5,341 Brazil Food products 
22 TAM 5,201 Brazil Transportation/logistics 
23 Oderbrecht 4,950 Brazil Construction, others 







































Argentina 346 393 14 
Brazila 7,537 944 -87 
Chile 1,959 2,193 12 
Colombia 384 1,168 204 
Mexico -501 2,939 … 
Venezuela 1,068 80 -93 
Total 10,793 7,717 -28 
Source: The authors, on the basis of official figures as of 20 July 2009. 




Annex table 3. Main acquisitions by Trans-Latins outside their countries of origin, announced or 





















Operations announced prior to 2009 and concluded in 2009 
Fresh bread & 
baked goods 
business 




Canada 2,500 Food 
Coal assets Colombia Vale Brazil Cementos Argos SA Colombia 305 Mining 
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National companies or foreign affiliates: Whose contribution to growth 
is greater? 
 
Alice H. Amsden* 
 
A priori, is there a growth/efficiency justification for government programs designed to 
support and promote national companies (public and private) as opposed to, and in 
competition with, opening the doors to MNEs? In competitive markets, there should be 
no difference. Where national companies close in capabilities to foreign affiliates do not 
exist, FDI may stimulate development, if a country is lucky enough to attract it. But in the 
imperfect markets that characterize the BRICs and other emerging markets, where 
foreign affiliates may crowd out excellent but inexperienced national firms, the question 
arises as to which type of enterprise policy makers should encourage for the long run. 
Historically, policy makers used tariffs to promote national firms (a “race to the bottom”). 
Today they use investments in science and technology (a “race to the top”). 
 
National firms are likely to be the more entrepreneurial of the two types because national 
firms know their local markets best. 1  But foreign affiliates may have synergistic 
advantages from operating in more countries than the typical national firm. Still, in 
today’s global markets, there are eight relatively new functions that normally only 
national firms can perform, giving them a wide edge over foreign affiliates. More 
specifically, without private or public nationally owned enterprises to secure home 
markets: 
 
• Supplying outsourcing services to developed countries is unrealistic. Outsourcers, by 
definition, look overseas for national firms to undertake production, especially in 
electronics (a US firm may establish its own affiliate as an outsourcer, but typically 
experienced national outsourcers are faster and more efficient). 
• Establishing brand names is very difficult (a brand name is company specific, and a 
company usually originates in a given country that has proprietary technology). 
• Dislodging a foreign legacy position in a natural resource industry like oil is undoable 
(to supplant a foreign concession, a domestic firm is required as demonstrated by 
OPEC members but not yet by Africa’s new oil-producing countries). 
• Reversing brain drain of top national talent is more difficult (a glass ceiling may 
obstruct nationals from reaching the position of CEO if a company is foreign-owned). 
• The illegality of imposing local content requirements under WTO law is binding. 
While foreign affiliates cannot be subjected to local content regulations, national 
enterprises have more incentive to build their own local supply chains and state-
owned enterprises can help in this respect via procurement. 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank Duncan Kennedy, Ben Ross Schneider and Andrés Solimano for their helpful 
comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on February 13, 2012. 
1 Charles Kindleberger, American Business Abroad: Six Lectures on Direct Investment (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1969). 
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• The benefits of outward FDI undertaken by foreign affiliates located in the country 
ultimately accrue to the parent company at home. 
• Foreign affiliates conduct almost no research and development in emerging markets; 
so competing in high-tech industries is problematic, unless governments are able to 
take a hard line with foreign investors, as in India and China.  
• Small and especially medium-size enterprises must be brought up to speed as 
subcontractors, and FDI rarely makes a large impact in this firm-size range, which is 
the object of numerous government programs. 
 
There are other reasons to believe that the best national firms in the fastest growing 
emerging markets (for example, the Republic of Korea’s Samsung, India’s Infosys and 
Brazil’s Embraer) tend to be more entrepreneurial than foreign affiliates.2 The latter today 
are typically bureaucratic -- operating with relatively dense levels of management and 
cookie-cutting single models throughout the world. For now, when most national firms 
enjoy both family ownership and professional management, they display minimal 
bureaucracy. If a developing country relies on FDI, every “new” industry requires the 
entry of yet another MNE, whereas the conglomerate group, a typical national business 
structure in the de-colonized world, can diversify faster and at lower cost. 
 
The thin layer of bureaucracy in national firms, due to familial relations, improves 
information ﬂows. National firms are often super-quick in entering new industries and 
then in designing the integration of parts and components to win the global race to 
market. One national firm in the Indian pharmaceutical industry reached the market faster 
than the Indian foreign affiliate of the MNE that had invented the drug.3 In many 
industries, national firms were the first movers. They diversiﬁed forcefully and fast -- the 
origin of the diversiﬁed business group structure. 
 
All this suggests that research on FDI must change. In the past, FDI was compared with 
no FDI, as if national enterprise had nothing to contribute. Now, the presence or absence 
of foreign affiliates must be compared against that of well-managed national firms. How 
different the results will be remains to be seen, depending on policy formulation and 
implementation. National firms must be nursed and nurtured to fulfill the functions that 
foreign affiliates are less likely to undertake. There is little substitution. For this reason, 
specific institutions must be built to promote national assets. Good models in Asia are the 
Republic of Korea and China, and in the Middle East, many OPEC members. 
  
                                                
2 Alice Amsden, A Rational Revolution: Developing from Role Models, Deserting Deductive Theory 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, in process). 
3 Mona Mourshed, “Technology transfer dynamics: Lessons from the Egyptian and Indian pharmaceutical 





The role of multinationals in sparking industrialization: From “infant 




Although not yet fully conceptualized as a new catch-up model in mainstream 
development economics, the infant industry argument (protectionism designed to replace 
imports with domestic substitutes) is giving way to a FDI-led model of industrialization. 
 
Industrialization used to be an arduous long-term process of structural upgrading. It took 
Britain nearly a century subsequent to the Industrial Revolution to become the world’s 
industrial leader in the second half of the 19th century. The United States replaced Britain 
in only about half a century. The spectacular rise of China has shortened the catch-up 
process even further, with the country having swiftly surpassed Japan in 2010 to become 
the world’s second-largest economy within three decades after the adoption of an open-
door policy in 1978. Behind this time-compressing trend of economic growth is the ever-
accelerating dissemination of industrial knowledge from advanced to emerging markets. 
Most recently, this advance comes at the hands of MNEs and through breakthroughs in 
information technology. 
 
To absorb and assimilate modern technology, the currently advanced economies used to 
resort to “infant industry protection” in their early stages of growth. The prime examples 
are the United States, Germany and Japan, which achieved great success with the catch-
up strategy of infant industry protection or “import substitution” (two phrases used 
interchangeably in development economics). 
 
This approach required the catching-up economy to go through a sequence of imports, 
domestic production and finally exports (if practical) -- involving the “visible hand” of 
government as a way of building up nationally owned industry under protectionism. 
During the course of technological learning, a protected industry had to secure industrial 
knowledge abroad (via many avenues, from licensing to copying) or create its own, 
which would be costly, time-consuming and often fruitless. 
 
In many instances, protected industries stayed in the import substitution phase without 
attaining export competitiveness. The required government involvement often resulted in 
inefficiency, corruption and monopolies. During its heyday of import substitution, Latin 
America fell victim to this dénouement, especially since it neglected to build export-
oriented labor-intensive industries, in which the region would have had a strong 
comparative advantage, thereby failing to mobilize its most abundant factor, labor, to 
trigger bottom-up industrialization. Latin America depended on “protected-market-
seeking” FDI in its comparatively disadvantaged industries (those incommensurate with 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank Joze P. Damijan, Lutao Ning and Charles P. Oman for their helpful comments 
on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on June 6, 2011. 
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its prevailing factor endowments and technology). Its reliance on “resources-seeking” 
FDI in particular led to a collusive alliance between MNEs and local elites, a form of the 
“resource curse.” 
 
In sharp contrast, however, China’s catch up now tells a quite different story, an 
alternative approach that is in tune with the zeitgeist of today’s global economy and can 
comply with WTO rules. China has unequivocally demonstrated the efficacy of what may 
be called “FDI-led industrial take-off,” a strategy that is a much quicker (indeed, virtually 
instant) and more effective means of acquiring modern technology and export 
competitiveness than old-fashioned import substitution. 
 
In comparison to infant industry protection, this FDI-led take-off strategy can create an 
entirely new export-driven industry practically overnight -- either wholly or jointly 
foreign-owned, depending on the host country’s policies. MNEs generate and possess 
industrial knowledge and, above all, access to export markets. Inward FDI can instantly 
complete the otherwise-prolonged three-stage sequence of imports, domestic production 
and exports. It also produces technological spillovers to the host economy. Indeed, China 
skillfully carried out this new strategy by actively welcoming MNEs -- early on, in its 
comparatively advantaged, labor-intensive light industries (notably, apparel, footwear, 
toys) and, more recently, in its capital-intensive, scale-driven industries (especially, 
automobiles, consumer electronics), thereby emerging as the workshop of the world. In 
this process China lifted hundreds of millions out of abject poverty. 
 
In addition, China is adopting a more directly outward-focused approach: “knowledge 
absorption via acquisition” (i.e. buying out technologically advantaged firms overseas), 
as best exemplified by Lenovo (which acquired the former IBM PC division in 2005) and 
Volvo (which was purchased by Geely in 2010). Although this newer approach is often 
blocked by political concerns in host countries (as is the case of Huawei’s recent attempt 
to purchase 3Leaf Systems in the US), FDI thus works both ways in China’s efforts to 
acquire industrial knowledge. Most interestingly -- and paradoxically, given its state-
dominated polity -- China’s approach is far more outwardly integrative and far more 
strongly market-driven than the conventional “closed-economy” strategy of import 
substitution pursued earlier, say, by postwar Japan. 
 
On the whole, therefore, China’s policymakers have made effective use of a new catch-up 
model that is powered by the logic of MNEs’ profit-seeking activities. The model of FDI-
led take-off has rendered that of infant industry protection obsolete. It is true that China 
now has to reformulate and refine its growth strategy as it climbs higher on the ladder of 
development, which increasingly requires more autonomous technological capacity. 
Nonetheless, China’s initial growth strategy and the way this has been implemented need 
to be conceptualized as a new approach that capitalizes on MNEs’ participation in export-
driven, labor-intensive industries as a jump-starter of industrialization. The days of infant 










A recent Perspective by Terutomo Ozawa1 singles out protectionism FDI as alternative 
drivers for the take-off phase of catching-up industrialization. This dichotomy neglects 
the rich and nuanced variety of strategic options revealed by recent successful 
industrialization experiences. Consider: 
 
• Strong diffusion-oriented science and technology (S&T) capability-building 
policies focused on specialized small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) were 
key to Taiwan Province of China’s industrialization strategy. 
• The Republic of Korea focused on fostering learning and the acquisition of 
technological competence by chaebols, so that these organizations could achieve 
critical mass to compete globally in capital and technology-intensive industries. 
• The allocation of public resources to engineering education, technical training and 
S&T has been critical to the development of scores of highly internationally 
competitive Brazilian private firms. Brazil’s development bank subsidizes 
consolidations between local private firms, with the goal of achieving economies 
of scale high enough to engage successfully in R&D competition with MNEs. 
• China’s own brand of catching-up industrialization 2  relies heavily on 
strengthening indigenous enterprises, fostering S&T capabilities (particularly in 
high-tech sectors) and attracting FDI complying with stringent domestic 
technology absorption policies. 
 
Key factors in shortening catching-up periods have been: 
 
Education and training. Successful catching-up countries have reached record rates of 
growth in the supply of university graduates, particularly in natural sciences and 
engineering (most relevant to technology absorption). 
 
Innovation and technology diffusion. The Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China, 
Brazil, and China have given high priority to speeding up technological learning, 
incremental innovation and domestic knowledge diffusion through institutional 
innovations. 
 
Entrepreneurship development. Fostering personnel and technology knowledge flows 
among research labs, universities and the private sector has helped to bridge imbalances 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank John Cantwell, Richard Nelson and Robert Pearce for their helpful comments 
on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on December 19, 2011. 
1 Terutomo Ozawa, “The role of multinationals in sparking industrialization: From ‘infant industry 
protection’ to ‘FDI-led industrial take-off,’” Columbia FDI Perspectives, No. 39 (June 6, 2011). 
2 Carlos A. Magarinos, Long Yongtu and Francisco Sercovich, eds., China in the WTO: The Birth of a New 
Catching-Up Strategy (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
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in the supply and demand of S&T and entrepreneurial skills, promoting competence 
building and fostering efficiency gains. Brazil’s government established state-owned 
enterprises and then privatized them once they acquired the abilities necessary to perform 
competitively. The strategy supporting the formerly state-owned Embraer was over 60 
years in the making, starting with targeted state support of massive education and 
training, along with learning subsidization. 
 
MNEs. These can also help in the catching-up process when favorable domestic 
conditions exist, particularly regarding technology absorption and capability-building 
policies. 
 
These strategies often relied on a covenant between the state and the private sector 
whereby the state subsidized technological learning and orchestrated the levers -- 
financial, external, fiscal, regulatory, and institutional -- conducive to the effective 
exploitation of the outputs of such learning for production for world markets, while the 
private sector achieved sustainable standards of technological mastery and international 
competitiveness through increasing R&D, innovation and training efforts. Clear and 
effective rules applied so that the goals sought were achieved within specific timeframes. 
 
FDI played a significant role in catching-up industrialization in some cases (China, 
Brazil). However, on the whole, FDI flows did not lead, but rather were led by host 
country policies and strategies.3 Understanding the role of FDI in host countries first 
requires grasping the underpinnings of host countries’ strategies, policies and institutions. 
Hence, FDI should not be seen as entirely exogenous, nor should infant development 
policies be considered as necessarily non-WTO compliant or antagonistic toward FDI. 
 
Actual policy focuses ranged from domestic SME development (Taiwan Province of 
China) to fostering chaebols (Republic of Korea), from indirect state incentive 
orchestration (Republic of Korea) to “market socialism” (China) and from heavy reliance 
on FDI (China, Brazil) to arm’s length technology deals with MNEs (Taiwan Province of 
China), including various blends of the strategies above. Commonalities include a 
capability-building focused strategy, the subsidization of domestic learning processes and 
the promotion of domestic entrepreneurship and export-orientation, along with episodes 
of import-substitution, which for the most part, when successful, were turned into export-
oriented ventures and, when unsuccessful, were phased out. The key to such policies 
today is the building and strengthening of domestic knowledge systems and the 
promotion of an internationally competitive private sector capable of embarking upon 
sustainable innovation trajectories. 
 
The issue is not, therefore, whether MNEs are on board, but rather whether domestic pre-
conditions are met so that MNEs can effectively contribute to sustainable catching-up 
development -- through FDI or otherwise. Accelerated international technology diffusion 
rates associated with FDI and information technology breakthroughs have not made 
lengthy domestic technological development efforts redundant, and subsidizing domestic 
                                                
3 Alice H. Amsden, The Rise of the Rest: Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing Economies 
(New York: OUP, 2001). 
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learning processes is normally indispensable and not necessarily inefficient. Yes, 
catching-up has become faster over time; but costly endogenous learning processes are 
not passé. Sweeping leapfrogging alternatives are not available. 
 
Without domestic absorption and innovative capabilities, little if any advantage can be 
taken of international knowledge flows, either through FDI or otherwise. Infant 











This is a reply to Francisco Sercovich’s commentary1  on my chapter on FDI-led 
industrial takeoff in which I described FDI as an ignition for catch-up industrialization.2 
He emphasized “the rich and nuanced variety of strategic options”3 (e.g., S&T policies, 
engineering education, chaebol-type enterprises for technology absorption, R&D 
capabilities), which are, however, relevant only to higher-stages of catch-up, but not to 
the kick-off stage with which my previous Perspective was concerned. Economic 
development derives from structural changes at different stages of growth, requiring 
stages-focused strategies. 
 
The FDI-led takeoff applies to the beginning stage of catch-up in which labor-abundant 
emerging economies have an endowed comparative advantage in low-end manufacturing. 
Higher stages are obviously built increasingly on knowledge and demand more 
sophisticated approaches. As I stated, “China now has to reformulate and refine its 
growth strategy as it climbs higher on the ladder....”4 Each stage calls for different 
preparatory measures, institutions and strategies.5 
 
Also, the notion of infant industry protection (IIP) has come to be stretched to cover 
practically any type of development measure. The FDI-led model was conceptualized as 
opposed to the conventional IIP theory epitomized in the Alexander Hamilton-Friedrich 
List approach that stresses import substitution to build a locally owned industry under 
protection-cum-promotion -- not under general development policies, allowing foreign 
advances into domestic industries. 
 
In this respect, postwar Japan effectively pursued the Hamilton-List IIP strategy in 
modernizing its capital-intensive industries (e.g., steel, machinery, automobiles) by 
borrowing and improving on Western technologies. However, war-devastated Japan re-
started first with then-comparatively advantaged, labor-intensive light industries and 
quickly redeveloped exports (e.g., toys, textiles). Japan’s light industries did not need -- 
and in fact, avoided -- investments by foreign MNEs. 
 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank Raphael Kaplinsky, Rajah Rasiah and Dennis Tachiki for their helpful 
comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on May 28, 2012. 
1 Francisco Sercovich, “Knowledge, FDI and catching-up strategies,” Columbia FDI Perspectives, No. 53 
(December 19, 2011). 
2 Terutomo Ozawa, “The role of multinationals in sparking industrialization: From ‘infant industry 
protection’ to ‘FDI-led industrial take-off,’” Columbia FDI Perspectives, No. 39 (June 6, 2011). 
3Sercovich, op. cit., para. 1. 
4 Ozawa, op. cit., para. 9. 
5 For a policy framework, see a “leading-sector growth” model in Terutomo Ozawa, “The (Japan-born) 
‘flying-geese’ theory of economic development revisited -- and reformulated from a structuralist 
perspective,” Global Policy, vol. 2 (October 2011), pp. 272-285. 
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In contrast, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China and the Republic of Korea deliberately 
had to set up export-processing zones to attract labor-seeking FDI in the 1960s-70s, since 
they lacked the experience of producing manufactured exports. And they quickly 
succeeded in attracting labor-intensive manufacturing, the first step to industrial 
modernization. China, too, emulated its neighbors’ successes by opening up for trade and 
FDI in 1978. China’s special economic zones and low-wage labor enticed foreign MNEs 
to build China’s low-cost, export-driven manufacturing, swiftly alleviating poverty. 
 
The FDI-led kick-off has thus become a new jump-starter of industrialization and a more 
expedient alternative to the inward-looking IIP strategy. Such a start of industrial 
modernization does not require the sophisticated measures cited by Sercovich. In fact, 
this is the reason why the World Bank is urging China to relocate low-wage factories to 
Africa in order to help spark industrialization, although Africa (other than South Africa) 
still lacks nuanced strategic capacities (like S&T capabilities, chaebol-type technological 
competence and R&D competition with foreign MNEs). 
 
As to chaebol-type conglomerates as a strategic option, they were actually not needed 
when the Republic of Korea was exporting labor-intensive goods (e.g., wigs, toys, 
footwear), initially from its Masan export-processing zone opened in 1970. Only in the 
subsequent, higher stages of catch-up (i.e., heavy and chemical industrialization and the 
development of assembly-based industries) chaebols became a powerful instrument -- 
just as Japan’s postwar keiretsu firms did -- for building scale-driven, capital-intensive 
industries (e.g., shipbuilding, machinery, microchips, automobiles). True, the government 
sagaciously began to make efforts to establish these higher-stage industries under IIP-
cum-subsidies, starting as early as the late 1960s (e.g., the Electronics Industry Promotion 
Law of 1969 initially to encourage assembly operations of monochrome TVs, i.e., from 
the low-end of a knowledge-based industry). All these industries, however, grew 
internationally competitive only in later and more recent decades. Interestingly, chaebols 
may now be even considered outdated in an era of entrepreneurship and start-ups 
spawned by information technology. 
 
Thus, the criticality of a stages perspective cannot be overstressed. For instance, to ask 
Africa’s unindustrialized countries to organize chaebol-type enterprises and invest in 
S&T capabilities is premature at the moment; instead, Africa should first apply its limited 
development resources (including policy capacity) to attracting FDI in labor-intensive 
manufacturing to ignite an FDI-led takeoff. This must be what the World Bank has in 
mind. True, there may be other options, such as fostering small and medium-size 
domestic manufacturers in hopes of an autonomous export-led kick-off. Some even 
propose a skipping-a-step strategy to enter a high-end industry. But this approach, even if 
workable, risks unbalanced development, leaving the region’s comparative advantage in 
labor-intensive industries untapped -- hence, the impoverished masses still under and un-
employed. Once it gets kick-started, however, more intricate higher-stage strategies are 
needed to sustain catch-up. In sum, it makes sense first to exploit endowed advantages 







Much ado about nothing? State-controlled entities and the change in 




The rise of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) -- 
together state-controlled entities (SCEs) -- has led to concerns that SCEs could threaten 
national security by following political rather than mere commercial goals with respect to 
their FDI. While developed countries acknowledged that the rise of SCEs should not lead 
to new barriers to FDI, several have changed their legislation to expand government 
oversight of FDI flows. In 2009, Germany also tightened its foreign investment regime. 
What are the first experiences with this change in German investment law? 
 
In April 2009, an amendment to the German Foreign Trade and Payments Act entered 
into force. According to the new law, the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology 
(BMWI) can review foreign investments and can suspend or prohibit transactions that 
threaten to impair national security or public order. The new law applies to an acquisition 
of voting rights of 25% or more of a listed or non-listed German company by non-EU or 
non-European Free Trade Association purchasers; it does not explicitly discriminate 
between private or public foreign investors.1 The law was prepared mainly before the 
financial crisis and was patterned, at the end, on US legislation. 
 
According to current legislation, it is not mandatory for foreign investors to submit 
notifications of the acquisition of a German firm. Rather, the BMWI collects information 
about M&As by foreign investors and may review these transactions within three months. 
In 2008, the BMWI expected that only about ten foreign investments per year would be 
reviewed. Foreign investors who are not sure whether their investments raise national 
security concerns can request a certificate of non-objection. Many economists and 
political commentators criticized the change of the German investment law, whereas the 
Government argued that the new law is only pre-emptive and will not be used to 
discriminate against SCEs. 
 
So far, the German authorities have applied the new law carefully. From April 2009 to 
December 2011, no foreign acquisition of a German company was suspended or 
prohibited, and no review process was initiated by the BMWI. There were 99 cases 
during that period in which foreign companies applied for certificates of non-objection. In 
98 cases, the foreign investors received the certificate, on average, within two weeks. In 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank Rudolf Dolzer, Justus Haucap, Steffen Hindelang, and Joachim Steffens for 
their helpful comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on June 4, 2012. 
1 Thomas Jost, “Sovereign wealth funds and the German policy reaction,” in Karl P. Sauvant, Lisa Sachs 




one case, the potential foreign investor refrained from its investment for unknown 
reasons.2 
 
In recent years, investments by SCEs in the German corporate sector have risen 
noticeably. Their FDI is not shown separately in the German inward FDI stock statistics; 
but FDI from economies that host SCEs (e.g. China, Iran, Russia, United Arab Emirates) 
has risen strongly in the past decade -- from less than US$ 2 billion in 2000 to US$ 8.5 
billion in 2009.3 SWFs have acquired stakes in several well-known German companies. 
For example, at the end of 2009, Qatar Investment Authority acquired a large stake in 
Volkswagen AG for US$ 9.6 billion, raising its share in the world’s third largest car 
producer to 17%. Most of these investments were under the 25% threshold that could 
provoke a review in case of security concerns. However, SCEs from countries of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council have also acquired several smaller sized German companies that are 
not listed on stock exchanges. In most of these cases they acquired more than 50% (and 
often 100%) of the equity capital of the German company. 
 
Despite the change of its legislation, Germany has remained open for FDI. In 2010, the 
OECD continued to rank Germany among the most open countries for inward FDI 
worldwide, far ahead of France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In the 
United States, for comparison, the Committee on Foreign Investment reviewed 313 
transactions within a period of three years (2008-2010), of which 30% resulted in 
investigations.4 
 
The careful handling of the new law and the increase of SCEs’ investments in Germany 
can be interpreted in different ways: on the one hand, the change of the investment law 
was successful and passed a practical test as Germany remained an open business 
location. On the other hand, one could ask whether the German authorities had 
overreacted in changing the law by doing much about nothing. Like in most other 
economies, the public debate on restrictive measures against SCEs’ investments has 
calmed down in Germany. In 2011, there were no reported changes of national 
investment laws with respect to national security in developed countries.  Since the 
Lisbon Treaty took effect, the EU has gained the competence concerning FDI. Practical 
implications for Germany’s legislation are still uncertain. 
  
                                                
2 Information provided by BMWI. An official published report of the Ministry is not available. 
3 Thomas Jost, “Inward FDI in Germany and its policy context, update 2011,” Columbia FDI Profiles, 
November 19, 2011. 





National security with a Canadian twist: The Investment Canada Act 




On March 12, 2009, the Canadian federal government passed significant amendments to 
the Investment Canada Act (ICA), Canada’s foreign investment law of general 
application. 1  Though the amendments generally liberalize important aspects of the 
Canadian foreign investment review regime, they also include a broadly worded national 
security test that now allows the responsible minister to review proposed investments in 
Canada on national security grounds.2 On July 11, 2009, the government published draft 
regulations that provide the details of the new national security review process. A 
detailed summary of the amendments and regulations is included in an extended note 
available at www.vcc.columbia.edu.3 
 
At a time when many jurisdictions, including the US and certain EU members, have or 
are contemplating national security reviews, it is unsurprising that the Canadian 
government has put a similar process in place. Indeed, the Canadian national security 
review raises issues akin to those raised in other jurisdictions with similar tests, including 
uncertainty about the meaning of “national security,” concern that the new test may be 
used to target sovereign investment (particularly in the natural resources and energy 
sectors), and the likelihood of politicization of national security reviews.4 
 
As is the case in new processes, which lack precise statutory or regulatory definition, it is 
unclear how the new test will be applied, and there are reasons to believe that it could be 
applied in a wide range of situations. There are at least three possible dimensions of 
national security: (1) economic welfare; (2) national security; and (3) super-national 
security.5 The application of any of these dimensions to a merger review raises the 
possibility that a potential transaction that will increase economic efficiencies is rejected 
for political reasons. First, an interest in economic welfare may raise concerns that 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank Anthony Baldanza and Ed Safarian for their helpful comments on this chapter, 
which was first published as a Perspective on July 30, 2009. 
1 It is important to note that foreign investment in Canada may be subject to sector specific legislation 
depending on the industry in question. See e.g. Donald G. McFetridge, “The role of sectoral ownership 
restrictions,” paper prepared for the Competition Policy Review Panel (2008).  
2 The ICA provides that the federal minister of Industry is responsible for administering the legislation in 
all contexts save those relating to investment in a Canadian “cultural business” (as the term is defined at 
section 14.1(5) of the ICA). The administration of the ICA as it relates to such businesses is the 
responsibility of the minister of Canadian Heritage. Investments that are both cultural and non-cultural may 
be subject to the jurisdiction of both ministers: http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ica-lic.nsf/eng/lk00053.html 
(accessed March 30, 2009). 
3 The link for the Extended Note is: http://vcc.columbia.edu/pubs/documents/ICAextendednote-Final.pdf. 
4 See, e.g. Edward M. Graham and David M. Marchick, U.S. National Security and Foreign Direct 
Investment (Washington, D.C., Institute for International Economics, 2006). 
5 Deborah M. Mostaghel, “Dubai Ports World under Exon-Florio: a threat to national security or a tempest 
in a seaport?” Albany Law Review, vol. 70 (2007), pp. 607-614. 
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domestic industries should be protected from being bought out by foreign investors. In 
the past, producers of “clothespin[s], peanut[s], pottery, shoe[s], pen[s], paper and 
pencil[s]” in jurisdictions around the world have invoked the economic welfare 
dimension of national security to protect their industry.6 Second, an interest in national 
security may refer to a concern that sectors of a country’s economy that are strategically 
sensitive for defense reasons should not be owned by foreign companies. Finally, an 
interest in super-national security may refer to the overarching imperative to “protect the 
homeland” from investment by countries that are viewed as a security risk. 
 
Recently, it could be argued that the federal government and Canadian public view all 
three of these dimensions as relevant to national security reviews in Canada. Successive 
federal governments have expressed concern over investments by state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) in Canadian businesses, exemplified by public debate over inbound investments 
by United Arab Emirates' SOEs and the issuance of review guidelines under the ICA 
specific to SOEs.7  The current government’s decision (seemingly supported by all 
parties) to block the Alliant/MDA transaction on the basis of arguably unusual concerns 
relating to US access to surveillance technology further suggests that there is political 
will to consider similar restrictions on defense related acquisitions, even emanating from 
countries like the US. 
 
Finally, public concern over the alleged “hollowing out” of corporate Canada, whether 
through elimination of Canadian head offices, stock exchange listings or reduced R&D 
has been apparent in the context of high profile acquisitions of Canadian businesses. 
Indeed, the consultation undertaken by the federal government, which preceded passage 
of the amendments to the ICA, explicitly considered the issue in its deliberations, and did 
not rule out the possibility, for example, that the loss of Canadian head offices due to 
foreign acquisitions of Canadian businesses could have negative consequences for the 
Canadian economy, though it did not recommend further direct restrictions on foreign 
investment.8 
 
                                                
6 Mostaghel, “Dubai Ports World under Exon-Florio: a threat to national security or a tempest in a 
seaport?,” op. cit., p. 608. 
7 Industry Canada, Guidelines, “Investment by state-owned enterprises: net benefit assessment,” (December 
2007). The guidelines are a statement of policy and, as such, do not have any legal effect or introduce any 
legislative amendments to the ICA. Instead, they specify particular factors that the minister should consider 
when applying the six economic factors under the ICA’s net benefit test to a proposed investment by an 
SOE, being: 
• The SOE’s adherence to Canadian laws, practices, and standards of corporate governance, including 
commitments to transparency and disclosure, independent members of the board of directors, 
independent audit committees and equitable treatment of shareholders; 
• The nature of and extent to which the SOE is controlled by a foreign government; and 
• Whether the acquired Canadian business will continue to operate on a commercial basis. 
The guidelines also suggest that SOEs should submit specific undertakings to the minister in support of a 
proposed transaction. Examples of possible undertakings include: 
• Appointing Canadians as independent directors on the board of directors; 
• Employing Canadians in senior management positions; incorporating the new business in Canada; or 
• Listing the shares of the acquiring company or the Canadian business on a Canadian stock exchange. 
8 Competition Policy Review Panel, Compete to Win: Final Report (Government of Canada, June 2008). 
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When these tendencies are considered in light of the breadth of the national security test, 
the federal government should be cautious in adopting an over-expansive approach to the 
application of the new test. The above tendencies demonstrate the country’s 
preoccupations with national champions, Canadian control over natural resources and 
domestic head offices. Allowing these preoccupations to dominate a national security 
review would counter the intended purpose of the test, and instead of functioning as a 
transparent tool to be used by the federal government in the limited circumstances in 
which foreign investment may threaten Canada’s national security, the national security 
test would become a meaningless catchphrase to be touted against unpopular, but 
legitimate foreign investments. Having said this, and as of the writing of this Chapter, the 
seemingly smooth progress (to date) of the recently announced acquisition by China 
Investment Corporation (CIC) of a minority voting interest in Teck Resources Ltd. (a 
major Canadian mining concern) under the new national security test is a welcome sign.9 
This transaction, involving a leading Chinese sovereign wealth fund acquiring a stake in a 
Canadian natural resource company, was precisely the type of acquisition that was to be 
scrutinized under the new test. 
 
Foreign investors considering investments that could be subject to the new process will 
also have to adjust to a review process that is no longer primarily administrative, but 
essentially political. The national security review process is highly consultative in nature, 
and invites input from the cabinet of the federal government, departments of the federal 
government, as well as provinces affected by the transaction. All of these constituencies 
are heavily influenced by public concern about high profile transactions, especially those 
that are the subject of extensive media comment. Prudent foreign investors are well 
advised to recognize this at an early stage of their planning and to consider government 
relations and public relations strategies that are consistent with the approach taken to 
review under the ICA. Investors who appreciate the multifaceted nature of the Canadian 
foreign investment review process will have the most success in securing ministerial 
approval in a timely and acceptable manner. 
  
                                                











In its World Investment Report 2011, UNCTAD reported that liberalizing investment 
policy measures taken globally in 2010 outnumbered restrictive measures.1 Without the 
benefit of statistics, investors might have drawn the opposite conclusion, witnessing what 
appears to be a rising tide of national resistance to foreign takeovers: the Australian 
Foreign Investment Review Board’s rejection of a takeover of the Australian Securities 
Exchange by the Singapore Exchange, Italian concern over a French company’s takeover 
of dairy giant Parmalat and the US Government’s requirement that Chinese company 
Huawei divest certain assets it had acquired from 3Leaf. 
 
In Canada, the rejection by the Canadian Government of the takeover of Potash 
Corporation of Saskatchewan (PotashCorp) by Australian mining giant BHP Billiton 
(BHP) has raised similar anxieties. However, closer scrutiny of the PotashCorp decision 
reveals that it does not portend a sea-change in the foreign investment review process in 
Canada. Rather, it underlines that politics can occasionally hijack the review of foreign 
investments, in contrast to other areas of law (such as merger control under competition 
law) that tend to have a more predictable, less open-ended framework of analysis. 
 
The PotashCorp decision represented only the second time in Canada’s history of foreign 
investment review legislation (Investment Canada Act or ICA) that a foreign investment 
outside the cultural sector has been rejected. PotashCorp is the largest producer of potash 
(a key ingredient in fertilizer), reported to have about 20% of global potash capacity. The 
Canadian Government found that BHP’s bid did not meet the “net benefit to Canada” test 
for approval under the ICA. Among other factors, the Canadian Government was not 
satisfied that BHP was prepared to make sufficient commitments in respect of capital 
expenditures or PotashCorp’s membership in the potash export consortium, Canpotex.2 
At the time, the federal Minister of Agriculture also referred to potash as a “strategic 
resource.”3 
 
Despite these explanations, the PotashCorp decision is properly viewed as an exceptional 
and largely political response to a number of factors: 
 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank Subrata Bhattacharjee, Andrea Bjorklund and Gus Van Harten for their 
helpful comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on August 27, 2012. 
1See http://www.unctad.org/templates/webflyer.asp?docid=15189&intItemID=2068&lang=1&mode=downloads. 
2See Cassandra Kyle, “BHP Billiton withdraws potash bid, citing ‘net-benefit’ bar,” Postmedia News, Nov. 
15, 2010, available at:  
www.canada.com/news/Billiton+withdraws+potash+citing+benefit/3827505/story.html. 
3 Eric Reguly, Andy Hoffman and Brenda Bouw, “BHP’s hopes fade as Ottawa calls potash ‘strategic,’” 
The Globe and Mail, November 5, 2010, p. B1. 
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• The Premier of Saskatchewan’s success in galvanizing opposition to the deal 
across Canada, based on expressed concerns over a significant reduction in tax 
revenues and foreign ownership of a “strategic” resource. 
• The ruling Conservative Party’s minority government status, which made it 
vulnerable to a potential loss of seats in the 2011 election -- particularly in the 
province of Saskatchewan where there was strong support for the Premier’s 
opposition. 
• The hostile nature of BHP’s bid. 
 
The absence of official reasons for the PotashCorp decision fostered anxiety about the 
Government’s openness to foreign investment. This was particularly the case in light of 
the significant and, in some respects, unprecedented undertakings BHP had offered 
Canada. The latter included foregoing tax benefits, remaining a member of the Canpotex 
potash export consortium for five years and establishing its global headquarters in 
Saskatoon. BHP also offered a US$ 250 million performance bond to the Government to 
backstop its undertakings, likely to allay public concerns about compliance. 
 
There are (at least) three lessons to be drawn from this decision. First, potential 
stakeholders in the Investment Canada process, particularly the provinces, have learned 
that political agitation can yield concrete results. However, whether this lesson will 
translate readily to other transactions is open to question: provincial leaders typically 
have more diverse and conflicting constituencies than Saskatchewan where the potash 
industry is very significant, and the federal government is no longer politically fragile, 
having won majority government status in May of 2011. 
 
Second, the Canadian Government is sensitive to criticism that its decision regarding 
PotashCorp could discourage foreign investment in Canada and, accordingly, has 
portrayed this case as exceptional and not indicative of a potentially worrisome trend of 
deploying national interest tests in a way that impedes the flow of international 
investment.4 Indeed, no deals have been rejected in the year since the decision, although 
it is telling that the Government has still not brought into force a 2009 amendment to the 
ICA that would increase the review threshold and thereby reduce the number of foreign 
investments subject to review. 
 
Third, some foreign investors may increasingly turn to self-help measures to address 
uncertainty over the Government’s approach to foreign investment. For example, by 
making minority investments of less than a third of a corporation’s shares, foreign 
investors can avoid scrutiny under the ICA, unless the investment is potentially injurious 
to Canada’s national security. In addition, in the resources sector, foreign businesses may 
negotiate “off-take agreements” entitling them to a share of production as a means of 
securing access to natural resources.	    
                                                
4 See Peter Lichtenbaum and David Fagan, “Lessons in mediating for dairy warriors,” Financial Times, 





The revised national security review process for FDI in the US 
 
Mark E. Plotkin and David N. Fagan* 
 
On December 22, 2008, new regulations setting forth the US Government’s national 
security review process for foreign mergers and acquisitions of US businesses became 
effective. They are the ultimate step in a lengthy effort to revise and strengthen the 
reviews undertaken by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
(CFIUS).1 
 
CFIUS administers the so-called Exon-Florio statute, which provides the US President 
with the authority to review mergers, acquisitions and takeovers that may result in foreign 
control over a US person or entity engaged in interstate commerce in the United States. 
(Greenfield investments are not subject to CFIUS review.) For M&As that threaten to 
impair US national security in a manner that cannot be mitigated or that is not, in the 
President’s judgment, otherwise addressable through other US laws, the President can 
suspend or prohibit such foreign investments -- a decision not subject to any judicial 
review. The Exon-Florio statute itself, and CFIUS as the statute’s administering body, 
came under political attack in the wake of the 2006 Dubai Ports World debacle. Some in 
the US Congress sought to tighten drastically the legal regime for foreign investment in 
the United States. Fortunately, through the leadership of certain key members of 
Congress, the administration and the business community, the debate shifted to 
improving the review process in a manner that protects national security while preserving 
the openness of the US to foreign investment. The end result was the Foreign Investment 
and National Security Act of 2007, which thoughtfully enhanced Exon-Florio and the 
CFIUS process. The Treasury Department, working with the other CFIUS agencies, has 
now issued final regulations implementing the Act. 
 
The amended CFIUS process maintains the formal existing timeframes for reviewing 
M&As, providing a critical measure of certainty to foreign investors and US parties. The 
timeframe for CFIUS review -- and Presidential action, when necessary -- can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
• CFIUS conducts an initial 30-day review following receipt of a voluntary notice 
filed jointly by the foreign acquiror and the US business. The vast majority of 
CFIUS cases are concluded following this initial 30-day review. 
                                                
* This chapter was first published as a Perspective on January 7, 2009. 
1 In addition to the Department of The Treasury, which chairs CFIUS, the Committee is comprised of eight 
other voting members (the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and 
Energy; the US Trade Representative; and White House Office of Science and Technology); two permanent 
non-voting members (the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Labor); and several other 
executive branch offices that act as observers and, on occasion, participants in CFIUS reviews. 
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• For transactions deemed to require additional review following the initial 30 days, 
the statute authorizes CFIUS to conduct an investigation for up to an additional 45 
days. 
• If CFIUS has not unanimously resolved a threat to US national security at the end 
of the 45-day investigation period, CFIUS will provide a formal report to the 
President. The President then has 15 days to issue his decision in the case. (Few 
transactions reach the stage of requiring a Presidential decision.) 
• CFIUS is now required to report to Congress on its reviews, but those reports occur 
only after the review is concluded. There is no formal prior role for Congress. 
 
For foreign investors and US parties, there are a number of other notable aspects of 
CFIUS’s authority and jurisdiction under the amended law and regulations. First, the 
CFIUS regime continues to employ a broadly flexible definition of “control” by a foreign 
person for purposes of determining CFIUS jurisdiction. Second, the applicable law and 
regulations do not precisely define the meaning of “national security.” CFIUS’s national 
security assessment in turn remains a case-by-case determination. Even the presence of 
foreign government-control over the investor -- for which there is a statutory presumption 
of heightened scrutiny -- does not necessarily create a national security risk; CFIUS still 
considers all facts and circumstances related to the particular M&A at issue in 
determining what, if any, national security risk is presented. Third, while CFIUS has 
authority to initiate its own reviews of M&As, the CFIUS review remains an inherently 
voluntary process, affording parties with discretion on when and whether to notify CFIUS 
of a “covered transaction” (i.e., a M&A involving investment by a foreign person). 
Fourth, while CFIUS’s amended legal authorities provide, in practice, for a more 
deliberative process that can result in enhanced scrutiny in certain cases and, in turn, a 
greater number investigations, they also create an arguably higher bar for CFIUS to 
extract formal (and potentially costly) risk-mitigation commitments from M&A parties as 
a condition of approval. 
 
Together, these characteristics of the amended CFIUS regime offer CFIUS the latitude to 
review transactions likely to raise real (or perceived) national security risks and to 
address those risks reasonably, without trampling the overall US policy of promoting 
foreign investment. They also offer transactional parties discretion on whether to 
condition the consummation of covered M&As upon CFIUS approval. Consequently, 
while the number of M&As filed with CFIUS has been rising steadily in recent years (see 
the table below), CFIUS likely will continue to review just a fraction -- generally 
estimated to be less than 10% -- of foreign investments in US businesses. Furthermore, 
even with the enhanced number of filings and increased investigations, the vast majority 
of CFIUS’s reviews will continue to conclude in the initial 30-day time period. 
 
It is important to note, however, that M&A parties should tread carefully with their 
discretion on when and whether to notify CFIUS of a transaction and to require CFIUS 
approval before closing the transaction. CFIUS does monitor M&A activity, and it is 
always preferable for parties to raise a transaction with CFIUS voluntarily rather than to 
have CFIUS formally come calling after the transaction is announced. Moreover, while 
relatively few covered M&As raise potential national security concerns, the President and 
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CFIUS have the power to unwind a transaction after closing. Conversely, a CFIUS 
review and approval provides a form of safe harbor for a transaction that can only be 
revisited in very limited, exceptional circumstances. Given this dynamic, parties are well 
advised to assess the CFIUS-related ramifications of a potential transaction involving 
foreign investment -- and to determine whether a CFIUS review is advisable -- in 
advance of entering into a covered M&A. 
 
In the end, the revised CFIUS regime largely preserves existing practices and timeframes; 
provides somewhat greater clarity to transaction parties; establishes greater accountability 
within the CFIUS process and of CFIUS to the US Congress; and strengthens political 
confidence in, and respect for, the CFIUS review system. Given the difficult place where 
the political process commenced after Dubai Ports World, this is a positive result, and 
benefits foreign investors and US parties alike by assuring greater transparency and 
stability in the CFIUS review process. 
Annex table. CFIUS Filings and Investigations, 2001-2008 
 
Source: US Treasury Department. 
  































Foreign direct investment and US national security: CFIUS under the 
Obama administration 
 
Mark E. Plotkin and David N. Fagan* 
 
There was considerable public scrutiny of the Obama administration’s performance in its 
inaugural year, but comparatively little focus on one of the administration’s key processes 
governing the flow of investment into the United States -- namely, the Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). Yet, this is a frequent question we 
receive from foreign investors -- has the change in the administration affected CFIUS? 
 
The good news for investors and US transaction parties alike is that the overall CFIUS 
process continues to function well under the Obama administration and has been faithful 
to the principles of open investment. At the same time, there have been several notable 
developments in the volume and pace of CFIUS reviews over the past year that should be 
of interest to those who watch the cross-border M&A market closely. 
 
The slowdown in overall M&A activity contributed to a reduction in filings with CFIUS.1 
In 2008, CFIUS reviewed 155 cases; CFIUS reviewed fewer than half as many 
transactions in 2009.2 This is the lowest number of notices since 2005 and the first 
reversal of an upward trend in nearly a decade. 
 
Perhaps the most significant development for investors was that CFIUS’s pace for 
completing its reviews also slowed materially in 2009. While official figures have not 
been released, CFIUS escalated a much higher percentage of matters under review to a 
second-stage 45-day “investigation” to the point that, by percentage, investigation nearly 
became the rule rather than the exception in 2009. By contrast, through 2007, fewer than 
two percent of all cases reviewed by CFIUS had proceeded to the investigation phase 
and, in 2008 (a year in which CFIUS received the most filings in nearly two decades), the 
number of investigations still was fewer than 15% of all cases.  
 
The slower pace of CFIUS reviews and corresponding increase in investigations may be 
attributed to several factors. First, there was a natural bureaucratic lag that results from 
any change in administration and turnover in senior positions in key agencies. The 
Treasury Department and other CFIUS agencies worked valiantly to move CFIUS cases 
along for review but often the necessary policy-level approvals were slow in coming. 
 
                                                
* The authors wish to thank José E. Alvarez, John Kline and James Mendenhall for their helpful comments 
on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on June 7, 2010. 
1 Through the first half of 2009, there was an estimated 86% reduction in overall M&A activity from 2008. 
Alexandria Zendria, “M&A in 2009,” Forbes, July 14, 2009, available at:  
http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/13/mergers-acquisitions-technology-intelligent-investing-healthcare.html. 
2 Final data on 2009 filings are not yet available, but the authors understand that CFIUS received notices 
for approximately 70 to 75 transactions in 2009. 
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Second, the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA), which 
“reformed” CFIUS and codified its review authority, established a presumption of 
investigation for foreign government transactions and transactions involving critical 
infrastructure. The number of investigations in 2009 partially reflects the continued role 
of state-owned enterprises and other sovereign investors even in the slower 2009 M&A 
market. 
 
Third, and most important, the Executive Order (EO) adopted by the Bush administration 
to implement FINSA included several provisions aimed at tightening CFIUS’s internal 
administration. In particular, the EO established a more rigorous internal process that 
CFIUS must undertake before it proposes measures directed at “risk mitigation” for a 
particular transaction. This internal process, while more disciplined and focused strictly 
on addressing only true national security issues, also creates an additional layer to the 
regulatory approval process. The result has been fewer mitigation agreements but a 
corresponding time lag due to the heightened formality of the internal mitigation process. 
 
This trade-off between fewer mitigations agreements but longer CFIUS reviews has 
benefits and costs for transaction parties. Investors benefit as the trend reduces longer-
term compliance costs associated with CFIUS approvals. On the other hand, delays in the 
average time for key regulatory approvals can potentially have a negative market impact, 
making foreign investors less attractive -- and, therefore, requiring higher prices from 
them -- than potential US acquirors. 
 
To be sure, there are reasons for optimism that equilibrium between mitigation and 
timing will be reached. Most key political positions with responsibility for CFIUS have 
been filled (after slow nomination and confirmation processes). As these officials become 
more comfortable with the inter-agency process, the processes established under FINSA 
become more routine, and the internal precedent under FINSA grows, the machinery of 
CFIUS will hopefully pick up pace and restore a balance between expeditious reviews 
and careful mitigation. 
 
There also are measured steps that transaction parties can take to facilitate the review 
process. CFIUS encourages transactions parties to engage with CFIUS before filing. 
More consequential, transaction parties can anticipate and address ancillary regulatory 
issues -- such as necessary export control-related filings or compliance matters -- that 
involve member agencies of CFIUS to keep those issues distinct from the CFIUS process. 
The failure to anticipate such issues can lead to their introduction into CFIUS’s 
deliberations, delaying CFIUS approval until they can be separately sorted with the 
particular member agency. 
 
Notwithstanding this dynamic nature of CFIUS’s considerations and the concerns over 
the timing delays over the past year, CFIUS in many ways remains a model for 
preserving open investment while balancing national security considerations. Placing the 
process in some perspective, it is remarkable that a government regulatory review that 
requires not just coordination but consensus from roughly a dozen federal agencies, each 
of which has its own perspective and equities -- and each of which may itself require 
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coordination among many internal offices and components -- can be completed in the 
vast majority of cases within the statutory timeframes (either 30 or 75 days) and with 







Chinese FDI in the United States is taking off: How to maximize 
benefits? 
 
Thilo Hanemann and Daniel Rosen* 
 
China’s outward FDI (OFDI) grew rapidly in the past decade, but flows to developed 
economies have been limited. Now China’s direct investment flows to the United States 
are poised to rise substantially. This new trend offers tremendous opportunities for the 
US, provided policymakers take steps to keep the investment environment open and 
utilize China’s new interest productively. 
 
China’s OFDI flows grew from an annual average of below US$ 3 billion before 2005 to 
over US$ 60 billion in 2010, bringing China’s total global OFDI stock to more than 
US$ 300 billion.1 This investment was concentrated in developing countries and a few 
resource-rich developed economies. Chinese investments in the US were few and far 
between. 
 
Since 2008, that story has begun to change. A new dataset allowing a real-time 
assessment of FDI patterns shows that Chinese FDI in the US is taking off. Direct 
investment expenditures by Chinese firms in that country have grown more than 130% a 
year over the past two years. In 2010 alone, Chinese firms spent more than US$ 5 billion 
in the US on 25 greenfield projects and 34 acquisitions. Today, Chinese firms have 
investments in at least 35 of the country’s 50 states, across a wide range of industries.2 
 
This new momentum in Chinese FDI in developed economies is driven by changing 
economic realities forcing firms to look abroad. In the past, a fast-growing domestic 
economy and booming export markets overshadowed overseas opportunities. The shift of 
China’s growth model is now forcing Chinese firms to upgrade technology, move up the 
value chain and augment their managerial skills and staff base. We expect Chinese firms 
to place US$ 1-2 trillion in OFDI worldwide over the coming decade. Developed 
economies will receive a big share of this investment. 
 
Japan exemplifies the potential. Japanese firms played a minor role in the US economy 
when they started to invest there in the 1970s. Today, they employ more than 700,000 
workers in that country, with an annual payroll of US$ 50 billion, account for more than 
US$ 60 billion of US exports and spend more than US$ 5 billion annually on research 
                                                
* The authors wish to thank Clarence Kwan, Joel H. Moser, Oded Shenkar, and Stephen R. Yeaple for their 
helpful comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on October 24, 2011. 
1  Data from China’s balance-of-payments (BOP) statistics, Peoples’ Bank of China, available at: 
http://www.safe.gov.cn. 
2 See Daniel H. Rosen and Thilo Haneman, An American Open Door? (New York: Asia Society and 




and development in the US.3 However, China will not inevitably replicate Japan’s 
success. Policymakers must take the right steps to ensure these flows materialize and 
benefits are maximized. 
 
In particular, US leaders must guard against protectionism and defend investment 
openness. China’s modest OFDI has already stoked political fires, and there is a danger 
that anti-China sentiment may further increase if OFDI levels surge. Washington must 
work on protecting the national security review process from politicization, improve 
decision-making transparency and reject calls to expand the reviews to include economic 
security issues. 
 
The US should not only keep the door open but should actively encourage FDI from 
China, starting with a clear and bipartisan message that this investment is welcome.4 
Growing FDI from China and other emerging markets is changing the game. The US 
might lose out in competition with other developed countries if it fails to adapt. 
 
Finally, policymakers need to think how best to leverage China’s new overseas 
investment interest. Threatening to block access to sectors in which foreign firms face 
restrictions in China would choke off badly needed investment -- while having little 
effect on foreign investment rules in China. However, the increasing presence of Chinese 
firms in their jurisdiction gives developed countries greater leverage to demand openness, 
transparency and adherence to global business norms from those companies and their 
domestic regulators. The US Government should explore bilateral and multilateral 
options for using this new leverage. 
 
Formulating a coherent policy response to growing Chinese investment is crucial in 
preparing for a major shift in the patterns of global capital flows. From 2000 to 2009, the 
share of emerging markets in global OFDI flows jumped from less than 2% to more than 
14% as the rest of the world has started to catch up with developed countries in global 
FDI flows.5 China will serve as a test case for how the United States deals with these new 
realities. 
  
                                                
3 Data points refer to all US affiliates of Japanese companies in 2008. Source: US Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. 
4  The Obama administration’s reaffirmation of the country’s open investment policy and the new 
SelectUSA program that bundles investment promotion efforts were steps in the right direction. 
5 NCTAD’s global FDI database. Figures refer to the broadest available definition of emerging markets 







Economic patriotism: Dealing with Chinese direction investment in the 
United States 
 
Sophie Meunier et al. * 
 
China is investing throughout the world, in industries from automobiles to zinc. In the 
US, Chinese FDI accounted for only 0.25% of total FDI stock in 2010,1 but it is likely to 
increase as China diversifies its holdings and seeks to obtain technology, managerial 
know-how and easier access to US consumers. As these investments multiply, we expect 
a few cases to attract negative attention in the media and political arena. Chinese 
companies are predominately state-controlled, raising the specter that they act to fulfill 
strategic, rather than profit maximizing, goals. China is also an ideological rival, causing 
irrational concern that Chinese investment in the US may act as a Trojan Horse of 
Chinese values and politics -- fueled by rational concerns about subsidies, piracy, and 
economic espionage. 
 
Even though hosting Chinese FDI in the US is not free from risk, we argue that the 
benefits outweigh the costs. First, FDI provides an influx of capital into the struggling 
economy, increasing employment at no cost to the taxpayer. Second, jobs in foreign 
affiliates are typically better remunerated than similar jobs in domestically owned 
companies. Third, keeping the US open to foreign investment demonstrates a global 
example for international openness. Finally, Chinese money refused by the US could 
alternatively be directed to competitors or even the US’s enemies. 
 
We offer five policy recommendations designed to welcome Chinese FDI in the US while 
dealing with its potential dangers and limiting the inevitable associated political backlash. 
 
1. Without naïveté, the US must avoid incorporating reciprocity into considerations of its 
openness to FDI. A decision by China to close itself to US investment, in addition to its 
existing market access restrictions, would damage American economic interests. 
However, the US should avoid compounding these losses with protectionist policies of its 
own whenever possible. To be sure, the threat of tit-for-tat provides bargaining leverage 
and may act as deterrence. Yet inward FDI, exempt a legitimate security issue, should be 
encouraged no matter its country of origin. 
 
                                                
* This chapter is a summary of the report “Economic patriotism: How to deal with Chinese investment,” 
written by Andrew Budnick, Thomas Gibbons, Michael Jiang, Andrew Sartorius, Thomas Tasche, Derek 
Wu, and Bradley Yenter, under the direction of Sophie Meunier, as part of the Junior Policy Task Force 
“Economic Patriotism” at Princeton University in the fall 2011 semester, available at: 
 http://www.princeton.edu/~smeunier/Princeton_Task_Force_Report_Final_2011. The authors wish to 
thank David Fagan, Thilo Hanemann and Nicolas Veron for their helpful comments on this chapter, which 
was first published as a Perspective on May 14, 2012. 




2. The US could attract more Chinese investment if Chinese firms did not fear an 
inhospitable environment. The Department of Commerce (DOC), primarily through its 
new SelectUSA campaign, and the Organization for International Investment (OFII) 
should encourage Chinese firms to showcase their investments’ contributions to US 
society. Such measures undertaken and paid for by Chinese firms could include: engaging 
in philanthropic activities in the state and local community, placing billboards near 
Chinese greenfield investments, and running ad campaigns outlining how Chinese 
investments are saving or creating jobs. 
 
3. Potential inward FDI from China might be discouraged by the perception that the 
process for reviewing investment through the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States (CFIUS) is arduous, unpredictable and biased against Chinese companies, 
especially following failed investments such as China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation’s (CNOOC’s) attempted purchase of Unocal in 2005 and the automatic 
investigation of state-owned companies required by the 2007 Foreign Investment and 
National Security Act -- even if some of these failed transactions never went through a 
CFIUS review. The Treasury should find ways to better get the message across that the 
CFIUS process is apolitical, predictable and only restrictive on the grounds of national 
security -- starting with highlighting CFIUS’s factual record and overwhelming openness 
to investment, with only one transaction ever formally blocked in 1990 (even though 
other transactions were voluntarily withdrawn before being blocked). Such a statement 
would also help mitigate the tendency for competing firms and members of Congress to 
oppose deals for reasons unrelated to national security. 
 
4. Currently, US states compete with each other by offering lucrative incentives to attract 
investments. Through SelectUSA, the DOC should coordinate local investment attraction 
efforts, offering a single point of entry and unified front for foreign nationals considering 
investing in the US. It could work in closer coordination with the State Department to 
simplify bureaucratic hurdles, such as getting visas and providing assistance to foreign 
firms. SelectUSA should enlist Chinese-American organizations (such as the Committee 
of 100) to help these firms adapt to the local environment. SelectUSA, in conjunction 
with China's Ministry of Commerce, could also establish a US-China bilateral investment 
fair. 
 
5. If crafted properly, a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) would give both US and Chinese 
investors more certainty in the marketplace. As a major capital exporter, but also as a 
country in need of foreign investment, the US must stay relevant in the current race to 
sign BITs, especially as the European Union and China negotiate their own treaty. 
Serious negotiations with China would demonstrate US commitment to maintaining an 
open investment environment. 
 
If the US does not act quickly to implement the above recommendations, it might 
continue to lose Chinese investment -- expected to top US$ 1 trillion by the end of the 
decade -- to Europe and other competitors. The US should corral as much of this 
investment as possible to revitalize the domestic economy and strengthen its image as an 





Can the US remain an attractive host for FDI in the auto industry? New 




President Obama has been supporting a new bill, the Employee Free Choice Act, 
designed to promote the labor unions’ drive for unionization. This bill, if enacted, will 
surely be a big boon for unions as it helps enlarge their membership, enhance their 
bargaining power vis-à-vis businesses, and enrich their coffers to wield political clout. An 
important issue here, however, is how such reinforced unionism contributes to the US’s 
much needed industrial competitiveness and employment -- and, more specifically, how 
this new policy will affect the US as a host to FDI in the auto industry. 
 
In 2008, General Motors (GM) yielded its world’s top position to Toyota. Unfortunately, 
Detroit’s woes have been caused in significant part by the ever-restrictive work rules and 
legacy costs (i.e., generous wages and retirement and healthcare benefits) obtained by the 
United Auto Workers union (UAW). For this, however, the UAW alone should not be 
blamed. It has been acting in its own interest within an institutional setup that was created 
by the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, a law that was legislated amid the 
Great Depression and in understandable sympathy with the plight of massively laid-off 
workers, the victims of then unbridled capitalism. US unionism was thus fostered by 
Congress as a way of giving workers countervailing power against “uncaring” 
management that considered them mere cogs in the machine. Unfortunately, however, 
labor and management have ever since been trapped in a relationship that was inherently 
antagonistic and adversarial -- that is, a sort of an institutional curse. True, such unionism 
helped secure unprecedented benefits for tens of thousands of US workers -- so long as 
Detroit enjoyed unchallenged competitiveness. The UAW and automakers both shared 
the spoils of industrial dominance. 
  
It was, however, not long before the rest of the industrialized world had caught up, 
altering the competitive environment. Most importantly, Fordism-cum-Taylorism came to 
be outcompeted by flexible production that was initiated by Toyota. Toyotism is now 
being emulated across industries worldwide -- even the US Postal Service has been 
endeavoring to adopt flexible techniques in its efforts to raise efficiency and to serve 
customers better. 
 
Auto FDI in the US (known as “transplants”) is centered in non-unionized southern 
states. Foreign multinationals there can produce automobiles cost-effectively largely 
because of a flexible workplace that is unencumbered by restrictive union rules. Japanese 
transplants in particular thrive on Toyota-style management and production. They are 
known for their workplace “democratization” where the supervisory structure is flattened 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank Mark Barenberg and Hugh Patrick for their helpful comments on this chapter, 
which was first published as a Perspective on October 26, 2009. 
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and where both management and workers share common facilities (such as parking lots, 
cafeterias, and restrooms) and common activities (group calisthenics and recreations), all 
designed to promote informal communication and a teamwork spirit. The 
pay/compensation gap between executives and the rank-and-file is much smaller than that 
in comparable US companies. Also, the transplants treat workers as “brain” workers who 
perform multi-tasks on a rotation basis to avoid monotonous single task assignments, and 
actively suggest ways to improve on work practices (i.e., kaizen approach). This is in 
sharp contrast to the status of workers as “brawn” workers who are assigned to simplified 
repetitive tasks under mass production (as satirized by Charlie Chaplin’s Modern Times). 
Moreover, they minimize layoffs and furloughs during a downturn, retaining and 
retraining workers. Also, flexible production relies on “just-in-time” delivery (instead of 
“just-in-case” inventories) of parts and components. The workers at the transplants have 
so far been turning down the UAW’s offer for unionization. 
 
Some of these practices are emulated by US automakers, but their management culture in 
general and the restrictive work rules in particular are in their way. True, the New United 
Motor Manufacturing’s labor union accepted many of Toyotist techniques, and the 
factory’s efficiency became far better than its GM counterparts. But it has never attained 
Toyota’s (or the transplants’) benchmark and remained unprofitable – and is set to close 
despite an ardent plea from Governor Schwarzenegger to save it. Also, from the start, 
Saturn’s UAW collaborated to eliminate most of its work rules, though decried by its 
traditionalists. In 2004, however, Saturn’s union voted to dismantle such a Toyotist 
arrangement and went back to the standard UAW contract. It is headed for closure unless 
a white knight is found. 
 
All in all, the transplants’ competitiveness derives fundamentally from Toyotism, though 
“no legacy costs” certainly help. Flexible production is not intended to exploit labor but 
to create a larger pie to share with workers. Wagner Act-enabled collective bargaining 
disregards the size of a pie, even if it shrinks because of workplace inflexibility and 
disruptive strikes. Actually, the transplants pay higher compensation (about 20% more) 
than the national average -- currently employing more than 400,000 Americans at the 
average annual pay of US$ 63,538.1 At least, southern members of Congress, governors, 
and mayors -- and workers themselves -- understand the benefits of flexible production 
and are eager to attract more auto FDI so as to create well-paid manufacturing jobs 
locally. This is the reason why even some Democrats in Congress are opposed to the 
EFCA. 
 
It is critical for lawmakers -- and management, as well as labor -- all to realize that the 
antagonistic mode of labor relations institutionalized by the Wagner Act is utterly 
outdated. A more cooperative relationship is called for. Simply expanding the power of 
unions by making unionization easier cannot enhance the US’s competitiveness. Since 
Detroit is already unionized, Detroit South will naturally be the new target of 
unionization. Detroit-style unionization discourages foreign multinationals from coming 
to the US and encourages the US’s own companies to outsource production overseas. It is 
high time for the President and Congress to treat unions not merely as an electorate but as 
                                                
1 “What is an ‘American’ car?,” by Matthew J. Slaughter, Wall Street Journal, May 7, 2009. 
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a vital economic player who can contribute to industrial efficiency and to devise policies 
for flexible labor. As part of the Detroit bailout conditionality, the UAW agreed to allow 
for flexibility and cooperation. This type of mandate, at least, ought to be explicitly 






President Obama’s international tax proposals could go further 
 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah* 
 
The Obama administration’s 2011 budget proposals include revenues of US$ 122 billion 
over ten years from “international tax reform.” This set of proposals is similar to but 
narrower than the ones advanced by the administration in May 2009, which would have 
raised US$ 210 billion. 
 
The two main proposals are substantially repeated from 2009. The first would indirectly 
limit the deferral opportunity for US-based multinationals by restricting the deductibility 
of interest expense that is allocated to deferred income. Under current law, US-based 
MNEs that earn foreign source active business income through their foreign affiliates 
(CFCs) can defer US tax on such income until the CFCs pay a dividend to their US parent 
corporation. At the same time, the US parent may deduct currently interest expense even 
if it is allocated to the deferred income of the CFCs. The same proposal was made in 
2009 but applied to a broader category of deductions. 
 
The second proposal restricts the ability of US-based MNEs to repatriate income from 
CFCs in high-tax jurisdictions while continuing to defer tax on income earned by CFCs 
in low-tax jurisdictions. Under current law, dividends paid by CFCs carry with them 
foreign tax credits that are calculated based on a formula that compares the amount of tax 
paid to the CFCs' earnings. The new proposal would calculate the tax paid and the 
amount of credit given based on the pooled earnings of all the CFCs of a MNE, including 
CFCs in low-tax jurisdictions. The result would be a higher US tax burden on the 
repatriated earnings. This proposal was also made in 2009. 
 
These proposals are interesting because they seem to run counter to the prevailing 
international trend. In recent years, jurisdictions such as the UK and Japan that used to 
tax their MNEs on a worldwide basis have moved in the direction of territorial taxation 
by exempting dividends paid by CFCs to the parent corporation out of active business 
income but at the same time tightening their CFC anti-abuse provisions. Other OECD 
members such as Germany, France and Canada that have CFC regimes have always 
exempted dividends from active business income. By imposing indirect restrictions on 
deferral and increasing the tax burden on repatriations, the Obama administration risks 
being perceived as putting US-based MNEs at a competitive disadvantage.1 
 
However, in my opinion such a view is mistaken, for three reasons. First, there is no 
evidence that US taxation of the foreign source income of US multinationals puts them at 
a disadvantage. Second, our FDI partners tax foreign source income more than we do, 
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on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on February 11, 2010. 
1 Matthew J. Slaughter, “How to destroy American jobs: Obama's proposals for increasing the tax burden 
on US-based multinationals would harm our most dynamic companies,” Wall Street Journal, Feb. 3, 2010. 
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and that will still be true if the Obama proposals are adopted. Third, even if we want to 
go further and tax US multinationals on all their foreign source income, we could use the 
OECD to coordinate such a move with our FDI partners so that no competitive 
disadvantage would result. 
 
US multinationals have been making the competitive disadvantage argument since 1961, 
when President Kennedy first proposed to tax them on their overseas profits. At that time, 
US multinationals dominated the world. General Motors (GM), to take a painful example, 
had over 40% of the US car market. Since then, other countries have grown, and US 
multinationals face more competition. But there is absolutely no empirical evidence that 
any of the myriad changes to our taxation of foreign profits of US multinationals since 
1961 has made any difference to their ability to compete. US multinationals succeed 
when they create products or services the world wants to buy, and they fail (like GM) 
when they do not. 
 
Nor is it true that our FDI partners tax their multinationals more lightly. They do refrain 
from taxing dividend distributions from foreign income, but they restrict this to income 
that was either taxed overseas or that has a real connection to the country it was earned 
in. We, on the other hand, tax dividends but give a credit for foreign taxes, so that in most 
cases US-based MNEs do not pay tax on foreign source dividends. And we permit our 
multinationals to defer taxation on a much broader range of income than our foreign 
competitors. For example, US banks and insurance companies are free to set up shop in 
Caribbean tax havens and not pay tax on their earnings there, while our competitors 
would tax these earnings unless you could show a real connection to the country they are 
supposedly earned in. As a result, our multinationals pay less tax on their foreign profits 
than their competitors, and this will not change if the Obama proposals are adopted. 
 
The Obama proposals could have gone much farther. They envisage raising US$ 58 
billion over ten years from partially taxing foreign profits, while adopting the Kennedy 
administration proposal to tax all foreign profits would have raised US$ 250 billion. But 
even that supposedly radical step could be achieved if we were willing to coordinate it 
with our FDI partners, most of whom adopted their rules to tax foreign income following 
our lead. Such coordination is possible, as shown by the OECD adoption of a binding 
treaty that embodies the principles of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (before the 
OECD treaty, US-based MNEs were the only ones subject to FCPA and were at a 
competitive disadvantage). 
 
US multinationals currently earn a third of their overseas profits in three low-tax 
countries (Bermuda, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). Eight of the top ten locations for 
US multinational profits have an effective tax rate of less than 10%. The Obama 
proposals represent a very cautious first step toward making US multinationals pay their 
fair share of the tax burden, and toward leveling the playing field with small US 
businesses that are subject to the full 35% tax and that are our principal job creators. 






Beyond treasuries: A foreign direction investment program for US 
infrastructure 
 
Geraldine McAllister and Joel H. Moser* 
 
In his jobs address to a joint session of Congress last week, President Obama returned to 
a familiar theme: a call for nontraditional infrastructure investment as a generator of 
economic growth and, ultimately, jobs. The President's frequent references to “private 
investment”1 and “fully paid”2 infrastructure are encouraging, yet there is no assurance 
that domestic private capital investment alone is sufficient to reverse the degradation of 
the nation’s infrastructure. As host to the largest flows of inward FDI, it is time that the 
United States employs this critical source of capital in tackling the nation’s infrastructure 
deficit. 
 
The use of foreign capital to improve US infrastructure and competitiveness is not 
without its challenges. First, it requires the government to find a new balance between 
economic openness and national security concerns -- no easy task, particularly with the 
inclusion of “critical infrastructure”3 in the definition of national security. Nevertheless, 
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, dedicated to reviewing the 
impact of FDI on national security, has garnered significant experience in this area. 
Devising a legislative and regulatory framework that provides for domestic security 
without excluding the United States from access to investment in infrastructure is not 
beyond the capacity of the government. Ultimately, failure to address this challenge will 
be to the detriment of both US national security and economic interests. A recent Asia 
Society report notes: “If political interference is not tempered, some of the benefits of 
Chinese investment … such as job creation, consumer welfare, and even contributions to 
US infrastructure renewal -- risk being diverted to US competitors.”4 
 
Secondly, such inflows must be encouraged and facilitated -- it is not simply a case of 
allowing FDI flow into US infrastructure. Low levels of political risk and a large market 
still make the United States an attractive investment destination; yet it is but one possible 
investment location, and competition is vigorous. The US Government must build a 
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110publ49.pdf. 
4 Daniel H. Rosen and Thilo Haneman, An American Open Door? (New York: Asia Society and Woodrow 




program to attract and incentivize investment in infrastructure -- for example, by 
transferring a portion of the federal budget currently spent on funding municipal bond 
investor tax incentives for the wealthy toward grants and other incentives, perhaps as part 
of the federal tax overhaul anticipated in the debt crisis resolution and as contemplated by 
the Simpson-Bowles commission. 
 
Finally, an infrastructure FDI program must be scalable to provide for investment at the 
requisite levels. The United States has some experience in this area, having adopted 
public private partnerships for a number of projects. The current limiting factor, however, 
is deal flow. We propose a pilot program that mandates states to set aside an increasing 
portion of their capital programs, reaching 10% by decade-end, for funding incorporating 
an equity component. This federal mandate can be linked to federal funding, such as 
transportation funding. The net cost of this program (if any) could be borne by gradual 
reductions in the availability of the costly indirect subsidy of federal tax-exemption on 
municipal bonds, further shifting the dynamic from public debt to private investment. 
 
A grant-based program could also work; however, whatever method is chosen, the 
Federal government must act quickly. Experience in other countries has shown that it can 
take a decade to develop a mature market for private infrastructure investment and 
development. Given that these may be the final days of the era of easy access to foreign 
capital in the Treasury bond market, now is the time to take a meaningful step toward 
building the alternative. Through the sale of Treasury bonds abroad, infrastructure has 
been substantially financed by foreign capital for decades. It is time to construct a new 










India’s food price inflation is a major driving factor behind the country’s overall 
accelerating inflation over the past few years. Agricultural food prices in particular have 
risen recently: over the past year vegetables have become costlier by 18%, pulses by 
14%, milk by 10%, and eggs, meat and fish by 12%. The rise in fruit prices was, 
however, relatively smaller (5%), and the same happened for cereals (3%).1 This price 
escalation is largely due to an inefficient supply chain in agriculture.2 Some of the supply 
side constraints have been identified: poor agricultural productivity, lack of corporate 
involvement in agriculture, ceilings on landholding size, existence of middlemen, 
hoarding, and, more importantly, insufficient cold storage facilities and transportation 
infrastructure. Around 50% of fresh produce in India rots and goes to waste between the 
farm gate and the market because of inadequate cold storage facilities and a poor 
distribution network.3 These factors unfavorably affect agricultural supply, create a 
supply-demand gap and help raise food prices. 
 
Controlling food price inflation has become an urgent policy objective for India because 
of the regressive tax that inflation imposes, since food occupies a massive share in the 
consumption basket of a significant section of the Indian population. Moreover, persistent 
and spiraling food inflation also threatens the macroeconomic stability of the country and 
the potential for high and sustained economic growth in the future. With the clear 
objective of curbing inflation, the Indian Cabinet approved 51% FDI in multi-brand retail 
on November 24, 20114 after intense deliberations at different levels that extended over a 
year. The policy comes with some riders to protect the interests of neighborhood stores, 
farmers and small and medium-sized enterprises. If effectively implemented, such FDI 
has the potential to: 
 
• bring in foreign capital, technology and managerial expertise of big international 
retailers; 
• develop an efficient linkage between the back-end supply chain and the front-end 
via capital investment and technological inputs; 
• create a proper farm-to-fork infrastructure through direct purchase from farmers 
and the resultant control of intermediaries; 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank Premila Nazareth, Andreas Nölke and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful 
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2  Duvvuri Subbarao, “Factors that drive India food inflation and policy measures to combat it,” 
CommodityOnline, November 24, 2011. 
3 BBC.com, “India MPs in uproar over retail reform plan,” 25 November 2011, available at:  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-15885004. 
4 “India Inc welcomes FDI in multi-brand retail,” Business Today, India Today Group, November 24, 2011. 
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• bring about efficient movement of produce through the reduction of transit costs; 
• minimize the prevailing wastage of fresh produce5 through improving and adding 
upon the existing cold storage facilities, transport infrastructure, warehousing 
technology, and food processing facilities; 
• help raise farm productivity through the application of contract farming; 
• increase agricultural production, reduce intermediate costs, render remunerative 
prices to farmers for their produce and eventually lower final food prices to 
consumers, thus integrating retailers into the value chain; and 
• create employment in small and medium-size industries and back-end 
infrastructure.6 
 
Despite the regulatory provisions to ensure domestic competition and protect the 
domestic retail industry and farmers, the policy has received stiff opposition. Concerns 
include the possibility of monopoly power of foreign entrants over both farmers and 
consumers, predatory pricing strategies of the entrants, manipulation of prices for the 
entrants’ own benefit and a fall in income, employment and the eventual destruction of 
the unorganized indigenous retail sector dominated by small family-run outlets.7 
 
But it is important to remember that other countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Russia, Singapore, and Thailand have allowed 100% FDI in multi-
brand retail since the 1990s and many of them have had encouraging experiences. China, 
for one, permitted FDI in retail as early as 1992. It has since attracted huge investments in 
the retail sector without affecting either small retailers or domestic retail chains. Since 
2004, the number of small outlets rose from 1.9 million to over 2.5 million in China. 
Employment in the retail and wholesale sectors increased from 28 million to 54 million 
from 1992 to 2001.8 In Indonesia, even after ten years of opening FDI in multi-brand 
retail, 90% of the business remains with small traders.9 
 
Favorable experiences of other emerging markets suggest that the appropriate 
implementation of FDI in multi-brand food retailing, with effective checks designed to 
protect indigenous small and medium-size enterprises, will eventually alleviate the 
supply-side impediments to agricultural production. It will transform the way perishable 
agricultural produce is acquired, stored, preserved, and marketed -- and thus help control 
India’s persistent food inflation. 
  
                                                
5 “FDI in multi-brand retail trading,” KPMG, Audit Committee Institute (2010). 
6 “FDI in multi-brand retail will create 10 million jobs: Anand Sharma,” The Times of India, November 26, 
2011. 
7 “FDI in multi-brand retail: Industry lauds decision,” India Today, November 25, 2011. 
8 “Foreign direct investment (FDI) in multi-brand retail trading,” Department of Industrial Policy and 
Promotion Discussion Paper, Government of India (2010). 





Greek FDI in the Balkans: How is it affected by the crisis in Greece? 
 
Persephone Economou and Margo Thomas* 
 
The current Greek crisis raises the question of its impact on FDI by Greece on its 
neighbors in the Balkans.1 Greek MNEs first began to establish a presence there in the 
1990s, following the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. This trend accelerated during the 
past decade. As of 2009, Greece’s outward FDI stock in the Balkans stood at US$ 10.5 
billion or 26.5% of Greece’s outward FDI stock worldwide.2 
 
From the point of view of Balkan countries, Greece is an important source of FDI -- but 
not the biggest. First place is reserved for Austria, which accounted for 19% of the 
Balkan’s combined inward stock (excluding Albania) as of 2009. Greece accounted for 
6% of Balkan countries’ combined inward FDI stock, or US$ 10 billion (outside Albania). 
The highest Greek FDI shares are in Macedonia FYR (13%) and Serbia (10%). Greek 
FDI accounts for 41% of Albania’s inward FDI stock.3  
 
Greek banking presence, however, is quite significant for the Balkan host countries.4 
Greek foreign affiliates make up four of Bulgaria’s top 10 banks, three of Serbia’s top 10 
banks and two of Romania’s top 10 banks. Greek banks account for about 28% of the 
banking system’s assets in Bulgaria, about a quarter of those in Macedonia FYR and 
about a sixth of those in both Romania and Serbia. 
 
According to Barclays Capital,5 the five Greek banks (National Bank of Greece, Piraeus 
Bank, Eurobank EFG, ATE Bank, Alpha Bank) most exposed to the sovereign debt crisis 
in Greece, which also operate in the Balkans, hold around US$ 52 billion of Greek 
sovereign debt. In addition to the recently agreed “haircut” of 50% for private creditors, 
Greek banks are also required to introduce a 9% core tier-one capital ratio by June 2012. 
The European Banking Authority reported that Greek banks would need an additional 
US$ 41 billion in capital for the latter, in principle covered by funds under by the EU-
IMF program.6 
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on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on November 21, 2011. 
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3As of 2008. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Energy, Report on Foreign Direct Investment in Albania, 
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4 Laza Kekic, “The Greek crisis: The threat to neighbouring Balkan economies,” in Will Bartlett and 
Vassilis Monastiriotis, eds., South East Europe after the Economic Crisis: A New Dawn or Back to 
Business as Usual? (London: LSEE, 2010). 
5 See Figure 1 in “Everyone’s problem,” The Economist, June 22, 2011. 
6 European Banking Authority, “The EBA details the EU measures to restore confidence in the banking 
sector,” Press release of October 26, 2011. According to EBA, the existing backstop facility exceeds the 




The main issue is the extent to which all of these measures will strain the Greek banking 
system. The process of recapitalizing Greek banks could force their affiliates in the 
Balkans to cut back lending. The effects of this would be amplified by a slowdown in 
lending by other European banks with significant exposure to the Greek sovereign debt 
crisis. Greek bank affiliates may also be asked to help raise funds for their parent banks in 
Greece. In September 2011, the National Bank of Greece announced plans to establish a 
separate bank holding company to manage its foreign affiliates in the Balkans, reportedly 
to gain independent access to global capital markets.7 Greek bank foreign affiliates may 
even be sold off to foreign or local banks. For example, ATE Bank has announced plans 
to sell its majority stake in ATE Bank Romania by the end of 2012 and exit the Romanian 
market.8 One possible option to prevent the reduction in credit availability would be to 
introduce a framework for coordinating crisis management in the financial sector when 
foreign affiliates in banking are involved, similar to the “Vienna Initiative” (2009-2011).9 
In the longer term, more attention should be paid to the extent of foreign ownership in 
banking, which can have important consequences on lending in times of crisis. 
 
In sum, the recession in Greece and financing constraints on Greek MNEs will continue 
having a direct negative effect on Greek FDI into the Balkans in both banking and non-
banking sectors. For most Balkan countries, the impact on FDI overall will be limited 
given the relatively low levels of Greek FDI in the region. Albania is the exception given 
its much greater dependence on Greek FDI. Curtailed lending by Greek bank foreign 
affiliates would also affect any expansion plans of Greek non-financial foreign affiliates 
already in the Balkans. 
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The purpose of this Perspective is to explore the relationship between MNEs and their 
home countries. I use the term “nationality” when discussing a home country, to stress 
the contrast with “multinationality” which refers to business enterprises. The question I 
seek to address is whether, ceteris paribus, nation states have an economic interest in 
becoming home countries to MNEs. This is not a trivial question, bearing in mind that in 
many countries -- especially those with emerging markets -- outward FDI has been 
frowned upon long after incoming FDI was generally welcome by local governments and 
academic scholars. 
 
My tentative answer to the questions posed above is “yes.” The MNEs’ value activities 
lower the barriers separating countries from their foreign sources of supply and their 
international markets. This enables home countries to increase the benefits they derive 
from the international division of labor, exploitation of economies of scale and the 
ownership advantages of their MNEs. Other things being equal, an extension of the 
global reach achieved through cross-border value activities is likely to compensate for the 
tax loss and the diminution of sovereignty implied by outward FDI. 
 
The theoretical basis of the claim that home country status is generally superior to that of 
host country status is provided by the concept of the distance penalty (DP). DP is 
incurred whenever transactions are conducted across national borders. This penalty 
consists of costs generated by the existence of systematic differences among the cultural, 
legal and institutional characteristics of domestic and foreign business transactions. It 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade and investment. The tremendous advances of 
recent decades in transportation and communication have reduced the costs of 
international interactions dramatically, but have not eliminated them altogether. 
 
In the absence of a cost of doing business abroad, the idea of “home country” would be 
indistinguishable from that of “host country.” Home countries and host countries both 
increase the reaches of MNEs, and both pay a price in terms of tax losses and diminution 
of sovereignty. DP makes a difference because it has an asymmetric effect on home and 
host countries. Home countries benefit from an implicit first refusal when competing with 
host country counterparts for the establishment of new business ventures. This implies 
that home countries are able to “bid” on every new business project being considered. It 
goes without saying that, if a foreign location turns out to be more efficient or otherwise 
more profitable, the project will be located in that country. But, if the cost benefit 
calculation indicates equality between the two locations, the home country will be 
preferred. Similar reasoning applies to cases of relocation, closure and generally of 
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gaining access to resources provided by top management. The absence of a distance 
penalty, due to proximity to the strategic decision makers, endows home country 
affiliates with advantages, over and above those available to affiliates located in host 
countries. 
 
The above analysis suggests that, ceteris paribus, nation states will prefer being home 
countries to being host countries. Note, however, that firms rarely get to choose their 
home country. Their nationality is in most cases “an accident of birth.” Consequently the 
public policy implications of home countries' preferences are not obvious. 
 
Nationality can become an issue when an MNE is sold abroad. In my own country, Israel, 
several local MNEs have been sold to foreign companies in recent years, thus changing 
their nationalities. The latest example is Makhteshim Agan, a multinational producer of 
generic insecticides, herbicides and fungicides with 4,000 employees and 50 facilities 
worldwide. Makhteshim Agan was sold in 2011 to ChemChina, a state owned Chinese 
supplier of agricultural chemicals at a price of US$ 2.4 billion. The transaction 
undoubtedly made business sense to IDB Holdings, a conglomerate that had a controlling 
interest in the company. The question that should be considered is whether the transaction 
was consistent with the public interest. Regrettably, the issue of the public interest was 
never raised, despite the fact that numerous workers, suppliers and other stakeholders 
were affected, and that millions of dollars of taxpayers' money had been poured into 
Makhteshim Agan and similar companies over the years. 
 
I conclude this chapter with a quote from J.M. Keynes who, in the early 1920s, opposed 
British financial investments abroad. His view of FDI was very different: “The hazarding 
of capital resources in foreign parts for trading, mining and exploitation is an immemorial 
practice, which has generally proved of immense benefit to nations with the courage, the 
temperament, and the wealth to follow it. For the English and the Scots it has been, 
beyond doubt, the foundation of their national fortunes. The risks are recognized to be 
great, but the profits are proportionate…. Nothing that I shall say here must be interpreted 
as casting a doubt upon the national advantage of investments of this kind.”1 
  
                                                
1 John Maynard Keynes, “Foreign investment and national advantage,” reprinted in D. Moggridge, ed., The 






The times are a-changin’ -- again -- in the relationship between 
governments and multinational enterprises: From control, to 
liberalization to rebalancing 
 
Karl P. Sauvant* 
 
Governments seek to attract FDI undertaken by MNEs because it contributes to the 
growth of their economies; they seek to maximize the benefits of this investment in the 
framework of their national economies. Firms undertake FDI because it improves their 
access to markets and resources and hence increases their international competitiveness; 
they seek to maximize the benefits of this investment in the framework of their global 
corporate networks. This difference in objectives and frameworks gives rise to tensions 
that play themselves out in the approach governments take in national FDI policies and 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs). During the late 1960s and the 1970s, the dominant 
approach was to control MNEs. During the 1990s, it was liberalization -- and the 




• During the 1990s, 95% of 1,035 national FDI policy changes worldwide1 made the 
investment climate more welcoming for MNEs. 
• National FDI screening agencies were replaced by investment promotion agencies 
(IPAs) -- red carpets replaced red tape. 
• Reflecting this national approach, the number of BITs -- geared entirely toward 
protecting foreign investors and, in this manner, hoping to attract more FDI -- rose 
from 370 in 1989 to 1,719 in 1999.2 
 
Thus, by the end of the 1990s, FDI was widely regarded as part of the solution to 
advancing economic development. Virtually all governments had liberalized their FDI 
regulatory frameworks, established IPAs and signed BITs. Since then, countervailing 




• The share of national FDI policy changes worldwide that made the investment 
climate less welcoming rose from 6% in 2001-2002, to 12% in 2003-2004, to 20% in 
2005-2006, to 23% in 2007-2008, and to 32% in 2009-2010.3 
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• A number of countries (particularly developed ones) have strengthened their 
screening mechanisms of incoming mergers and acquisitions (M&As), in the process 
also distinguishing between types of investors by singling out state-controlled entities 
(SCEs). For example, the number of investigations by the Committee for Foreign 
Investment in the United States rose from 1 in 2000 to 35 in 2010.4 
• The investment regime seems to be fragmenting as well, with separate rules emerging 
for SCEs. 
• Reflecting the new approach at the national level, the international investment regime 
itself is becoming less protective of MNEs. In particular, the US (but not yet many 
other countries) has narrowed certain substantive protections of foreign investors, 
especially fair and equitable treatment and indirect expropriation; abandoned the 
umbrella clause; and strengthened the essential security interest clause (which allows 
governments to disregard BIT commitments under certain circumstances). 
 
Thus, a growing number of governments are now taking a more nuanced approach to the 
role of FDI in their economies. While they continue to liberalize their FDI policies and 
conclude BITs, there is a clear trend to make the investment climate less welcoming and 
less predictable. 
 
What explains this change in approach? 
 
• The consensus that all FDI is equally beneficial is changing as more governments 
consider (certain) M&As as less beneficial than greenfield investments; conversely, in 
the future they may encourage more sustainable FDI, i.e. investment that makes a 
maximum contribution to economic, social and environmental development and takes 
place within mutually beneficial governance mechanisms while being commercially 
viable. 
• Governments pay more attention to competing objectives, especially national 
interests/essential security, the promotion of national champions and the protection of 
national industries. 
• Pressure from civil society. 
• The growth of FDI from emerging markets brings new players into the global FDI 
market, and their competition is not welcome by all, especially if they are SCEs. 
• The cumulative number of treaty-based investment disputes brought by firms rose 
from 38 in 1999 to 450 in 2011, involving 89 governments.5 Importantly, a number of 
developed countries have become respondents and therefore seek to protect 
themselves against far-reaching interpretations of international investment law and 
from losing arbitrations (even if that means weakening important elements of BIT 
protections). 
• Finally, it is unclear how important BITs are to help attract FDI, while it is clear that 
they restrict the policy space of governments. 
 
                                                
4 CFIUS, Annual Report to Congress, Report Period CY2010 (Washington, DC: CFIUS, 2011). 
5 UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note, no. 1, 2012. 
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What does all this add up to? For all governments, FDI is a tool. To the extent it serves 
their objectives, it will be promoted or restricted. We are thus moving toward a regulatory 
approach that is more protective of sovereigns by allowing more policy space for 
governments to regulate FDI in the public interest, at the national and international levels. 
This is being helped by the fact that more and more countries are simultaneously home 
and host countries. 
 
Rebalancing the investment regime to take into account the interests of both host 
countries and investors is a welcome development as it strengthens the regime’s 
legitimacy and puts the relations between governments and MNEs on a more solid 
footing. The challenge is to find the right balance between the rights and responsibilities 















Evaluate sustainable FDI to promote sustainable development 
 
John M. Kline* 
 
Prescriptions to increase the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in promoting 
sustainable development generally focus on the macro level -- getting policies right and 
otherwise improving the investment climate. These steps are necessary but not sufficient. 
Effective implementation processes, especially at the micro project level, are also 
essential to encourage FDI that matches host country development needs and priorities. 
 
The recent UNCTAD Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development1 offers 
a set of core principles to guide national and international officials making investment 
policy. The principles recognize the need to establish development priorities to evaluate 
FDI projects and a companion FDI contribution index2 provides a starting point that 
includes some useful indicators. However, the Framework falls short of providing an 
integrated and applied mechanism for assessing whether FDI meets sustainability criteria. 
 
Thus, the missing component is a process implementation tool that can help evaluate the 
multiple, interactive effects of a FDI proposal across economic, environmental, social, 
and governance objectives.3 One approach is to use a project assessment matrix to 
evaluate FDI proposals.4 A broadly inclusive process would select a top five and second 
five set of priority goals to receive extra weight. The matrix would assess the impact of 
FDI projects on value indicators representing a country’s development priorities, using a 
plus-five to minus-five range. After multiplying each indicator by its priority weight, the 
final score provides a cumulative assessment of its desirability as sustainable FDI. 
 
The assessment would quantify qualitative judgments about non-economic indicators so 
they can be compared and interactive effects evaluated. Easily quantified economic 
measures currently dominate FDI evaluations, creating a more-is-better mind-set. 
Regulations force some environmental assessments of FDI projects, but social and 
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governance effects that lack a similar legal mandate are generally overlooked or 
undervalued. Ironically, economic measures are really just instrumental values whose 
ultimate worth is reflected in social indicators that represent how a society’s way of life 
can be enriched. The matrix would curb the disproportionate influence now exerted by 
economic data in favor of a more holistic evaluation of project impacts. 
 
Adopting an easily understood ratings and assessment system encourages transparency 
and inclusiveness in the evaluation process. A matrix that incorporates economic, 
environmental, social, and governance indicators highlights FDI projects deserving 
promotion, pinpoints areas for improvement and discourages potential corruption by 
revealing the basis for a project’s net benefit assessment. 
 
The scarce resources countries devote to FDI promotion and facilitation should be 
targeted toward projects that advance priority development objectives. Unless improved 
evaluation tools assess the full range of project impacts, resource allocation will yield 
sub-optimal and possibly counter-productive results. FDI promotion dominated by 
macro-economic measures risks missing social and other impacts that more directly affect 
people’s lives. 
 
Is some FDI always better than no FDI? Perhaps, not. Even least developed countries 
struggling to attract FDI should assure potential projects produce more than an ephemeral 
spurt in economic indicators. FDI projects that mobilize capital and create jobs offer 
measurable economic benefits, but a project assessment matrix would evaluate the 
investment’s environmental, social and governance impacts as well. Projects may pollute 
or deplete the public water supply, displace populations or strengthen entrenched elites. 
Such FDI can, on balance, leave the host society less well off, compared to the status quo 
without the FDI, in terms of inclusive growth and sustainable development. 
 
Each nation sets its own priority development objectives and determines what role FDI 
should play in their achievement. Host countries should communicate their development 
priorities to prospective investors, requesting an evaluation of how FDI projects would 
affect relevant objectives. Investors could evaluate and adjust plans to promote societal 
benefits, recognizing that sustainable FDI requires a win-win outcome for both the 
country and the company. 
 
Sustainable FDI can contribute to sustainable development, but the outcome is neither 
automatic nor assured. Within a macro policy framework that encourages FDI, micro 
process assessments of potential projects are warranted before national resources are 
committed to their promotion. Both astute policy-making and effective implementation 





Shaping global business conduct: The 2011 update of the OECD 




On May 25, 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton joined ministers from members 
of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and developing 
economies to celebrate the Organisation’s 50th anniversary and agree on an update of 
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the fifth revision since their 
adoption in 1976.1 This marked the culmination of an intense one-year negotiating 
process involving a large number of stakeholders, international organizations and 
emerging economies. 
 
The fact that the business community shares responsibility for sustainable development is 
no longer disputed. But enterprises need to know how best to respond to societal 
expectations. As stated by the OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría, the updated 
Guidelines “will help the private sector grow their businesses responsibly by promoting 
human rights and boosting social development around the world.”2  
 
The Guidelines are founded on the premise that non-discriminatory treatment of foreign 
affiliates by host country governments, as provided for by the OECD National Treatment 
Instrument, should be reciprocated by socially responsible corporate behavior. They 
constitute the most comprehensive government-backed code of conduct that enterprises 
are invited to observe wherever they operate.3 The principles and standards they promote 
are consistent with applicable laws, internationally recognized standards and OECD 
instruments on good governance and business. They are known for their implementation 
procedures that include "National Contact Points" (NCPs) in all adhering countries and a 
mediation mechanism for addressing complaints involving alleged misconduct by MNEs. 
Thirty-four OECD members and eight non-OECD countries currently subscribe to them, 
and several more are in various stages of their application process. 
 
The 2011 update concentrated on three issues: 
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• The incorporation of a new chapter on human rights, based on the concept 
“protect, respect and remedy” -- the Framework and the respective Guiding 
Principles developed by the UN Special Representative for Business and Human 
Rights, John Ruggie.4 The Guidelines are -- together with the revised International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) standards -- among the first international instruments 
to operationalize the UN Framework, and the only one offering a ready-to-use 
governmental remedy mechanism for cross-border violations of human rights. 
• The introduction of the general operational principle of due diligence, i.e. a 
process through which enterprises can identify, prevent, mitigate, and account for 
how they address actual and potential adverse impacts as an integral part of their 
internal decision-making and risk management systems. Due diligence applies not 
only to harm caused or contributed to by an enterprise itself, but also by business 
partners with a direct link to its operations, products or services. 
• The reinforcement of implementation procedures through clearer and more 
predictable rules for the handling of complaints by NCPs and a stronger emphasis 
on problem solving through mediation. Together with a new focus on helping 
enterprises and other stakeholders cope with difficult situations or circumstances, 
this constitutes a major shift from merely expressing adhering governments’ 
expectations to actively contributing to the prevention and resolution of conflicts 
arising out of MNE operations. 
 
Other important improvements include expanded provisions on workers’ rights, bribe 
solicitation and extortion, climate-related issues, sustainable consumption, tax 
governance, and tax compliance. 
 
The update achieved its objective of redefining the “gold standard” for responsible 
business conduct in a global context. But while a successful update was a necessary 
condition for a further increase in the impact of the Guidelines, it is not a sufficient one. 
Exploiting the updated Guidelines’ potential will require sustained efforts by all involved: 
Adhering countries will have to review the organization and work methods of NCPs and 
make available the necessary resources. The OECD will have to reconsider how best to 
assist NCPs in their tasks as well as how to deepen its relationships and cooperation with 
non-adhering countries, in particular emerging markets, and with international partners. 
Recently signed working arrangements, for example with the International Labour 
Organization, the United Nations Global Compact, the International Organization for 
Standardization and the Global Reporting Initiative, are important steps toward a 
coherent global approach to corporate responsibility. Many more will have to follow. 
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The Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) is the Organisation’s flagship instrument for 
responsible business conduct. The Guidelines provide non-binding recommendations to 
MNEs, drawn up and implemented by governments. Updated in 2011, they consist of 
principles and standards in such areas as sustainable development, governance, disclosure, 
human rights, employment and industrial relations, the environment, anti-corruption, 
consumer interests, and taxation. The 42 adhering governments are required to promote 
the Guidelines and to contribute to the resolution of issues arising under the Guidelines, 
including by setting up a complaints mechanism -- “National Contact Points” (NCPs) -- 
to which trade unions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are able to submit 
specific instances concerning alleged breaches of the Guidelines. 
 
Manfred Schekulin stated that the Guidelines are the most “comprehensive government-
backed” instrument for responsible business conduct and that the recent Update achieved 
its objective of “redefining the ‘gold standard.’”1 
 
I agree that the Guidelines are special. The government-backed complaints mechanism 
sets them apart from other instruments, significantly increasing their potential to close 
global governance gaps and to ensure that the fruits of FDI are more equally shared 
among countries and between labor and capital. However, this potential has not been 
fulfilled. While, at their best, NCPs have contributed to the timely and effective 
resolution of issues raised under the Guidelines, at their worst, NCPs -- shielded from 
outside scrutiny -- have failed even to answer their mail. 
 
I also agree that the Update delivered significant improvements in the content of the 
Guidelines, in particular by establishing due diligence as an over-arching principle for 
responsible business conduct, requiring enterprises to “identify, prevent, mitigate and 
account for how they address their actual and potential adverse impacts;”2 clarifying that 
the Guidelines apply to the full range of business relationships, including throughout 
supply chains; adding a chapter on human rights; and requiring companies to pay best 
possible wages at least adequate to meet the basic needs of workers and their families. 
Importantly, the Council Decision on the Implementation Procedures also included a new 
instruction to governments to make available the necessary human and financial 
resources so that NCPs “can effectively fulfill their responsibilities.” However, overall, 
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the Update did not do enough to strengthen the rules governing the functioning of NCPs, 
falling short in two key areas: 
 
• Weak authority of the NCPs. The best performing NCPs play two distinct roles: 
offering their good offices for mediation and, where this fails, making an 
assessment of a company’s observance of the Guidelines (determination). These 
mediation and determination roles are inter-dependent: mediation is the “carrot” 
and the threat of determination the “stick” to bring parties to the NCP mediation 
table. While the Update strengthened mediation, it failed to strengthen 
determination, thus leaving the NCP system weak. 
• Lack of oversight. Peer review, pioneered by the OECD, is an examination of a 
government’s performance by its peers; it derives its strength from peer pressure. 
The peer review system of the OECD Anti-bribery Convention is widely regarded 
as a model, underpinning the strength of OECD’s flagship anti-corruption 
instrument. Yet, despite this best practice, the Update rejected mandatory peer 
review in favor of voluntary peer evaluation. It also failed to require NCPs to set 
up steering or review boards so as to strengthen national level oversight. 
 
The Update has generated high expectations. For the Guidelines to be regarded as the 
“gold standard,” however, by those workers and communities around the world whose 
lives and livelihoods are affected by MNEs, the Guidelines have to make a difference on-
the-ground. This depends on NCPs significantly improving their performance: namely 
handling cases in a transparent, impartial, predictable, and equitable manner. Now that 
the latest round of multilateral negotiations is over, adhering governments need to address 
the remaining deficits. In particular, they should meet their commitments on resources, 
strengthen their determination role and set up national oversight mechanisms, in line with 
NCP best practice, and sign up for rigorous transparent and participatory country peer 
review, based on OECD best practice. And the OECD should take steps to strengthen 
accountability and transparency by expanding the reporting requirements of NCPs to 
reflect their new commitments and procedures and by introducing more regular reporting 
by NCPs at meetings and on-line. 
 
It is essential that governments meet their responsibilities to ensure that the updated 
Guidelines fulfill their potential to promote responsible business conduct in a global 
context. I join Manfred Schekulin in calling for a sustained effort on the part of the 
OECD and adhering governments to close global governance gaps that leave millions of 
women and men around the world working in conditions of poverty, hardship and 






Toward the successful implementation of the updated OECD Guidelines 




The Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD (BIAC) has accepted1 the 
updated OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Guidelines), adopted on May 
25, 2011 after a series of negotiations and consultations among members of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), adhering 
governments, BIAC, the Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD, and OECD 
Watch, an international network of civil society organizations. The Guidelines are the 
most comprehensive government-endorsed code of responsible business conduct. The 
Update upheld the voluntary and non-legally binding character of the Guidelines, and 
while the new text introduces important new elements, the Update is very carefully 
formulated and its changes are accompanied by extensive conditionalities.2 
 
The new Guidelines more clearly define responsible business conduct of MNEs, 
particularly in the area of human rights. The incorporation of a human rights chapter in 
the Guidelines represents a significant milestone. The OECD and United Nations Special 
Representative John Ruggie worked together to draft this chapter. As a result, the 
Guidelines fully reflect the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,3 which 
were unanimously endorsed by the United Nations Human Rights Council in June 2011. 
 
A key provision that has been newly introduced in the Guidelines states that MNEs 
should avoid causing or contributing to adverse impacts on the social, environmental and 
other interests to which the Guidelines relate. This provision covers MNEs’ activities and 
also the direct involvement of MNEs in activities in the supply chain.4 When an adverse 
impact occurs to which MNEs did not contribute, MNEs are expected to examine 
possibilities to avoid such impacts if there is a direct linkage between the impacts and the 
activities of MNEs as a consequence of a business relationship. However, this is not 
intended to shift responsibility from the entity causing an adverse impact to the MNE 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank Alberto Echarri, Ardanaz and Soichiro Sakuma for their helpful comments on 
this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on January 17, 2012. 
1 See BIAC, “BIAC statement on the adoption of the update of the OECD Guidelines for multinational 
enterprises at the OECD Ministerial Council meeting on 25-26 May 2011;” see USCIB, “Business calls on 
OECD to promote updated Guidelines for MNE’s in non-adhering countries,” (press release May 25, 2011) 
available at: http://www.uscib.org/index.asp?documentID=4103. 
2 This Perspective is in response to Manfred Schekulin, “Shaping global business conduct: The 2011 update 
of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,” Columbia FDI Perspectives, No. 47, September 26, 
2011; and John Evans, “Responsible business conduct: Re-shaping global business,” Columbia FDI 
Perspectives, No. 50, November 7, 2011. 
3 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, General Assembly, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, March 21, 2011. 
4 The Guidelines are not specific as to the tier/level in the supply chain. 
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with which it has a business relationship: the adverse impact provision is only applicable 
if there is at least some form of direct involvement of the MNE in the adverse impact. 
 
A new provision expects companies to carry out risk-based due diligence to identify, 
prevent and mitigate actual and potential adverse impacts as mentioned above. This new 
provision is applicable to all chapters, apart from those dealing with science and 
technology, competition and taxation. The Guidelines do not formulate any procedural 
requirements for due diligence, except for in the human rights field. 
 
The procedural aspects of the “National Contact Points” (NCPs) have been substantially 
improved, for example by establishing an indicative timeframe, the availability of 
adequate human and financial resources and measures to avoid unmeritorious claims or 
frivolous campaigns. However, NCPs’ role as mediators to resolve potential issues 
remains unchanged. No (quasi-judicial) prerogative to formulate a judgement on the 
behavior of companies was introduced. 
 
From the business point of view, the success of the new Guidelines will depend primarily 
on two factors. 
 
• First, success depends on the extent to which the Guidelines are incorporated or 
referred to in MNEs’ own codes of conduct for improving corporate responsibility. 
The Guidelines expect the NCPs to play a role in the promotion of the Guidelines 
and also require the OECD Investment Committee to develop initiatives for the 
effective implementation of the Guidelines. BIAC is willing to contribute to these 
efforts by cooperating with the OECD. 
•  Second, the extent to which emerging markets adhere to the Guidelines is 
fundamental to securing a global level playing field. The Guidelines are currently 
adhered to by the 34 OECD members and 8 non-OECD countries, but not by 
major emerging markets such as China, India, Indonesia, Russia, or South Africa. 
The OECD must undertake determined efforts to encourage emerging markets to 
adhere to the Guidelines. 
 
The Guidelines form part of the OECD Declaration on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises (Declaration). Business considers this link essential, precisely 
because the Declaration also assures that adhering governments promote an open and 
predictable investment climate by granting MNEs national treatment and avoid 
conflicting requirements on them. Such a commitment by governments is essential for 
business to promote responsible business conduct in accordance with the provisions of 







A good business reason to support mandatory transparency in 
extractive industries 
 
Perrine Toledano and Julien Topal * 
 
Transparency demands in extractive industries are tied to the complex paradoxical 
correlation between significant resource endowment and poverty in many resource-
dependent countries. Citizens of these countries and international investors alike only 
have limited means to scrutinize money-flows between governments and companies, 
disrupting accountability mechanisms. 
 
Improving accountability and access to information is a step toward ending the resource 
curse. Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act, known 
as the Cardin-Lugar Transparency Amendment, requires extractive companies listed at 
US-securities exchanges to disclose all payments made to host country governments on a 
country-by-country and project-by-project basis. Amid corporate opposition, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has only now, more than one year late and 
after Oxfam America started court proceedings and over 65 Congress members put 
pressure on the SEC, set a date to vote on the rules.1 However, despite opposition, there is 
a business case to be made in support of such mandatory transparency demands. 
 
The debate on the Transparency Amendment has, very broadly, two camps: the 
opponents -- most expressively represented by the American Petroleum Institute -- and 
the proponents, including civil society with Publish What You Pay (PWYP) as the main 
supporter, groups of investors and certain congressional members. While supporting the 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), the corporate lobby opposes the SEC 
rules for allegedly causing high implementation costs, opposing legal demands and a 
comparative disadvantage for US-listed companies. The second camp has challenged 
these claims and has argued in favor of the amendment as a promising answer to the 
limitations of the voluntary EITI. 
 
Companies maintain that implementation costs can exceed US$ 50 million since they will 
have to re-devise their accounting instruments to disclose project-based and non-material 
information. Civil society and even The Economist have contested the veracity of this 
claim, noting that much information is already collected and calculating that US$ 50 
million is little more than 0.1% of ExxonMobil’s last year’s revenue.2 The claims that 
demands of the Transparency Amendment contradict host country confidentiality laws 
                                                
* The authors wish to thank Laurent Coche, Matthew Genasci, Isabel Munilla, and Jessica van Onselen for 
their helpful comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on August 13, 2012. 
1  The vote is scheduled for August 22, 2012. Securities and Exchange Commission, available at: 
http://www.sec.gov/news/openmeetings/2012/ssamtg082212.htm. 
2 “Extracting oil, burying data,” The Economist, February 25, 2012. 
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are also ill placed. 3 Civil society rebutted this claim by demonstrating that most countries 
allow for exceptions based on stock exchanges’ disclosure demands.4 
 
There is no denying that a certain short-term competitive disadvantage is created for 
impacted companies -- although the European Council’s directive for mandatory payment 
disclosure limits the scope of not-covered competition. Companies contend they will lose 
bids either because host countries prefer non-disclosing companies or because disclosed 
information is commercially sensitive. Here is the reality-check: Angola just awarded 
deep water oil blocks to Statoil, Eni, Total, and BP, which are all EITI-supporters and 
covered by the Amendment, which incidentally only deals with non-commercially-
sensitive fiscal information widely shared by the industry. Lastly, the competitive 
disadvantage argument is unduly cynical. Part of the complaint has to do with the 
limitations on bypassing the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act by “creatively” bribing through 
either “facilitators” or local partnerships. Bribery is illegal both in the US and Europe; 
“[k]eeping it hard to expose would not make it more legal.”5 
 
Companies have a choice to play either destructive or constructive roles in the quest for 
transparency. The choice consists of either accepting narrow capitalism -- which 
prescribes short-term profitability and concomitant opposition to regulatory limitations on 
corporate operations -- or believing in a forward-looking and long-term shared value 
approach to business. Through a shared value lens, companies seek out benefits for both 
shareholders and the communities in which they operate since the companies understand 
that they require a social license to operate to attain long-term success. Increasingly, 
investors seek out companies based on such long-term credentials. 
 
Various studies by the Vale Columbia Center found that transparency -- measured by 
companies’ country-by-country reporting -- holds a promise for better corporate 
performance. One such study showed a clear correlation between transparency and better 
financial results along different measures.6 Interestingly, those transparent companies are 
also associated with fewer cases of human rights abuse. 
 
Corporate leaders should change tactics and transform a short-term comparative 
disadvantage into the comparative advantage of being first-movers. This means to follow 
in the footstep of BP’s former CEO7 and support recent attempts by the US President to 
encourage the development of a global transparency regime, which will be achieved 
either by pushing other stock exchanges -- starting with Europe -- to follow suit or by 
improving on the disclosure demands of the current host country-led EITI. For their own 
                                                
3Angola, Cameroon, China, and Qatar have such laws according to API and Shell. API’s letter, January 28, 
2011: available at: http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-42-10/s74210-10.pdf. PWYP US 
(http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-42-10/s74210-29.pdf and http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-42-
10/s74210-118.pdf) and the Cameroonian organization RELUFA (http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-42-
10/s74210-96.pdf) deny these claims. 
4 VCC’s memo to the SEC, available at: http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-42-10/s74210-52.pdf. 
5 “Transparency rules,” Financial Times editorial, February 26, 2012.  
6  The results have been communicated to the SEC: http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-42-10/s74210-
115.pdf; VCC memos are available at: http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/content/vcc-memos. 
7John Browne, “Europe must enforce oil sector transparency,” Financial Times, April 24, 2012. 
 
136 
sakes, companies should acknowledge that the transparency moment is now and the 





Law at two speeds: Legal frameworks regulating foreign investment in 




Foreign investment in developing countries’ natural resources brings into contact 
competing interests characterized by an unequal balance of negotiating power -- from 
multinational enterprises and host governments to people affected by the implementation 
of investment projects.1 Economic globalization has been accompanied by extensive 
developments in national and international norms regulating investment and its impact -- 
including investment law, natural resource law and human rights law. These norms affect 
the way the costs, risks and benefits of investments are shared among the multiple parties 
involved. 
 
An analysis of developments in national and international law and in transnational 
contracts for natural resource investments in Africa suggests that the balance of legal 
claims tends to provide stronger protection to foreign investment than to affected people. 
For the vast majority of rural populations whose rights are protected under national 
legislation and international human rights law, legal protection is undermined by 
shortcomings in rule of law, substantive rules and legal remedies. For them, challenging 
adverse government action is difficult at both national and international levels. State-of-
the-art social and environmental management plans developed for some investments go 
substantially beyond national law requirements, but fall short of creating legal 
entitlements enforceable by affected people. On the other hand, bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs), national law reforms, transnational contracts, and international arbitration 
have gone a long way toward strengthening the legal protection of foreign investment and 
imposing discipline on the arbitrary exercise of state sovereignty, reflecting significant 
developing country efforts to attract foreign investment. The resulting regime seems more 
geared toward enabling secure transnational investment flows than ensuring these flows 
benefit people in recipient countries. 
 
Take the case of international law. Both investment law and human rights law protect 
right-holders against arbitrary interference by the state and provide access to international 
remedies. But the safeguards that investment law provides to foreign investors tend to be 
more effective than those available to all under human rights law. Expropriation clauses 
in BITs typically include public purpose, non-discrimination and compensation 
requirements, and link compensation to market value. On the other hand, the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights affirms the right to property but does not require 
states to compensate right-holders for losses suffered; it merely requires compliance with 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank Howard Mann, Olivier De Schutter and Andrea Shemberg for their helpful 
comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on June 29, 2012. 
1 This note is based on the author’s new book Human Rights, Natural Resource and Investment Law in a 
Globalised World: Shades of Grey in the Shadow of the Law (London and New York: Routledge, 2012). 
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applicable law, demonstrating that international human rights law does not address gaps 
in compensation requirements that may exist under national law. 
 
In addition, human rights law typically requires petitioners first to try all available 
remedies under national law before accessing international courts, possibly involving 
lengthy proceedings and several degrees of appeal. Many arbitration clauses included in 
BITs do not require investors to exhaust domestic remedies -- though some do and others 
require first trying domestic remedies. 
 
If human rights petitioners win a case, the ruling may have limited legal or practical 
force. For example, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights only issues 
non-binding decisions. The recently established African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights issues binding judgments. But only about half the African states are parties to the 
Court’s Protocol. And only four countries issued declarations allowing individuals and 
NGOs to bring matters to the Court without first going through the Commission. On the 
other hand, where states have consented to international arbitration, arbitral awards are 
legally binding. In practice, investment law offers no absolute sanctuary against 
determined government action. Although enforcing awards can be difficult, arrangements 
to enforce such awards are generally more effective than those provided by human rights 
law. By virtue of some widely ratified multilateral treaties, where signatory governments 
are unwilling to pay up investors can seize assets that the host state holds abroad -- 
though immunity rules may restrict this option. 
 
Where competing rights come into contest, differences in legal protection can have 
important implications -- for example, where an investor and affected people bring 
disputes about the same investment respectively to international arbitrators and human 
rights bodies. This has recently happened in cases involving Latin American countries. 
 
Investors need effective safeguards against arbitrary treatment. There may be legitimate 
reasons to treat different rights differently. But as global interest in developing countries’ 
natural resources increases, it is imperative that affected people also have stronger rights. 
In relative terms, affected people have more to lose from weak protection than large 
investors -- because the loss of a small plot of land can make them vulnerable to 
destitution and loss of social identity. 
 
International law must be more balanced, so that the protection it offers to investment is 
matched by equally strong safeguards for rights that may be affected by investment 
flows. National law must grant local landholders stronger rights to their resources and a 
greater voice in decision-making. Investment contracts must be more inclusive, in terms 
of transparency, accountability and safeguards for local rights where national law falls 
short of international standards. For these legal reforms to make a difference, they must 











Over the past 12 months, large-scale acquisitions of farmland in Africa, Latin America, 
Central Asia and Southeast Asia have made headlines in a flurry of media reports across 
the world. Lands that only a short time ago seemed of little outside interest are now being 
sought by international investors to the tune of hundreds of thousands of hectares. 
 
Trends and drivers 
 
An article recently published in The Economist suggested that foreign investors have 
acquired or sought some 15-20 million hectares of farmland in poorer countries since 
2006, quoting estimates from the International Food Policy Research Institute.1 
 
The accuracy of these estimates is hard to assess, but evidence points toward significant 
levels of activity and upward trends over the past five years. In four African countries 
alone (Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali), approved land allocations to foreign 
investors since 2004 amount to over 1.4 million hectares of land (just below the size of a 
country like Swaziland or Kuwait); this excludes allocations below 1,000 hectares, 
allocations to nationals and pending negotiations. Due to incomplete datasets, this is a 
conservative figure -- and it is much higher if deals still under negotiation in the four 
countries are included. 
 
Approved allocations include a 452,500-hectare biofuel project in Madagascar, a 
150,000-hectare livestock project in Ethiopia, and a 100,000-hectare irrigation project in 
Mali. All four countries experience upward trends in both project numbers and allocated 
land areas, and evidence suggests that investment levels will grow in future. Private 
sector deals are more common than government-to-government ones, though 
governments are using a range of tools indirectly to support private deals, and levels of 
government-owned investments are significant and probably growing. 
 
Concerns about food security (compounded by water shortages in key investor countries 
and by the food price hikes of 2008) and the biofuels boom are key drivers, but other 
factors are also at play -- such as business opportunities linked to expectations of rising 
food prices, agricultural commodity demand for industry, and policy reforms in recipient 
countries. 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank Howard Mann, Ruth Meinzen-Dick and Herbert Oberhaensli for their helpful 
comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on June 22, 2009. 
1 “Buying farmland abroad: outsourcing’s third wave,” The Economist, 23 May 2009, p. 65. See also 
Joachim von Braun and Ruth Meinzen-Dick, “Land grabbing by foreign investors in developing countries: 
risks and opportunities,” International Food Policy Research Institute, (Washington D.C., 2009). Available 




Mitigating risks, seizing opportunities 
 
This new and fast-evolving context creates risks and opportunities. Increased investment 
may bring macro-level benefits (GDP growth, greater government revenues), and create 
opportunities for raising local living standards. Investors may bring capital, technology, 
know-how, infrastructure and market access, and may play an important role in 
catalyzing economic development in rural areas. 
 
But as outside interest increases and as governments or markets make land available to 
prospecting investors, land acquisitions may result in local people losing access to the 
resources on which they depend -- land, but also water, wood and grazing. National laws 
may not have sufficient mechanisms to protect local rights and take account of local 
interests, livelihoods and welfare. Insecure resource rights, inaccessible registration 
procedures, compensation limited to loss of improvements like crops and trees, and 
legislative gaps often undermine the position of local people. 
 
Ultimately, the extent to which international land deals seize opportunities and mitigate 
risks depends on each project’s terms and conditions: how risks are assessed and 
mitigated (for instance, with regard to project location), what business models are used 
(from plantations to contract farming through to various forms of equity participation by 
local people), how costs and benefits are shared (including the distribution of food 
produced between home and host countries), and who decides on these issues and how. 
 
Unpacking land deals 
 
While outright purchases appear common in Latin America and Eastern Europe, land 
leases are predominant in Africa -- not least due to restrictions under national laws. 
Leases are often granted by host governments, though deals with local leaders are 
common for instance in Ghana, and some deals involve separate contracts with host 
governments and local people. A recent contract from Madagascar entails a combination 
of lease and contract farming arrangements, including through a direct deal with 13 
associations of local landholders. 
 
Lease durations range from short term to 99 years, and are associated with transfers of 
water rights. Land fees and other monetary transfers tend to be relatively low, linked to 
efforts to attract investment, perceived low opportunity costs, and lack of well-established 
land markets. Host country benefits mainly involve investor commitments on investment 
levels, job creation and infrastructure development -- for example, with regard to the 
construction  of irrigation systems. 
 
Overall, however, some land deals appear rather short and simple, particularly compared 
to contracts in other sectors such as extractive industries. Key issues like promoting 
business models that maximize local content, strengthening mechanisms to monitor or 
enforce compliance with investor commitments, maximizing government revenues and 
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clarifying their distribution, as well as balancing food security concerns in both home and 
host countries, may be dealt with by vague provisions if at all. 
 
Lack of transparency is a major challenge in many negotiations, with little public access 
to information and decision-making. This includes many government-to-government 
negotiations, which may be expected to be subject to greater public scrutiny. Lack of 
transparency and of checks and balances in contract negotiations create a breeding 
ground for corruption and deals that do not maximize the public interest. 
 
What needs to happen 
 
Trends in FDI in land for agriculture reflect deep global economic and social 
transformations, with potentially profound implications for the future of world 
agriculture. The role of food in human consumption makes it fundamentally different 
from other commodities. In many parts of the world, land is central to identity, 
livelihoods and food security, and decisions taken today will have major repercussions 
for many, for decades to come. While bilateral negotiations are unfolding fast, there is a 
need for vigorous public debate in recipient countries, so as to base decisions on strategic 
thinking about the future of agriculture, the place of large and small-scale farming within 
it, and the role and nature of outside investment. 
 
Where international land deals emerge as a way forward, governments must ask hard 
questions about the investor’s capacity to deliver on very ambitious projects. Sensible 
regulation, skillfully negotiated contracts and robust social and environmental impact 
assessments are key. Host governments must create incentives to promote inclusive 
business models that integrate rural smallholders and family farms, and ensure the respect 
of commitments on investment levels, job creation, infrastructure development, public 
revenues, environmental protection, safeguards in land takings, and other aspects. Some 
recipient countries are themselves food insecure, and robust arrangements must protect 
local food security, particularly in times of food crisis. 
 
Although extractive industry projects are often controversial, contractual practice in this 
large-scale, capital-intensive sector may also provide some insights, particularly as the 
size and value of land deals increases. 2  This might include precise local content 
requirements (employment, inputs) that evolve over project duration to increase local 
percentages and extend them to higher-value content (e.g., skilled labor); provisions on 
local capacity building (training, technology transfer); specific safeguards on land takings 
and environmental damage; sophisticated revenue sharing mechanisms giving host states 
a sizeable share of project revenues, possibly increasing it over project duration; and 
efforts to improve transparency in contracts and revenue management, including through 
open tendering and civil society oversight (under the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative). 
 
As interest in land grows, efforts must be stepped up in many countries to secure local 
land rights, including customary rights, using collective land registration where 
                                                
2 “Fixing the Land Deals,” Financial Times, Editorial, 27 May 2009. 
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appropriate and ensuring the principle of free, prior and informed consent, robust 







Untying the land knot: Turning investment challenges into 




Consider the following cases: 
 
• China, 1980s. Newly embarked on its economic transformation, China opened to 
foreign direct investment (FDI) to obtain capital, technology and access to world 
markets. Investors hesitated, however, since national law prohibited access to 
state-owned land. In reaction, the government introduced a long-term lease 
system, first tested in special economic zones and later applied across the country. 
This approach enabled China’s phenomenal success in attracting FDI in the years 
to come; it also paved the way for 500 million urban citizens to gain property 
rights, which in turn inspired the rural population to ask for the same rights today. 
• Egypt, 1990s. Mounting economic needs called for diversifying tourism to the 
Red Sea coast. However, both domestic and foreign investors shied away from the 
lengthy and unpredictable land approval process. Project approval involved 
screening by at least five line ministries, from archeological to national security 
ministries. The bottleneck was finally removed by a negative approval approach, 
with each ministry mapping out areas along the coast that were not sensitive to 
their legitimate concerns. The areas cleared by all were then made available for 
priority tourism development. Business prospered immediately, while public 
interests were protected. 
• Namibia, 1990s. As vast communal land was turned into national parks for 
wildlife conservation, the country’s indigenous population faced the threat of 
losing its traditional livelihood. The government introduced legislation allowing 
registration of communal conservancies. Having gained this collective right, 
indigenous groups could borrow from banks and form eco-tourism joint ventures 
with outside investors. By 2005, over 50 conservancies were up and running, 
enabling 220,000 communal residents to benefit from businesses consistent with 
wildlife protection. 
 
What do these cases have in common in terms of non-agricultural investment? 
 
• Well-secured land is essential for investment, foreign and domestic. 
• Outdated and counterproductive laws, policies and institutions, seen everywhere, 
can prevent investment opportunities from materializing, while keeping valuable 
land resources locked, in de Soto’s term, as “dead capital.”1 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank Ward Anseeuw, Lorenzo Cotula and Carin Smaller for their helpful comments 
on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on November 19, 2012. 
1 Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere 
Else (New York: Basic Books, 2000), p. 7. 
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• Most importantly, investment challenges in access to land can be turned into 
opportunities consistent with public interests. In fact, lasting investment results 
and social and environment sustainability can be best achieved together, through 
policies that open up opportunities for all stakeholders. 
All around the world, managing land use conflicts is difficult in fast-paced development. 
Many countries want to attract FDI, especially the kind bringing jobs and helping 
industrialization; but investors are hindered by the lack of access to well-secured, well-
zoned and well-serviced land. Global enterprise surveys indicate over half of the 
manufacturing firms in Africa find access to such land a major impediment to their 
businesses; well over one-third of manufacturers in all other regions voiced the same 
concern.2 Adding to the results the unknown amount of investment that has never taken 
place due to land obstacles, the overall situation is much worse. 
 
Foreign and domestic investors are equally concerned, according to the same surveys. 
However, foreign investors conceivably have more choices -- if not satisfied, they simply 
move elsewhere. The runaway investment impact is, therefore, likely higher with foreign 
investors than their domestic peers. 
 
Governments anxious to attract FDI sometimes offer free land and other special deals as 
investment incentives. Such an approach, however, creates more problems than it solves. 
Special deals given to few -- usually the large and well-connected -- disadvantage the 
rest. Moreover, land has a value serious investors are willing to pay for; offering it free 
makes host countries forego revenue and attracts wrong investors who speculate rather 
than build on the land -- a lesson many Chinese local governments learned from their 
earlier experiences. 
 
Some governments have intervened by forcing ordinary citizens off the land to make way 
for new investment. Such interventions, leading to land grabs in extreme cases, create 
social injustice defeating the development goal. The popular resentment caused can also 
backfire against investment, as seen in the well-known case of Tata Steel in Orissa, India. 
Disrespect for citizens’ rights further undermines the confidence of the business 
community. Many wonder: If land is taken away from someone for us today, can it be 
taken away from us for someone else tomorrow? 
 
Short-cuts like these are sometimes attempted because fixing the systemic problems is 
hard. Obstacles imbedded in the lack of market development, unsecured property rights, 
obsolete rules and, above all, favoritism and corruption are fundamental. They cannot be 
overcome unless political leaders are willing and able to operate on their own systems, 
including, sometimes, taking away the power from the powerful. 
 
Further, systemic reforms require efforts not only to dismantle the old machine but also 
build a new one. Modernizing property laws and land administration, updating zoning 
and environment regulations and building capacity at all implementing levels -- these 
                                                
2 World Bank Enterprise Surveys, 2006-2009, available at: http://www.enterprisesurveys.org. 
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require persistent efforts based on political leadership, institutional cooperation and, 
when ready solutions do not exist, a bit of pragmatism and innovation. 
 
Fortunately, progress is possible -- from A to C if not immediately from A to Z. The 
experiences of China, Egypt and Namibia are just a few examples. Efforts like these are 
worth making, as they lead to a fair, efficient and transparent system -- exactly what 






The coming harmonization of climate change policy and international 
investment law 
 
Daniel M. Firger* 
 
Developments in climate change policy and international investment law may be ushering 
in a new era characterized by profound harmonization between the two regimes. 
Although policy instruments such as the Kyoto Protocol’s “Clean Development 
Mechanism” (CDM) have been in existence for years, it is only relatively recently that 
the international community has turned to low-carbon FDI and away from command-and-
control regulation as the preferred means by which to achieve future greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions. Meanwhile, states have begun to renegotiate international 
investment agreements (IIAs) or sign new treaties to take into account policy goals, 
including climate change mitigation, that extend beyond the regime’s traditional 
preoccupation with investor protection. Though still somewhat tentative, emerging trends 
in both arenas are thus showing unmistakable signs of convergence. 
 
New climate change policies, particularly those related to finance and technology transfer, 
are proving to be compatible with international investment law in ways inconceivable for 
traditional environmental measures. Both the 2009 Copenhagen Accord and the 2010 
Cancún Agreements, for instance, call on developed-country governments to mobilize 
hundreds of billions of dollars in private financing for climate mitigation projects in the 
developing world, while largely eschewing the imposition of hard caps on emissions, as 
under the Kyoto Protocol. Low-carbon FDI has thus taken center stage in international 
climate negotiations, with diplomats discussing a range of new financial mechanisms to 
incentivize private investments in the lead-up to the seventeenth Conference of the 
Parties in December 2011. 
 
Clusters of states are also initiating a host of national, bilateral and regional initiatives to 
encourage low-carbon FDI and facilitate a range of public-private partnerships on clean 
technology transfer. Examples include new national-level programs aimed at attracting 
greater FDI inflows under existing mechanisms such as the CDM, bilateral agreements on 
technology transfer such as the US-China Framework for Ten Year Cooperation on 
Energy and Environment, and regional accords such as the Asia-Pacific Partnership on 
Clean Development and Climate. 1  The sorts of investment promotion strategies 
emphasized in these initiatives tend not to conflict with states’ international investment 
law obligations, as do many forms of traditional environmental regulation. Rather, the 
benefits of a “clear, stable and predictable policy framework”2 for low-carbon FDI 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank John Kline, Petros Mavroidis, Kate Miles, and Jorge Viñuales for their helpful 
comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on May 9, 2011. 
1 For a lengthier examination of these and other related initiatives, see Firger and Gerrard, op. cit. 
2 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy (New York: United 
Nations, 2010), p. xxvii. 
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become even greater as states seek to facilitate sustainable development through private 
investment. 
 
At the same time, international investment law is itself undergoing a transformation of 
sorts, as increasingly multidirectional capital flows call into question long-standing 
distinctions between capital importing and capital exporting countries,3 and as more 
serious consideration is therefore given to host country regulatory flexibility by 
traditional capital exporters.4 This give-and-take is reflected in the language of IIAs: 
recent agreements impose less stringent obligations on host countries and contain more 
environmentally-minded exceptions and, in some cases, climate-specific language than 
those concluded just a few years earlier. New initiatives may go even further. The 
European Commission’s proposed regulation on foreign investment, for instance, 
includes provisions on the environment and discusses the potential imposition of home 
country obligations in this regard. Such rules could conceivably include low-carbon 
finance or technology transfer requirements that may further enhance the relationship 
between climate policy and international investment law. 
 
To maximize the potential for coordination and mutual learning rather than fragmentation 
and discord, states should take several affirmative steps to consolidate the progress they 
have made thus far on low-carbon FDI. First, climate policymakers and investment treaty 
negotiators should communicate early and often. Most immediately, states should craft a 
coherent, forward-thinking framework for low-carbon FDI to be adopted at seventeenth 
Conference of the Parties. Second, states should seek to develop novel mechanisms to 
incentivize low-carbon FDI, particularly if such mechanisms can strengthen rather than 
undermine existing legal frameworks governing such investments. For example, 
developed country governments could make export credit guarantees for clean 
technology firms conditional upon certain performance requirements, such as capacity-
building programs, that not only comply with investment treaty provisions but also 
support host countries’ good faith efforts to tackle climate change. Finally, states should 
accelerate the process of concluding new IIAs with explicit climate-friendly language, 
while at the same time renegotiating some of the nearly 3,000 investment treaties 
currently on the books in order to strike the right balance between incentivizing low-
carbon FDI and guaranteeing strong protections for all forms of foreign investment. 
 
The international community has come a long way over recent decades in recognizing 
that the purposes of international investment law include more than merely safeguarding 
investors’ rights. With the threats posed by climate change looming ever larger, states 
must take affirmative steps to remove barriers to the transition away from carbon-
intensive investments and toward sustainable, low-carbon growth. 
  
                                                
3 See, e.g., Daniel H. Rosen and Thilo Hanemann, An American Open Door? Maximizing the Benefits of 
Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Asia Society, May 2011). 
4 Canada, for example, announced in 2010 that it would amend its foreign investment law to require greater 
transparency and accountability from foreign investors. See Bernard Simon, “Canada to toughen rules on 





Responsible agricultural investment: Is there a signification role for the 




The world food situation is back in the headlines as price levels surpass 2008 peaks, 
confirming the rising trend in food markets.1 Higher prices pose challenges to both food 
importing and exporting countries. One serious barrier to increasing food output remains 
the lack of necessary capital and technology in countries that have the potential to 
increase production rapidly.2 To avoid a food crisis, international organizations and 
several governments have increasingly turned to promoting FDI by MNEs in agriculture. 
This may be an effective solution, but some obstacles stand in the way of the 
establishment of such projects and, more importantly, their long-term sustainability. 
 
Agriculture is a socially very sensitive area, and foreign investors should expect its 
regulation to change frequently.3 This political risk, however, is only one side of the story. 
All too often, for host countries and their populations FDI has been associated with land 
grab, dispossession and damaging environmental fallout.4 Many food-import-dependent 
countries have recently acquired large tracts of land to secure their food supplies. This 
strategy has created some skepticism due to the potential effects of these projects on the 
local population, which could suffer loss of livelihood despite increases in production. 
Against this complex backdrop, the challenge lies in promoting sustainable and 
responsible FDI, permitting private investors to enjoy a reasonable profit while also 
ensuring that all investment inflows benefit host populations.5 
 
The need for such a compromise has been acknowledged by international organizations. 
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD), UNCTAD, and the World Bank are working together on an 
initiative aimed at convincing all stakeholders that foreign investment projects in 
agriculture should consider social and environmental sustainability. The most important 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank Lorenzo Cotula, Olivier De Schutter and Lisa Sachs for their helpful 
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1 “A special report on feeding the world. The 9 billion-people question,” The Economist, February 24, 
2011, available at: http://www.economist.com/node/18200618. 
2  FAO, “Foreign direct investment: win-win or land grab?,” available at: ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/ 
fao/meeting/018/k6358e.pdf. 
3 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2009: Transnational Corporations, Agricultural Production and 
Development (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2009), pp. 96-97. 
4 Lorenzo Cotula, Sonja Vermeulen, Rebeca Leonard, and James Keeley, Land Grab or Development 
Opportunity? Agricultural Investment and International Land Deals in Africa (London/Rome: IIED, FAO 
and IFAD, 2009). 
5 Olivier De Schutter and Peter Rosenblum, “Large-scale cross-border investments in land: the interaction 
between foreign direct investment and land rights,” in Karl P. Sauvant, ed., Yearbook on International 




objective of this joint effort is to recommend a set of voluntary guidelines based on the 
“Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respect Rights, Livelihoods and 
Resources” (“the Principles”).6 Investors are invited to adhere to and abide by the 
Principles, which include respecting land and resource rights, ensuring food security and 
assuring social and environmental sustainability. These goals embody desirable 
objectives, particularly from a public perspective; however, the future success of the 
Principles will depend more on the support of states and international organizations than 
on a declaration of good intentions. The implementation and legal effects of the 
Principles remain in question. 
 
It is frequently noted that international investment agreements lack obligations on the part 
of the investor, instead focusing mainly on the protection of MNEs and facilitating their 
operations. Moreover, it is argued that guidelines and voluntary codes constitute a 
deficient counterbalance because they are not legally binding and thus cannot be enforced. 
MNEs’ main motivation for adhering to the Principles, however, is the improvement of 
their corporate reputation, as they show their social and environmental commitment to the 
international community, consumers and their own employees. Nonetheless, despite the 
non-binding nature of these corporate commitments, the international community should 
be able to expect MNEs that have agreed to observe the Principles to stick to their 
promises. This proposition would be consistent with the position in international 
investment law that representations made by a state, i.e., assurances provided by host 
countries that were reasonably relied on by an investor, should be respected.7 
 
This legal approach could prove positive for the purposes envisaged by the drafters of the 
Principles. When investors commit to observe the Principles, they do not assume a legal 
obligation; still, it is worth considering the role the Principles can play in shaping 
investors’ legitimate expectations -- typically one of the most contentious issues in 
arbitration. If investors in legal dispute argue that their expectations were not met, and 
these expectations are clearly at odds with the Principles, investment tribunals could not 
easily find them legitimate. The Principles could contribute to defining the scope of 
regulatory authority, helping states to pass new regulations, for instance, when there is 
sound evidence of environmental and social risks.  In this manner, the Principles could 
strike a balance between investors and host country populations’ concerns, promoting 
sustainable FDI in agriculture as a partial solution to the present food situation. 
  
                                                
6 See generally http://www.responsibleagroinvestment.org/rai/node/256. 
7 This position was adopted by the arbitrators in Waste Management Inc. v. Mexico (Number 2), ICSID 










As UNCTAD highlighted over a decade ago and again recently in its Investment Policy 
Framework for Sustainable Development, home-country measures (HCMs), like host-
country commitments regarding the protection of foreign investors, are tools of 
promoting foreign investment.1 Nevertheless, the vast bulk of investment treaties, which 
state the promotion of foreign investment as their objective, overlook the potential role of 
HCMs and focus rather singularly on setting out the obligations of host countries 
regarding the treatment of foreign investors. Even recent agreements and model 
investment treaties that should represent “next generation” practices incorporating 
accumulated learning about the impacts and effectiveness of these treaties remain 
relatively devoid of any obligation for governments to facilitate or promote the quantity 
and quality of outward investment that many countries want and need for sustainable 
development.2 
 
A few countries (developed and, increasingly, developing) take HCMs to facilitate or 
promote outward investment. These measures can include such actions as providing 
information, technical assistance, insurance, and/or financial and fiscal support to 
domestic firms to encourage and aid them in establishing operations overseas; enhancing 
coordination among investment promotion agencies; and assisting potential host countries 
in developing the infrastructure necessary for attracting investment. The dominant 
approach by home countries has been to formulate and implement these HCMs 
unilaterally as part of efforts to support FDI by domestic enterprises, and/or as part of 
international development assistance programs. And although some investment treaties 
do contain provisions on HCMs, those provisions have generally been limited to 
hortatory statements regarding FDI promotion and cooperation rather than specific 
obligations with mechanisms to ensure their implementation. To a great extent, therefore, 
the HCMs that have been referenced in investment treaties are weak, and lack the 
stability and predictability to make them the effective tools for sustainable development 
that they could be.  
 
There is, however, nothing inherent in investment treaties that precludes or is inconsistent 
with including more obligations on HCMs, making such obligations measurable and 
enforceable under those agreements and using them to promote the amount and type of 
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2 See, e.g., 2012 US Model BIT, available at: 
 http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf. But see also, e.g., 
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investment that can facilitate sustainable development. Countries could include in their 
investment treaties commitments on HCMs to allow, encourage and/or promote outward 
investment, and could craft these provisions to take into account the countries’ special 
and differential obligations; their respective needs, priorities and industrial policies; 
specific development challenges; and the potential costs and benefits of investment 
treaties for state parties at the macro- and the micro-levels. Further, they could design the 
provisions to be flexible or evolve over time as levels of development change. 
 
HCMs, it should be recognized, are not free from controversy. Some argue, for instance, 
that they raise issues of competitive neutrality, a topic that has recently attracted 
significant attention from OECD countries. Domestically, HCMs promoting home-
country firms’ efforts to establish overseas affiliates could potentially exacerbate 
opposition to investment treaties from constituents concerned about a consequent loss of 
jobs. Nevertheless, to the extent objections to some HCMs exist and are not assuaged by 
research or policy responses, home countries have various options for avoiding such 
objections when, for instance, designing and implementing HCMs that focus on 
increasing the capabilities of developing host countries to draw in and benefit from FDI. 
These include HCMs to promote the investment in infrastructure that will help host 
countries attract FDI, and HCMs that support host countries’ development of the 
absorptive capacity that is crucial for enabling them to reap long-term benefits from such 
investment.   
 
Home-country efforts to assist with investment promotion activities can truly be win-win 
measures for home and host countries,3 helping investment treaties move beyond their 
arguable current role as mere regulators of the relationship between foreign investors and 
host countries, to actual tools for encouraging the FDI and economic cooperation that can 
lead to sustainable development: HCMs can help a home country’s investors overcome 
myriad barriers that make it difficult for them to invest and succeed abroad; the measures 
can be targeted so as to help scale-up and channel investment into cutting-edge 
technologies and inclusive business models aimed at solving some of the world’s most 
pressing challenges such as poverty and climate change, while also enhancing the 
competitiveness of home-country firms; and, more generally, HCMs can serve as 
catalysts for the type and quantity of international flows of capital that are important for 
sustainable development, particularly in countries and regions that have struggled to 
attract such flows. It would thus be a welcome, feasible and overdue departure from 
traditional practice if new treaties were to contain these commitments, and is an issue 
policy makers and treaty negotiators should have on their agendas.  
                                                
3 Because it is focused on the role of investment treaties as promoting investment for sustainable 
development, this note primarily envisions HCMs in agreements between developed and developing 





Environmental concerns in international investment agreements: The 
“new era” has commenced, but harmonization still appears far off 
 
Kathryn Gordon and Joachim Pohl* 
 
In Columbia FDI Perspective No.37, Daniel M. Firger foretells “a new era characterized 
by profound harmonization” between climate change policy and international investment 
law,based on what he sees as “unmistakable signs of convergence” in recent investment 
treaty making.1 A study just released by the OECD suggests that convergence of 
investment treaty making toward environmental policy began about a decade ago, but 
also that “profound harmonization” of investment and climate change policy is still some 
time away.2 
 
Arguably the first of its kind, the study surveys over 1,600 international investment 
agreements (IIAs) for references to environmental concerns and categorizes these 
references according to their regulatory purpose. It provides a systematic statistical 
portrait of how and to what extent governments have dealt with environmental protection 
in their investment agreements since 1958. 
 
Until relatively recently, references to environmental concerns in investment treaties were 
exceedingly rare. Indeed, no investment treaty concluded between 1958 and 1985 
contained any reference to the environment, and fewer than 10% of treaties concluded in 
any given year from 1985 to 2001 contained this feature. References to environmental 
concerns in such treaties have increased sharply since 2002. The share of newly 
concluded IIAs with explicit environmental references exceeded 50% for the first time in 
2005 and reached 89% in 2008. Notably, all free trade agreements (FTAs) included in the 
sample contain references to the environment in their investment chapters. 
 
Treaty writing practice in this regard still varies considerably: 19 of the 49 countries 
covered by the study have never used such language in their IIAs, while a few countries 
have, from a given date onward, systematically included environmental references in 
their treaties (e.g. Canada, Mexico and the United States since the early 1990s, and 
Belgium/Luxembourg more recently). Several countries such as Australia and the 
Republic of Korea appear to have no policy of systematically including such language, 
but have included such references in some of their treaties. 
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The environmental language in IIAs shows significant variation across time and across 
countries. The details of the language, even within specific subject areas, vary and 
identical language across treaties is rare. However, almost all references to environmental 
concerns appear to develop a limited number of themes (e.g. general environmental 
references in preambles, right to regulate in the environmental policy area, and not 
lowering environmental standards for the purpose of attracting investment). 
 
A few treaties in the sample go beyond generic references to environmental concerns and 
deal with more specific environmental subject matter. These more specific references 
mainly use language derived from the 1948 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
repeating the concepts underlying the environmental policy agenda that prevailed at that 
time. These references include 45 treaty clauses that deal with protection of human, 
animal or plant health and 25 dealing with protection of exhaustible natural resources. 
Almost without exception, more recent concerns, such as climate change and biodiversity, 
have not yet penetrated the limited set of environmental issues addressed in investment 
treaties. 
 
The statistical analysis of treaty writing practice says little about the legal effects and 
policy implications of references to environmental concerns in IIAs. Whether such 
clauses enable governments better to integrate investor protection and environmental 
policy objectives is an open question. Given the large stock of IIAs in force, the political 
and practical limitations on renegotiations of IIAs, and the slow penetration of concepts 
of international environmental law into IIA negotiations, it would seem that changing or 
adding to the explicit environmental content of investment treaties will be a long, slow 
process. 
 
Other avenues for clarifying states’ political and legal intent in treaty writing appear 
promising, but require further reflection and dialogue by both the investment and 
environmental policy communities.3 This reflection could start by exploring systematic 
variations of clauses in the treaty sample -- e.g. the fact that all FTAs with investment 
chapters in the sample, but only 6.5% of BITs, contain references to the environment. 
Further legal analysis could shed light on the influence of international environmental 
law on the interpretation of investment law and ultimately contribute to the “profound 
harmonization” between climate change policy and international investment law. 
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Attracting FDI through BITs and RTAs: Does treaty content matter? 
 
Axel Berger, Matthias Busse, Peter Nunnenkamp, and Martin Roy * 
 
It may appear all too obvious that the extent to which foreign direct investment (FDI) is 
attracted by bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and regional trade agreements (RTAs) 
depends on the strength of key investment provisions. Still, BITs and RTAs have 
typically been treated as black boxes in prior empirical literature, ignoring two important 
legal innovations: investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) and pre-establishment national 
treatment (NT) provisions.1 
 
An assessment of the impact of different classes of BITs and RTAs on bilateral FDI flows 
between up to 28 home and 83 developing host countries (covering the period 1978-
20042) yields strong evidence that liberal admission rules promote bilateral FDI. For 
instance, a host country could increase its share in total FDI flows by almost 30% in the 
hypothetical case of switching from RTAs without pre-establishment NT provisions to 
RTAs with such provisions in relation to all possible partner countries. In conducting our 
analysis, we used a wide range of control variables, employed different estimation 
methods to test the robustness of our findings, and also found that the results are not due 
to reverse causality. Like other similar studies, however, our model did not given data 
limitations or account for unilateral changes in the admission of FDI. Compared to NT 
provisions, ISDS mechanisms appear to play a minor role. 
 
Also in contrast to what one might expect, the impact of similar investment provisions on 
bilateral FDI depends on whether these provisions are contained in RTAs or BITs. RTAs 
offering nothing specific to foreign investors, in terms of liberal admission or effective 
dispute settlement, leave bilateral FDI unaffected or may even induce a substitution of 
home-country exports for FDI. By comparison, foreign investors respond to BITs rather 
indiscriminately regardless of the strength of dispute settlement or market access 
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1 Recent efforts to code BITs and RTAs help overcome this gap. Jason Yackee classified BITs according to 
ISDS provisions. (Jason Yackee, “Do BITs really work? Revisiting the empirical link between investment 
treaties and foreign direct investment,” in Karl P. Sauvant and Lisa E. Sachs, eds., The Effect of Treaties on 
Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows 
(Oxford: OUP, 2009), pp. 379-394.) We supplemented Yackee’s work and coded BITs and RTAs with 
respect to NT provisions in the pre-establishment phase. (Axel Berger, Matthias Busse, Peter Nunnenkamp, 
and Martin Roy, “Do trade and investment agreements lead to more FDI? Accounting for key provisions 
inside the black box,” International Economics and Economic Policy (April 2012).) The inclusion of such 
provisions guarantees market access for multinational enterprises (MNEs). As regards pre-establishment 
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provisions. This may be surprising given that some recent BITs are no longer restricted to 
investor protection and extend to FDI liberalization. The low profile and rather technical 
nature of BIT negotiations provide a possible explanation; foreign investors may tend to 
regard BITs as agreements containing a similar set of rules, without checking their legal 
intricacy. Clearly, further qualitative studies are needed better to understand how 
investors take into account BITs and RTAs when making investment decisions.3 
 
Our findings suggest that governments seeking to attract FDI may put greater emphasis 
on providing comprehensive and transparent admission guarantees. It is primarily the 
market access guarantees provided by NT at the pre-establishment phase that appears to 
lead to more FDI. NT provisions using negative list modalities improve legal security and 
predictability at the admission phase. Specifically, signaling effects appear strongest if 
pre-establishment NT provisions cover all sectors, precisely list non-conforming 
measures and generally bind access conditions at the currently level of openness. More 
restrictive approaches of limiting NT provisions to selected sectors do not appear to be 
effective.  
 
Concerns the choice between BITs and RTAs, policymakers seeking to attract FDI may 
face a dilemma. The negotiation and ratification of RTAs tend to be highly politicized. 
This may help alert foreign investors and increase FDI. However, rule setting in RTAs 
typically covers a much wider area than in BITs and could impose additional costs. 
Policymakers should know that RTAs tend to be ineffective in promoting FDI if the focus 
is exclusively on trade liberalization. On the other hand, the technical nature of BIT 
negotiations may have the effect that foreign investors are hardly aware of more 
favorable features that BITs may contain. Investment promotion agencies bear major 
responsibility to convince foreign investors that it is worthwhile checking the small print 
of BITs. 
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Different investment treaties, different effects 
 
Clint Peinhardt and Todd Allee* 
 
The proliferation of investment treaties is perhaps exceeded only by academic studies of 
those treaties. Legal scholarship has long been attentive to the evolution in international 
investment agreement (IIA) content -- but until recently, quantitative assessments of IIAs 
have tended to treat them as interchangeable: the only measure of investor protections 
encoded in IIAs is whether a treaty had been signed and/or entered into force. Thankfully, 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development has been at the forefront of 
capturing not just IIAs’ proliferation but also the evolution in their content. Its work 
shows that treaties apply for differing durations, have conflicting procedures for 
termination and include varying definitions of even basic terms, such as “investors” and 
“investment.” Other quantitative studies have begun to measure these variations, focusing 
initially on differences in dispute resolution.1 Some IIAs demand that investors choose 
between domestic and international dispute resolution; some provide explicit consent of 
both parties to international arbitration; and some designate a particular forum for 
arbitration, whereas others specify multiple options. Of course, IIAs vary across many 
dimensions, but our initial examination of dispute resolution provisions alone 
demonstrates the importance of examining IIA content. 
 
Importantly, the variations across IIAs are systematically related to characteristics of the 
governments negotiating them. Even powerful countries’ model investment treaties are 
rarely enacted in full, and treaties enact language that reflects carefully balanced 
bargaining positions. For example, treaties between countries with great power disparities 
provide stronger international arbitration provisions; treaties between relative equals tend 
to be less stringent.2 
 
Most published quantitative studies find a correlation between IIAs and FDI -- but, 
increasingly, this relationship appears more complex than the simple “IIAs increase FDI” 
story. The earliest studies found little evidence of this story, but in recent years a number 
of studies have found correlations between the number of IIAs a country signs and its 
inward FDI. Other research finds that IIAs and FDI between signatories move together as 
well. Both approaches have elicited criticism on methodological grounds, since previous 
FDI can influence which countries get IIAs.3 Also, the FDI effects of IIAs depend on 
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compliance: states that sign IIAs but appear more often (or lose) in international 
arbitration will not gain new FDI, and in fact may jeopardize the investment stocks they 
already possess.4 
 
New research on IIAs simultaneously examines how the characteristics of their individual 
state parties, the relationship between those parties, and treaty content affect investment. 
IIAs do appear to have differing effects on FDI due to their varying levels of investor 
protection.5 After taking into account which states sign stronger treaties, the specific 
language in dispute resolution clauses can impact FDI; for example, treaties that omit any 
reference to local dispute resolution options appear more likely to increase FDI between 
the signatories. 
 
For policymakers, this implies that not all countries are likely to gain FDI as a result of 
IIAs. Only countries on the cusp of establishing good investment climates may benefit, 
for example by signing more comprehensive investment treaties than their peers. 
Countries already unattractive to foreign investors are unlikely to become more so as a 
result of a typical IIA. Likewise, those already viewed as safe investment hosts may only 
stand to lose ground if they sign weak treaties. Overall, the actual investment effects of 
investment treaties depend greatly on context. Lastly, our findings do not imply that 
investors pay great attention to all treaties; instead, where BITs contribute especially 
critical information, such as in newly independent countries, treaties that commit states 
more credibly to investor protections can attract FDI.6 
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Reconciling IMF rules and international investment agreements: An 




There is currently no universal framework governing capital controls. As a result, a 
conflict has arisen due to the different approaches taken by various international 
organizations and many international investment agreements (IIAs). In particular, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) -- established to manage the international financial 
system -- preserves national autonomy over capital controls when such measures are 
deemed necessary; in contrast, IIAs, and especially bilateral investment treaties (BITs) -- 
crafted primarily to protect investors -- typically do not allow for the imposition of 
restrictions on capital outflows associated with foreign investments for balance-of-
payments reasons. 
 
More specifically, countries that significantly limit the policy space for capital controls in 
their IIAs (that is, do not allow for a balance-of-payments derogation) can potentially 
come in direct conflict with the IMF. For instance, a senior IMF lawyer, expressing 
concern that this approach might be contrary to a request by the Fund that a government 
adopt capital controls, observed that there is a risk that, “in complying with its obligations 
[under Free Trade Agreements] … a member could be rendered ineligible to use the 
Fund’s resources under the Fund’s articles.”1 Recent volatile capital flows to developing 
countries, as well as the greater acceptance of capital controls today, make it likely that 
this issue will stay on the international agenda. This dilemma has been recognized in the 
international community, as demonstrated by several attempted solutions.2 
 
In response to this issue, IIAs should incorporate derogations for countries when treaty 
obligations conflict with IMF recommendations. More specifically, if and when the IMF 
suggests that a government employ capital controls for a limited time to respond to severe 
economic hardship, the employing country would have a complete defense against 
investor lawsuits under IIAs incorporating such derogations. 
 
This recommendation may be more politically palatable than other proposed derogations 
that might afford greater discretion to treaty parties in the implementation of capital 
                                                
* The author would like to thank Sergey Ripinsky, Diana Rosert, Manfred Schekulin and two anonymous 
reviewers for their helpful comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on 
September 10, 2012. 
1 Deborah E. Siegel, “Using free trade agreements to control capital account restrictions: Summary of 
remarks on the relationship to the mandate of the IMF,” International Law Student Association Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, vol. 10 (2004), p. 301. 
2 E.g., some IIAs state that in exceptional cases restrictions to the transfer of funds provisions are allowed 
when they conform with relevant WTO agreements and IMF regulations. Furthermore, more recent IIAs 
increasingly incorporate balance of payments exceptions. However, in contrast, the new 2012 US Model 
BIT does not allow for capital controls. 
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controls and therefore should be the most politically feasible. Moreover, the IMF has the 
preeminent role in international economic rule-making on this issue; the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services defers to IMF authority on the question of transfer 
restrictions and some countries have already demonstrated a willingness to rely on IMF 
judgment on this subject: the North American Free Trade Agreement’s balance-of-
payments derogation relies upon IMF statistical information and recommendations. US 
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner has even advocated a greater role for the IMF in 
policing international capital flows.3 
 
This proposal could be especially useful for US IIAs and the US Model BIT; the US has 
been particularly reluctant to incorporate any derogation for capital controls into its IIAs. 
This plan offers several advantages over the potential balance-of-payments derogation 
currently debated by the US State Department. First, an IMF exemption could allow 
controls to prevent a crisis from escalating, rather than addressing problems purely 
retrospectively; this problem has already occurred regarding the NAFTA balance-of-
payments exception. Though permission to use capital controls in this manner would 
likely be extremely rare, the possibility may prevent a costly and potentially unnecessary 
buildup of reserves, as occurred in Mexico.4 The requirement of an IMF recommendation 
to use controls would also limit abuse of the flexibility by host countries. It is also more 
objective and therefore promotes legal predictability, as the existence of a balance-of-
payments crisis can be subjective. A country may be threatened with lawsuits even if it 
believes capital controls are needed to respond to a clear balance-of-payments dilemma; 
IMF permission to impose capital controls would remove this uncertainty. If the IMF 
states that capital controls are needed to address a financial difficulty, a country may 
proceed without fear of lawsuits. 
 
Most importantly, this proposed derogation would directly address the IMF’s concern 
that its authority to recommend capital controls could be undermined by IIAs. While 
rules of international institutions are carefully designed to ensure that they do not create 
conflicting obligations, this is not the case for most treaties crafted in the investment area. 
Currently, it is possible that a country in crisis will have to face two potentially 
conflicting international obligations: an IMF recommendation to employ capital controls, 
and IIAs that allow investors to sue if controls are imposed. A simple derogation in IIAs 
would remove this risk and enhance the compatibility of such agreements with 
international rule-making.  
                                                
3 Statement by the United States Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner in the twenty-third meeting of 
the International Monetary and Financial Committee, April 16, 2011, available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/spring/2011/imfc/statement/eng/usa.pdf. 






Political risk insurance and bilateral investment treaties: A view from 
below 
 
Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen* 
 
Many of the risks covered by bilateral investment treaties are also covered by political 
risk insurance (PRI). Although there are important differences between PRI and BITs, 
both in terms of coverage and underlying purpose, the considerable overlap between the 
two instruments suggest that PRI providers should take BITs into account when assessing 
the risk of investment projects. But while the relationship between BITs and PRI has 
often been alleged to be considerable,1  in practice there is practically no publicly 
available evidence to sustain this assumption. This Chapter reviews evidence from a 




Several governments provide their investors abroad with insurance against political risks, 
and a few of these, such as those of Germany and France, make their guarantees 
contingent on investments being covered by BITs. This is notable because practically all 
BITs allow government-sponsored PRI agencies to “subrogate” insured investors’ claims 
against host countries, thereby providing a legal basis for the government’s insurance 
agency to recover benefits paid out to investors. These programs are an exception, 
however, in that most public investment guarantee programs do not incorporate BITs as a 
precondition for coverage. And while BITs may at times provide comfort when PRI 
agencies of capital-exporting states issue guarantees in risky jurisdictions, interviews with 
officials from nine of them indicate that it is exceptionally rare that the treaties have a 
decisive impact on either coverage or pricing. 3 
 
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) 
                                                
* The author would like to thank Geza Feketekuty, Mark Kantor and Michael Nolan for their helpful 
comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on August 2, 2010. 
1 See e.g., United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, “Bilateral arrangements and agreements 
related to transnational corporations,” Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 1986, p. 23 
(“the existence of a bilateral agreement with the respective host country is very often a pre-condition for 
political risk insurance by the investor’s home country.”); UNCTAD, “UNCTAD hosts bilateral investment 
treaty negotiations by group of fifteen countries,” press release, January 7, 1999 (“In many cases, they 
[BITs] have become a sine qua non for the availability of political-risk insurance.”); Rudolf Dolzer and 
Margrete Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), p. 156 (BITs 
“reduce the ‘risk profile’ of a covered investment to a level where it can be prudently insured by the 
investor’s Home state ….”); Jenifer M. DeLeonardo, “Note: are public and private political risk insurance 
two of a kind? Suggestions for a new direction for government coverage,” Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law, vol. 45 (2005), p. 753 (BITs “increase insurers’ abilities to offer favorable insurance 
terms to investors.”). 
2 Further details and discussion can be found in the full study. 
3 Covered countries are, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United 




For MIGA insurance, a foreign investment has adequate legal protection if covered by a 
BIT, and the treaties are relevant for other parts of MIGA’s operational regulations as 
well. But whereas BITs may thereby make the underwriting process easier within MIGA, 
the treaties are often not crucial. A BIT is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for 
coverage. And with respect to the pricing of expropriation risk, MIGA has to consider no 
less than 57 rating factors when determining the underwriting premium rates. Only one of 
these relate to the existence of an “investment protection agreement” -- a rather broad 
term which covers trade agreements with investment chapters, for instance, the Energy 
Charter Treaty. Suffice it to say that, if countries engage in conduct that signals a scale-
back of investor protections -- such as withdrawing their consent to submit investment 
disputes to international arbitration -- that would naturally be factored into MIGA’s 
underwriting decisions. But for developing countries that remain committed to foreign 
investment and the rule of law, past and current high-ranking officials confirm that the 
absence of a BIT rarely impacts pricing or coverage, and is never in itself a sufficient 




As an alternative to public investment guarantee schemes, private companies have 
offered PRI for the past three decades. The survey summarized here included feedback 
from underwriters and senior managers from firms and Lloyds’ syndicates accounting for 
around 50% of the total “confiscation, expropriation and nationalization” capacity of 
most PRI providers. Their feedback may appear surprising to those convinced that BITs 
are crucial for the PRI industry. A few providers incorporate BITs into their products (for 
instance by insuring treaty-based arbitration award defaults), and some occasionally use 
the treaties as a guiding tool when assessing investment risks, but most private firms find 
BITs largely irrelevant for the underwriting process. Naturally, if cancelling or failing to 
honor existing BITs can be taken as signals that a host country plans to weaken its 
investor protections, this will be noted and taken into account (as with MIGA). But for 
developing countries that treat foreign investors fairly and in a non-discriminatory way, 





Naturally, what has been discussed here is only one out of several possible links between 
BITs and PRI. An additional -- and obviously related -- question is the relevance of BITs 
when PRI providers resolve claims with host governments. This remains almost entirely 
unexplored in the literature due to the short supply of information about the PRI industry. 
The conclusion is nevertheless notable: While BITs are basically aimed at reducing the 
risk of investing abroad, many agencies that price the risk of foreign investments rarely 
take them into account. Why might that be? If the reason is ignorance about the potency 
of BITs among some PRI providers, then the treaties should increase in importance once 
more underwriters realize their potential. But even among those well informed about 
BITs, major providers remain skeptical about their practical relevance as a risk-mitigating 
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tool. Ultimately, however, it remains to be studied exactly why BITs may be decisive for 
some underwriting decisions, but have nevertheless not had a transformative impact on 






How much do US corporations know (and care) about bilateral 
investment treaties? Some hints from new survey evidence 
 
Jason Webb Yackee* 
 
A remarkable number of countries have recently entered into bilateral investment treaties 
as a means of protecting and promoting inward FDI. But do the treaties “work”? In 
exchange for giving up some measure of regulatory autonomy, host countries hope to 
receive increased flows of investment. Scholars have devoted substantial energy to 
examining whether this so-called “grand bargain” has in fact been realized. Most studies 
follow a common research design. The number of BITs that a country has signed are 
counted up, with the resulting independent variable regressed against country-level FDI 
flow data. Unfortunately, the results of these various and increasingly complex statistical 
exercises are inconsistent.1 Some studies show that BITs can have massive positive 
impacts on foreign investment; others show modest positive impacts; others show no 
impact at all, or even a negative impact. 
 
A small handful of scholars are attempting to move past this econometric stalemate by 
returning to the older, less sophisticated, but potentially more enlightening methodologies 
of surveys and interviews.2 In a recent working paper, I presented results from a mail-
based survey of general counsels in large US corporations. General Counsels were 
targeted because it is unlikely that busy non-legal senior executives will be in a position 
to monitor or evaluate the highly technical and relatively inaccessible evolution of BIT 
jurisprudence. If investment treaties meaningfully impact FDI, that influence is likely to 
flow into the corporation’s decision-making process through the General Counsels’ 
knowledge or appreciation of BITs as risk-reducing devices. 
 
The survey was mailed to General Counsels in the top 200 US corporations on the 
Fortune 500 list. 75 surveys were returned, a relatively respectable response rate given 
the nature of the respondents, who are, undoubtedly, exceedingly busy. Given the modest 
sample size, and given that I was able to focus only on General Counsels in US 
corporations, the survey’s results should be viewed as preliminary rather than definitive. 
Responses were received from corporations across the top 200, including four in the top 
ten, and included corporations from all major economic sectors. 
 
                                                
* The author also wishes to thank Rachel Brewster, Tim Büthe, Jeswald W. Salacuse, Greg Shaffer, and 
Lauge Poulsen for their helpful comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on 
November 23, 2010. 
1 For a valuable collection of the main studies, see Karl P. Sauvant and Lisa E. Sachs, eds. The Effects of 
Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and 
Investment Flows (New York: OUP, 2009). 
2 See, e.g., Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen, “The importance of BITs for foreign direct investment and political 
risk insurance: revisiting the evidence,” in Karl P. Sauvant, ed., Yearbook on International Investment Law 
and Policy, 2009-2010 (New York: OUP, 2010), ch. 14. 
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The basic story is a somewhat surprising one given some claims in the existing empirical 
literature that BITs matter a great deal to foreign investors. General Counsels reported 
that they personally were relatively unfamiliar with BITs. On a five-point scale, ranging 
from “1” (“not at all familiar”) to 5 (“very familiar”), the median response for General 
Counsels was only a “2,” with only about 21 percent indicating high familiarity (“4” or 
“5”).3 General Counsels reported an identical median level of unfamiliarity with BITs by 
non-lawyer senior executives. 4  General Counsels did not view BITs as providing 
particularly effective protection against expropriation (median response of “3” on a 5-
point scale where “5” means “very effective” and “1” means “not at all effective”), with 
only about 21 percent rating BITs as highly effective (“4” or “5”).5 They were even less 
impressed with BITs as an effective shield against adverse regulatory change (median 
response of “2,” with no respondents selecting “5” and only 10 percent selecting “4”).6 
 
This latter result is intriguing, because classic expropriation has become an exceedingly 
rare phenomenon. If BITs have an important role to play in reducing investment risk (and 
thus in encouraging FDI), it is probably by reducing the risk of adverse regulatory change 
-- so-called “regulatory expropriation.” In fact, General Counsel’s skepticism about the 
ability of BITs to protect against regulatory change is consistent with the jurisprudence of 
arbitral tribunals, which have so far refused to read an ambitious regulatory takings 
doctrine into the treaties. General Counsels also indicated that, on average, BITs are not 
an important consideration in the “typical” FDI decision (median response rate of “2” on 
the five-point scale, where “1” is “not at all important”),7 and only four respondents 
reported that their company had declined to invest in a specific project because of the 
absence of BIT protections.8 Interestingly, those four companies that said that a BIT had 
impacted a specific project spanned the Fortune 200 (two are in the top 10, one is in the 
60s, and one is in the 170s) and included a variety of sectors. One is a defense-industries 
corporation; one is a natural resources company; one is a large manufacturing 
conglomerate; and one is a financial services company. 
 
Given the small and geographically non-diverse sample, the survey results should 
certainly not be understood as saying that BITs never matter to investors when they 
decide whether and where to invest. Nor do they prove that BITs will not matter more to 
investors at some time in the future, as knowledge of BITs and confidence in the strength 
of their protections grow. BITs may indeed influence certain investment decisions. But 
my survey results suggest that they are unlikely to influence many others. 
                                                
3 The question read, “How familiar are lawyers in your office with the basic provisions of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs)?” 
4 The question read, “How familiar are nonlawyer senior executives in your corporation with the basic 
provisions of BITs?” 
5 The question read, “In your view, how effective are international treaties like BITs at protecting foreign 
investments from expropriation by a foreign government?” 
6 The question read, “In your view, how effective are international treaties like BITs at protecting foreign 
investments from adverse regulatory change in the foreign country?” 
7 The question read, “How important is the presence or absence of a BIT to your company’s typical 
decision to invest in a foreign country?” 
8 The question read, “To your knowledge, has your company ever declined to invest (or to consider 




Of course, there are serious methodological challenges with surveys such as this one. But 
econometric studies of the links between BITs and FDI inflows have reached the point of 
diminishing returns. In order to provide a more certain answer to the question of whether 
BITs “work,” researchers should re-focus their energies on exploring in more depth and 
with more sophistication how and why corporate knowledge and appreciation of BITs 







US BITs and financial stability 
 
Kevin P. Gallagher* 
 
Almost immediately after taking office, the Obama administration charged the US 
Department of State’s Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy with 
reviewing the US Model bilateral investment treaty (BIT). The group established a sub-
committee of business groups, labor and environmental organizations, and a handful of 
academic experts and tasked it to make official recommendations for reforming US 
investment treaties. When completed, the Obama administration hopes to proceed with 
official negotiations with China, India, Vietnam, and possibly Brazil. 
 
In light of the global financial crisis, one of the specific issues that the administration 
asked the subcommittee to address was the potential impact of BIT provisions on the 
ability of governments to prevent and mitigate financial crises. Financial stability was one 
of the few areas in which a consensus recommendation was reached -- the subcommittee 
asked the administration to undertake a legal review of the prudential measures exception 
(Article 20 of the US Model BIT).1 In most recent US treaties that exception states that 
parties to the treaty should “not be prevented from adopting or maintaining measures … 
to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system.” However, the paragraph ends 
with the following sentence: “Where such measures do not conform with the provisions 
of this Treaty, they shall not be used as a means of avoiding the Party’s commitments or 
obligations under this Treaty.” Some on the subcommittee thought the language was 
vague and in need of clarification. Others echoed the concerns of legal scholars who 
argue that the sentences were self-canceling and in need of deletion.2 Given the high 
degree of contention among committee members, the report includes an annex in which 
individual members or subgroups provided additional arguments. A group of sub-
committee members (that included myself) recommended that the administration conduct 
a legal review of the potential that any of the measures implemented or under 
consideration in response to the financial crisis might be inconsistent with the 2004 
Model BIT, and made three specific recommendations that should be implemented by the 
US in a revised Model BIT: 
 
1. Codify the State Department’s position in Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States regarding 
the standard of proof for identifying principles of customary international law and the 
minimum standard of treatment. 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank Stephen Canner, Thea Lee and Theodore Posner for their helpful comments on 
this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on February 23, 2010. 
1 Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy, Report of the Subcommittee on Investment of the 
Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy Regarding the Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 
(September 2009). Available at: http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/2009/131098.htm (see annexes for 
individual comments). 





Financial bailout measures, or future preventative measures that create “too big too fail” 
regulations, could be challenged under the 2004 BIT on the grounds that they deny a 
foreign investor’s right to fair and equitable treatment and a minimum standard of 
treatment. Indeed, a Dutch subsidiary of a Japanese bank recently argued that the Czech 
Republic had violated its rights by extending its bailout program only to “too big to fail” 
Czech banks, excluding a small bank in which the Dutch subsidiary had invested.3 In 
addition to ensuring that the prudential exception is broad enough, codifying the Glamis 
position, which prevailed with a narrow interpretation of customary international law and 
minimum standard of treatment, will set a better standard for preventing and mitigating 
crises.  
 
2. Include a safeguard provision for balance-of-payments crises that is not subject to 
investor-state dispute settlement. 
 
US investment treaties essentially force nations to liberalize their capital accounts, 
regardless of their institutional capacity -- or be prepared literally to pay the 
consequences. This stands in stark contrast with economic science and most other global 
treaties. Ayhan Kose of the IMF, Eswar Prasad of Cornell University and Ashley Taylor 
of the World Bank confirm that capital account liberalization is not correlated with 
economic growth in developing countries. These authors expand such findings to show 
that capital account liberalization only works for those nations above a certain threshold 
of economic and institutional development.4 Capital controls have been shown to be an 
effective measure to prevent or mitigate a crisis and such a safeguard mechanism leaving 
governments room to impose capital controls under certain circumstances can be found in 
virtually every other form of international economic law, such as the WTO, OECD codes 
(and the draft MAI), and the BITs of most other capital exporting nations. 
 
3. Exclude “sovereign debt” from “definitions” of an investment. 
 
The US Model BIT does not explicitly exclude sovereign debt from the definition of 
covered investments, as NAFTA does. It should. The US government is the largest issuer 
of sovereign debt, and countries across the world have taken on much debt to get out of 
the financial crises and could risk default. As noted in the full subcommittee report, the 
IMF and others have raised concerns that efforts to restructure sovereign debt may give 
rise to investor-state claims. New model investment provisions should not obstruct global 
efforts to set up adequate facilities for sovereign debt restructuring that could be 
undermined if bondholders are able to circumvent such mechanisms by filing claims 
under BITs. At minimum, the model BIT should codify US-Peru FTA-like provisions 
that limit an investor's ability to bring an investor-state claim based on a debt 
                                                
3 See Saluka Investments BV v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Award (March 17, 2006), available at: 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Saluka-PartialawardFinal.pdf. 
4 See Ayhan Kose, Answar Prasad and Ashley Taylor, “Thresholds in the process of international financial 




restructuring where holders of 75% or more of the outstanding debt have agreed to the 
restructuring. 
 
Ensuring that the US model is in tune with global efforts to prevent and mitigate financial 
crises benefits both the US and its investment partners. Making sure that ample prudential 
exceptions exist can buffer the US from liabilities for prudential regulations. What’s 
more, stability among our investment partners helps US investors and exporters have 
more certainty for markets. Crises could lead to defaults and large losses to US assets and 
export markets. And, crises can cause contagion that spreads to other US investment and 
export destinations. Trade and investment treaties should not prevail over regulations for 






The new Dutch sandwich: The issue of treaty abuse 
 
George Kahale, III* 
 
Years ago, international tax lawyers introduced us to the term “Dutch sandwich.” The 
concept was to sandwich a Dutch company between an investor from country A and its 
investment in country B. The combination of the extensive network of Dutch tax treaties 
and investor-friendly domestic Dutch tax law meant that country A's investor could 
reduce withholding tax on dividends out of country B and perhaps eliminate capital gains 
tax altogether by structuring its investment through a Dutch company. 
A different type of Dutch sandwich has emerged over the past fifteen years, this time not 
related to taxes. It is the product of the extensive network of Dutch bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs). Companies from all over the world having little if anything to do with 
The Netherlands seek to acquire Dutch nationality to take advantage of the protections 
offered by Dutch BITs. 
This type of nationality planning has been championed by many in the field of investor-
state arbitration, but it is giving BITs a bad name. It does not take much to form a Dutch 
company. No real offices or employees are necessary, and visiting the country is optional. 
The benefits sought are not only the substantive treaty protections, but access to ICSID, 
the forum for dispute settlement specified in most Dutch BITs. 
Many states on the receiving end of foreign investment are getting upset at what they see 
as treaty abuse. They are reexamining treaties they entered into over the past twenty 
years, often without appreciation of the consequences. There are a number of reasons for 
this, not the least of which is the expansive interpretation given by some tribunals to 
terms such as “fair and equitable treatment.”1 But the issue of who gets in the door is an 
obvious source of annoyance to those who never imagined that a treaty with one country 
could open the gates to potentially a whole world of investors. 
The subject of treaty abuse has received heightened attention recently due to a number of 
cases involving the restructuring, rather than the structuring, of investments. 
Restructuring can take place for any number of legitimate business reasons, but often it is 
done simply for the purpose of moving into a treaty jurisdiction and gaining access to 
ICSID. The effectiveness of restructuring to achieve that goal becomes most questionable 
when its timing indicates that it was done in anticipation of litigation.2 The basic issue is 
whether there are any limits to the ability to restructure into a treaty jurisdiction or, put 
another way, whether there is such a thing as treaty abuse. Decisions such as Phoenix 
                                                
* The author wishes to Alejandro Faya Rodriguez, Matthew Skinner and Felix Alberto Vega Borrego for 
their helpful comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on October 10, 2011. 
1 See “Public statement on the international investment regime,” August 31, 2010, available at: 
www.osgoode.yorku.ca. 
2 See Zachary Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), at 551. 
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Action Ltd. v. Czech Republic3 and Mobil Corp. v. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
indicate that there is.4 
Although several tribunals prior to Phoenix had discussed the circumstances that might 
constitute treaty abuse, the issue gained momentum with Phoenix, where the tribunal 
dealt with an intra-family transaction apparently intended to shift an investment into a 
treaty jurisdiction in the midst of a dispute with the host state. The tribunal rejected that 
maneuver, using strong language to underscore the need to guard against abuse of the 
ICSID system: 
 
The Tribunal is concerned here with the international principle of good 
faith as applied to the international arbitration mechanism of ICSID. The 
Tribunal has to prevent an abuse of the system of international investment 
protection under the ICSID Convention, in ensuring that only investments 
that are made in compliance with the international principle of good faith 
and do not attempt to misuse the system are protected. . . . It is the duty of 
the Tribunal not to protect such an abusive manipulation of the system of 
international investment protection under the ICSID Convention and the 
BITs. 5 
The Mobil tribunal quoted language from Phoenix in holding that transfers into a treaty 
jurisdiction did not confer ICSID jurisdiction over pending disputes.6 
These decisions have already been the subject of much discussion in the international 
arbitration community, but there is more to come. Other tribunals will soon have the 
opportunity to define further the concept of treaty abuse, undoubtedly generating more 
commentary and controversy on what has become a hot issue in investor-state arbitration. 
In the future, the issue of treaty abuse may be addressed in the terms of new BITs 
(assuming that BITs continue to proliferate), but in the meantime tribunals will have to 
work out for themselves the limits of restructuring into treaty jurisdictions. Merely 
satisfying the technical requirements of nationality at the time of filing a request for 
arbitration does not suffice under the Phoenix and Mobil formulations, and it should not. 
 
                                                
3 Phoenix Action Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, award (April 15, 2009). 
4 Mobil Corporation and others v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, decision 
on jurisdiction (June 10, 2010). 
5 Phoenix Action Ltd. v. Czech Republic, op. cit., at 113 and 144 (internal citation omitted). 





International investment law and media disputes: A complement to 
WTO law 
 
Luke Eric Peterson* 
 
The recent high-stakes dispute between Google and China over censorship and cyber-
security has spawned renewed discussion of the international trade law protections that 
Internet and media companies may enjoy.1 Less recognized, however, is a perhaps more 
powerful legal tool in the arsenal of Internet and media companies engaging in cross-
border investments, namely international investment law.2 
 
A vast architecture of international treaties has been established to protect flows of FDI 
from discriminatory or arbitrary treatment, (uncompensated) expropriation, and other 
forms of mistreatment by host country governments. Legal disputes under these 
investment protection treaties are on the rise, with foreign investors often taking 
advantage of dispute settlement mechanisms that permit them to sue a host government 
for cash damages in case of alleged breach of treaty obligations. Moreover, a small but 
growing number of international arbitrations taking place between foreign investors and 
governments arise out of disputes over the treatment of media enterprises. These cases 
offer tantalizing hints as to the broad potential impact of investment protection treaties to 
advance freedom of expression and freedom of the media -- as well as some hints as to 
the limitations of these international investment pacts. 
 
Uses of BITs by media organizations 
 
Where media actors are wholly or partially foreign-owned, there may be scope to 
challenge a wide range of government actions as breaches of investment protection 
treaties. Such treaties provide specific legal protections for failure by the host state to 
compensate for direct or indirect expropriations or for breach of international investment 
law standards such as “fair & equitable treatment,” “full protection & security” or 
“national treatment.” Similar legal protections are also found in a growing number of 
Free Trade Agreements, including the North American FTA (NAFTA), Central American 
FTA (CAFTA) and numerous bilateral FTAs (including US-Peru and US-Singapore). 
While not directly aimed at the protection of expressive rights, those standards may 
protect foreigners and foreign-controlled organizations from government actions 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank Mark Kantor, José Alvarez, Jürgen Kurtz, and Andrew Newcombe for their 
helpful comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on January 27, 2010. He also 
thanks Toby Mendel, Senior Legal Counsel with Article 19, for earlier feedback on the ideas discussed 
herein. 
1  “Clinton urges global response to internet attacks,” New York Times, January 22, 2010, at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/world/asia/22diplo.html?emc=eta1. 
2 See, however, the work of Columbia University President Lee C. Bollinger for a discussion of the 
protections afforded by international human rights, trade and investment law. Lee C. Bollinger, 
Uninhibited, Robust, and Wide-Open: a Free Press for a New Century (New York: OUP, 2010). 
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designed to limit freedom of expression. For example, if a host state shuts down a 
foreign-controlled media company in reaction to the company’s broadcasting of a speech 
by an opposition leader, a foreign owner might argue that these actions constitute 
expropriation or breach of other international investment law protections such as “fair 
and equitable treatment.” Similarly, if a state refuses to provide a foreign-owned media 
operation with protection from a mob reacting violently to news reporting by that 
company, the foreign owners might argue that the state has breached its obligation to 
provide “full protection and security” to the investment. Foreign-owners of newspapers, 
radio stations, television outlets, and publishing houses have already begun to sue host 
countries on the international playing field for alleged mistreatment.3 Although most of 
these disputes are commercially-oriented and relate to tax, licensing or regulatory 
matters,4 others have touched on politically-motivated expropriations of media outlets 
during military coups or alleged discrimination against publishers who publish political 
opposition literature.5 
 
Challenges and opportunities 
 
The growing potential for media enterprises to rely on the protections of international 
investment treaties is likely to prompt debate as to the limits of such protections, and the 
discretion afforded to governments to regulate expression so as to uphold public morals, 
national security or other state interests. In a related vein, we may see further debate as to 
the relationship and overlap of investor protection law and human rights law. Already, 
international arbitrators have consulted human rights law for inspiration and guidance 
when dealing with certain investment disputes that touch upon questions of due process 
or denial of justice. It seems likely that, as arbitrators are asked to grapple with disputes 
arising out of alleged censorship or crack-downs on the media, they may look at how 
such matters are handled by human rights courts, and perhaps national courts such as the 
Supreme Court of the United States, even if the rulings of such bodies are not decisive for 
international arbitrators. In particular, arbitrators may look for guidance to the approach 
of human rights adjudicators with respect to permissible limits on freedom of expression, 
for reasons of national security, public safety or other considerations. While not strictly 
binding in the context of investment treaty disputes, human rights law may provide useful 
analogies or insights. 
 
                                                
3 Newspapers: Victor Pey Casado and President Allende Foundation v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/98/2, (September 25, 2001); Radio: Joseph C. Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, 
(September 18, 2000); Television: CME v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, (September 13, 2001), Ronald 
Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, (September 13, 2001), and European Media Ventures v. Czech 
Republic, UNCITRAL, (July 8, 2009); Publishing: Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/18, (July 26, 2007). 
4 Media licensing disputes under investment treaties can bear close resemblance to claims lodged under 
human rights adjudicative mechanisms. Compare, the investment treaty arbitration, Joseph Charles Lemire 
v. Ukraine, where Ukraine was held liable for certain breaches in relation to its handling of radio licensing 
applications, and an ECHR case where similar broadcast licensing actions were framed as breaches of 
human rights law: Meltex Ltd and Mesrop Movsesyan v. Armenia, Application No. 32283/04, Judgment 
(June 17, 2008). 
5 See Pey Casado v. Chile and Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, op. cit. 
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Although there are clear signs that media organizations may enjoy some protection under 
international investment treaties, these agreements are not a panacea for the range of 
challenges posed to freedom of expression. Not only are the protections of such treaties 
limited to foreign investors, the structure of such agreements -- including the provision of 
costly international arbitration -- mean that they are of most use in disputes where large 
sums of money are at stake.6 
 
Indeed, in an unfortunate twist, arbitration of disputes between media companies and 
governments can sometimes play out in confidence -- away from the prying eyes of 
journalists and the public -- thanks to the confidentiality that is the default position under 
certain arbitration rules. Thus, whatever its potential value to media enterprises, it should 
be noted that the international law protecting foreign investment could have broader 
impacts upon freedom of expression that need to be closely monitored. Foreign 
investments outside of the media sector, particularly in extractives or energy sectors, can 
be controversial and lead to serious conflict, particularly in developing countries. MNEs 
sometimes bring pressure to bear upon host countries to crack down on local activists or 
campaigners. At times, foreign investors may argue that governments are legally obliged 
to provide “full protection and security” against local critics or campaigners. In such 
cases, arbitrators will need to ensure that the security-interests of foreign-owned 




There are growing signs that investment treaty protections -- while rarely discussed in 
media or human rights law circles -- may be surprisingly useful in some cases of 
repression or censorship of foreign-owned media. While there is growing debate as to the 
uses of World Trade Organization agreements to combat certain forms of state repression 
of media actors, less attention has been paid to the potential of international investment 
law to combat certain forms of state censorship and repression. With the US Department 
of State now signaling that Internet freedom should be advanced through US foreign 
policy, it remains to be seen whether the US negotiating position on international 
investment treaties will shift so as to embrace this foreign policy objective. Ongoing 
investment treaty talks between the US and China could provide the obvious forum for 
this issue to be raised and debated. 
  
                                                
6 While effective as a bulwark against expropriation or arbitrary license cancellations, these international 
investment agreements may offer less value in situations where media repression is targeted at particular 
journalists or their reporting methods. See for example the recent battle at the ECHR between the Financial 
Times and the United Kingdom over the protection of confidential journalist sources, which appears to be a 





Is a model EU BIT possible -- or even desirable? 
 
Armand de Mestral C.M.* 
 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which entered into force 
on December 1, 2009, extends the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) articles 206 and 
207 to embrace “foreign direct investment.” This raises the question of whether the EU is 
now in a position to adopt a model BIT articulating a common policy on FDI. An EU 
policy on FDI could replace the disparate efforts of the 27 member states, complementing 
and reinforcing their efforts and presenting a stronger image to the world, especially at a 
time when the EU appears to have lost ground to other jurisdictions as a preferred 
destination for FDI.1 
 
Suggesting the preparation of an EU model BIT for treaty relations with third states 
assumes that the EU is empowered to do so and has the competence to negotiate and 
ultimately to implement any such agreement. However, despite the expansion of the CCP 
to include FDI, there remain many doubts as to the capacity of the EU to embark on such 
a course alone. The obstacles are at once political (the reluctance of member states to 
abandon their authority here) and legal (the limited competence under the CCP to 
regulate the internal market). In this context, three models can be envisaged: (1) a BIT 
binding all EU member states and concluded by the EU alone; (2) a BIT concluded as a 
mixed agreement (signed by both the EU and each member state); or (3) a BIT relating to 
EU action alone. Given the circumstances, the negotiation and implementation of a model 
BIT may only be possible as a mixed agreement with the willing concurrence of member 
states. 
 
EU competence over the CCP is exclusive, which has led some to suggest that member 
states must cease to negotiate BITs now that TFEU articles 206 and 207 are in place.2 
However, it is by no means clear what the new CCP competence embraces. The CCP has 
been read by the European Court of Justice to focus essentially outward, seemingly 
giving the EU authority to set the conditions for admission of foreign investment into the 
internal market, including the types of FDI and investors allowed and the conditions at 
the point of entry. But it is not clear that the CCP covers regulation of the standards of 
treatment of FDI in the internal market, as well as guarantees against performance 
requirements and expropriation. The TFEU does not define “foreign direct investment,” 
and the definition seems to exclude portfolio investment. It is also uncertain that the EU 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank Marc Bungenberg, Jan Winter, Joern Griebel, and Thomas Eilmansberger for 
their helpful comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on March 24, 2010. 
1 See chapter 9 above, José Guimón, “It’s time for an EU investment promotion agency.” 
2 Marc Bungenberg, “The politics of the European Union`s investment treaty making,” in Tomer Broude, 
Marc L. Busch and Amy Porges, eds., The Politics of International Economic Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), at 17, working paper available at:  
http://www.asil.org/files/ielconferencepapers/bungenberg.pdf; Christian Tietje, 
 “Die Außenwirtschaftsverfassung der EU nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon,” Beiträge zum Transnationalen 
Wirtschaftsrecht, vol. 83 (2009), p. 19. 
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could commit to all forms of investor state arbitration. Certainly it could not commit to 
ICSID procedures, as it is not a state. A further complication, which it shares with several 
federal states, is that it may not be able to recover the damages that it might be 
condemned to pay on behalf of member states’ peccadilloes. 
 
Given these limitations, a unilateral EU BIT would not be the equivalent of the standard 
BITs between member states and third states: hardly an attractive negotiating position 
from which to start. Further questions remain:  Would an EU BIT protect only against EU 
action or against the acts of all member states? If MFN and national treatment are 
offered, what will be the comparator -- the EU or member states’ action? Would the EU 
seek to renegotiate the hundreds of BITs with third states? If this were attempted, there 
are many pitfalls in renegotiating BITs, at least with those countries that are already 
actively seeking to get out of their existing BIT obligations. In this regard it should be 
noted that hundreds of “outdated” air transport bilateral agreements still remain in place 
due to inertia and the difficulties of renegotiation. 
 
A related legal issue is posed by the 191 existing BITs between member states. Are they 
to disappear as did air transport bilateral agreements when EU competence over air 
transportation was exercised after 1989? So far, only the Czech Republic is willing to 
abandon its intra-EU BITs -- perhaps because it has been an unsuccessful respondent in 
several investor-state claims? 
 
One should note that there is already a partial model EU BIT: the Minimum Platform for 
Investment for the EU FTAs. This is a curious document prepared by the Directorate 
General for Trade in 2006,3 focused primarily on establishment and trade in financial 
services providing investment services. It provides guidance to negotiators of EU trade 
agreements who may have a mandate to include provisions related to investment. It does 
not read like a standard BIT, and it would have to be considerably amended and 
expanded to serve as a genuine model BIT. 
 
Surely a common legal standard regulating FDI in the EU is an eminently sensible goal: it 
would replace 27 competing jurisdictions with one high standard of protection; it would 
allow the EU to present a common face to the world on FDI issues; and it would serve as 
a powerful incentive to promoting global standards. But it would be foolish to minimize 
the obstacles that lie in the path of this laudable goal. 
  
                                                
3 Council of the EU, Brussels 6 March 2009, 7242/09, Limited; first issued as Minimum platform on 
investment for EU FTAs – Provision on establishment in template for a Title on “Establishment, trade in 
services and e-commerce,” Note to The 133 Committee, European Commission DG Trade, Brussels, 28 
July 2006, D (2006) 9219. It must be noted that this document, although available on several NGO 





International investment arbitration: Winning, losing and why 
 
Susan D. Franck* 
 
We know several things about foreign investment. First, foreign investment matters, 
reaching US$ 1.7 trillion in 2008. Second, we know that foreign investors have new 
international law rights to protect their economic interests. Third, we know that those 
rights are now being used. So since we now know that the international legal risk is not 
illusory, the real questions are: who wins, who loses and why? While various 
commentators have asserted a variety of answers to those questions, many have done so 
without reference to valid and reliable data.1 In its most benign form, these observations 
create misinformation, but perhaps more troublingly, might also lead to policy choices 
based upon unrepresentative anecdotal evidence, supposition or political rhetoric. To help 
alleviate these possible outcomes, this Chapter reviews recent empirical research2 in 
order to provide basic information to fundamental questions about investment treaty 
arbitration (ITA) to create a more accurate framework for policy choices and dispute-
resolution strategies. 
 
So who does win and lose international investment treaty arbitration? The answer is: both 
foreign investors and host states win and lose.3 The data suggest, however, that they lose 
in reasonably equivalent proportions. Not including the disputes that ended with an award 
embodying a settlement, respondent governments, for example, won approximately 58% 
of the time. Meanwhile, investors won 39% of the cases.4 
 
Winning and losing, however, is not just about whether there is a breach of the 
underlying investment treaty. The amount awarded is also critical. Despite the fact that 
                                                
* The author wishes to Andrea Bjorklund, Christopher Drahozal, Mark Drumbl, Ian Laird, Clint Peinhardt, 
Andrea Schneider, Jason Yackee, and David Zaring for their helpful comments on this chapter, which was 
first published as a Perspective on June 15, 2009. 
1 See, e.g., Press Release, Food and water watch, World Bank court grants power to corporations (April 30, 
2007), available at: http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/press/releases/world-bank-court-grants-power-to-
corporations-article12302007. 
2 See Susan D. Franck, “Empirically evaluating claims about investment treaty arbitration,” North Carolina 
Law Review, vol. 86 (2007) 1, pp. 16-23 [hereinafter Evaluating Claims] (describing the method of 
gathering data from publicly available arbitration award to identify 102 public awards from 82 disputes that 
resulted in 52 final determinations); Susan D. Franck, “Development and outcomes of investment 
arbitration awards,” Harvard International Law Review, vol. 50 (2009) 2, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1406714 [hereinafter Development and Outcomes] 
(conducting chi-square and analyses of variance tests at significance levels of α = .05). 
3 This Chapter defines “winning” and “losing” using quantitative measures: (a) a binary yes/no answer 
about whether a government breached a treaty, or (b) a scaled quantitative variable of damages awarded. 
Qualitative approaches might assess experiences with ITA and measure “success” differently. Subjective 
approaches could consider how parties, with varying levels of familiarity with ITA, and other situational 
differences understand success. 




investors claimed US$ 343 million in damages on average, that is not what they received. 
Rather, tribunals awarded investors only US$ 10 million on average. This US$ 333 
million difference is not insubstantial, and it may give investors a basis for some 
reflection about the value of arbitration -- particularly given the need to pay the arbitral 
tribunal and the other legal costs associated with bringing a claim.5 
 
Knowing which parties actually win and lose begs a further question -- namely: why are 
parties successful? This question is critical given suggestions that ITA is potentially 
biased.6 There has been some debate about whether respondents’ development status or 
whether arbitrators come from the developing world improperly affects outcome. If these 
development variables cause particular results, this would raise issues about the integrity 
of investment treaties and arbitration. 
 
To address this critical issue, recent research considered whether there was a reliable 
statistical link between the level of development and ITA outcomes. The results suggest 
that development variables did not generally cause particular outcomes. One study found 
that there was no relationship between a government’s level of development and the 
outcome of ITA.7 A second study then showed that -- at a general level -- outcome was 
not reliably associated with the development status of the respondent, the development 
status of the presiding arbitrator, or some interaction between those two variables. This 
held true for both: (1) winning or losing investment treaty arbitration, and (2) amounts 
tribunals awarded against governments. Follow-up tests in the same study showed, 
however, that there were two statistically significant effects -- found in one sub-set of 
potentially non-representative cases -- that suggest arbitration must be used carefully in 
certain situations. Only where the presiding arbitrator was from a middle income country, 
the data showed that high income countries received statistically lower awards than: (1) 
upper-middle income respondents, and (2) low income respondents. Nevertheless, in 
other circumstances involving middle income presiding arbitrators or all cases involving 
presiding arbitrators from high-income countries, the amounts awarded were statistically 
equivalent.8 In other words, in limited circumstances, tribunals with presiding arbitrators 
from middle-income countries made awards that tended to favor developed countries and 
were different than one might expect from chance alone. 
 
The overall results cast doubt on the arguments that: (1) ITA is the equivalent of tossing a 
two-headed coin to decide disputes, (2) the developing world is treated unfairly in ITA, 
                                                
5 Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims, op. cit., pp. 49-50, 64. 
6 See e.g., Third World Network, Finance: Bias Seen in International Dispute Arbiters, June 22, 2007 
(JUN07/02), available at: http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/finance/twninfofinance060702.htm (“A little-
known entity closely affiliated with the World Bank that mediates disputes between sovereign nations and 
foreign investors appears to be skewed toward corporations in Northern countries”); Gus Van Harten and 
Martin Loughlin, “Investment treaty arbitration as a species of global administrative law,” European 
Journal of International Law, vol. 17 (2006). (“No matter how well arbitrators do their job, an award will 
always be open to an apprehension of an institutional bias against the respondent state”). 
7 Susan D. Franck, “Considering recalibration of international investment agreements: Empirical insights,” 
in José E. Alvarez, Karl P. Sauvant and Kamil Gerard Ahmed, eds., The Evolving International Investment 
Regime: Expectations, Realities, Options (New York: OUP, 2009). 
8 Franck, Development and Outcomes, op. cit. 
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and (3) arbitrators from the developed and developing world decide cases differently. The 
evidence creates a basis for cautious optimism about the integrity of ITA and suggests 
radical overhaul, rejection or rebalancing of these procedural rights is not necessarily 
warranted. While the follow-up tests and limitations of the data suggest optimism must be 
tempered properly, a sensible approach would involve creating targeted solutions to 
address particularized problems and enacting targeted reforms to redress perceived 
concerns about the international investment regime. 
 
Ultimately, the data suggest that investors and governments won and lost in relatively 
equal measure, but governments won a bit more. While the data show also that, when 
they did win, investors ended up with substantially less than they requested. Moreover, 
the data do not establish that a respondent’s development status was a reason why 
investors or governments were successful in pursuing arbitration. This suggests that why 
a party wins or loses arbitration may ultimately have more to do with factors other than 
development, such as the merits of a particular claim or defense. Other factors may also 
be linked with outcome, such as the business sector involved, the amounts claimed or the 
type of host state government, but they may not necessarily cause particular results. This 
suggests that although there are risks in pursing arbitration, there will be times when it is 







Thinking twice about a gold rush: Pacific Rim v El Salvador 
 
Gus Van Harten* 
 
Whether it concerns oil drilling or gold mining, sometimes a government, facing new 
circumstances, must change its mind. This reality creates a tension in law between 
encouraging stability and allowing adaptation to new information and new situations. The 
“gold rush” CAFTA lawsuits against El Salvador reveal this tension. 
 
Pacific Rim, a Canadian-based mining firm, has brought one of two gold mining lawsuits 
against El Salvador under CAFTA.1 Since the early 2000s, Pacific Rim has spent money 
looking for gold in El Salvador. It did so under exploration (but notably not exploitation) 
licences that were issued in 1996 and that Pacific Rim acquired in 2002. A few years 
later, after Pacific Rim decided where it wanted to dig, the government had adopted a 
more cautious position on gold mining. So, Pacific Rim has invoked its privilege -- 
uniquely available to foreign investors under international law, via investment treaties -- 
to sue El Salvador. It argues that the government should have allowed it to mine for gold; 
the government responds that Pacific Rim failed to satisfy steps in the approvals process, 
including an acceptable environmental assessment. Pacific Rim seeks at least US$ 77 
million for its costs and hoped-for profits. 
 
El Salvador is a small, poor country with precariously few water resources. It lost 20% of 
its surface water in the past 20 years, and 95% of the rest is reportedly contaminated.2 
Industrial gold mining is a recent prospect for the country, and there are serious concerns 
about the risks it poses to people’s health and livelihoods, especially their access to clean 
water. 
 
How should the tension here between stability and change be resolved? 
 
On the one hand, it seems unfair that a company that put money into exploration should 
be frustrated when applying for permission to exploit what it has found. On the other 
hand, all mining companies must be aware that a government might change its approach 
over time to health and environmental risks of mining. If taxpayers had to compensate 
everyone who lost out in bets on the social or environmental feasibility of a project, this 
would disadvantage those who are more prudent, patient, or environmentally conscious. 
The question of how the arbitrators in PacRim Cayman LLC v. El Salvador might resolve 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on this chapter, which 
was first published as a Perspective on May 24, 2010. 
1 The second lawsuit is by US-based Commerce Group Corporation. I focus on the Pacific Rim case here 
because there is more information publicly available about it. 
2 Richard Steiner, “El Salvador: gold, guns, and choice,” Report for the International Union for the 




this tension is challenging to answer. Although not the fault of the arbitrators, it raises 
some important concerns. 
 
First, under CAFTA and other investment treaties, the constraints put on governments are 
both exceptionally potent and highly malleable. This makes it very important, and yet 
very difficult, to assess the legal standards that will apply in particular cases. In numerous 
awards to date, tribunals have interpreted provisions on expropriation, national treatment 
and fair and equitable treatment in starkly divergent ways. In turn, they have fuelled high-
stakes uncertainty in the evaluation of policy space and litigation risk. 
 
Second, investment treaties rely on the remedy of damages in cases often stemming from 
difficult judgment calls by governments in complex areas of policy. This can put 
arbitrators in a bind. Do they order a state to pay damages after finding that it violated an 
unclear rule? Or do they dismiss the claim, leaving the investor reeling after a long, 
expensive arbitration? Compared to other forms of public law judging, the system gives 
few options to respond to government conduct that is characterized, well after the fact, as 
unlawful. 
 
Third, the use of arbitrators instead of judges to decide basic tensions in public policy 
makes it essential that the process be credible and independent. However, investment 
treaty arbitration lacks key safeguards of independence that apply to courts, including 
security of tenure, an objective method of assigning judges to specific cases, and checks 
on income-earning activities outside of the judicial role. 
 
This invites unsavoury questions. What are the business interests of the arbitrators chosen 
to decide a case? With whom might they have a common outlook at the International 
Chamber of Commerce, ICSID and others that wield key powers over arbitrator 
appointments? By allowing the arbitration industry to make final decisions in matters of 
public law, investment treaties remove longstanding safeguards that protect judges from 
economic and financial entanglement and that ensure public confidence in the courts. 
 
How should governments respond? One option is to re-introduce a mediating role for 
domestic courts, including perhaps the courts of neutral states not involved in a specific 
dispute. Another is to look for ways to re-introduce safeguards of judicial independence, 
such as by designating a roster of eminent jurists, drawn from outside the commercial 
arbitration industry, from which arbitrators would be chosen. 
 
On the rules, governments could clarify that investment treaties are designed to offer an 
exceptional remedy in cases of serious abuse or targeted discrimination against a foreign 
investor, but not a wide-ranging opportunity to challenge general laws and policies. 
Nearly all government measures harm some people while helping others, not because this 
is the aim of the regulation but because all general decisions, by definition, have ripple 
effects across the economy and society. Requiring public compensation for those foreign 
investors who are “harmed” by a general measure skews markets, as well as regulation, 




There are various ways to address the lack of independence, fairness and coherence in 
investment treaty arbitration. But the root questions are familiar. How should the tension 






Mining for facts: PacRim Cayman LLC v El Salvador 
 
Alexandre de Gramont* 
 
In the above chapter, Professor Gus Van Harten uses the PacRim v. El Salvador 
arbitration, pending at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID), as the basis for asserting a number of criticisms against the overall system of 
arbitration under investment treaties. 
 
The problem is that Van Harten has embraced a version of the facts that is very similar to 
that promulgated by the Government of El Salvador (GOES), without even 
acknowledging the allegations made by PacRim. The one-sided presentation of the facts 
contributes, in part, to a critique of the system that is off-target. 
 
I must disclose that I serve as counsel for the claimant in the PacRim case. Given that 
Van Harten has effectively presented only El Salvador’s side of the case, I will briefly 
present the claimant’s side here. The juxtaposition of PacRim’s version of the facts 
against El Salvador’s helps demonstrate why the issues posed by these cases are often 
more complex than presented in the above Chapter -- and why a neutral, independent 
system to resolve these disputes is so important. 
 
Van Harten’s premise is that GOES had to act against PacRim because of environmental 
concerns that GOES did not previously recognize when it invited PacRim to invest in the 
country, and when GOES enacted the mining and environmental laws under which 
PacRim carried out its activities in El Salvador. According to Van Harten, the issue is 
simply whether and how an investor should be given redress when a government has 
acted reasonably to safeguard its environment. But according to PacRim, GOES did not 
act reasonably, rationally or fairly. PacRim’s project would have set new standards for 
environmentally clean gold mining in the Americas. 
 
PacRim -- led by a group of geologists who are dedicated to green mining and sustainable 
development -- searched throughout Latin America before choosing this location in El 
Salvador. PacRim chose the site in large part because its geology allows for extremely 
clean, underground mining, with very limited surface disturbance and virtually no 
possibility of ground water contamination. The project would easily meet the regulatory 
requirements of any developed country where gold is mined (including, for example, 
Sweden, Canada, and the United States), while also bringing enormous economic benefits 
to an especially impoverished region of an already poor country. 
 
But El Salvador’s regulators never ruled on PacRim’s application. Nor have any of the 
laws and regulations under which PacRim invested in El Salvador been changed. Rather, 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank Todd Arena, Jan Paulsson and Gus Van Harten for their helpful comments on 
this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on September 8, 2010. 
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in the midst of a difficult election campaign, then-President Saca -- attempting to outflank 
his opposition on the left -- announced that his administration would not grant any more 
mining permits. The only “changed circumstances” here involve a highly-charged 
political situation, where wildly inaccurate information and accusations against PacRim 
have made any rational, informed or balanced discussion of the issue impossible. The real 
question posed by these circumstance is: in what forum are both sides most likely to 
receive a fair, neutral and objective hearing on their respective cases? 
 
Van Harten is critical of the system’s use of independent arbitrators. He suggests that it 
would be better for government appointed judges to hear these cases, or that it would be 
preferable to select arbitrators from “a roster of eminent jurists, drawn from outside the 
commercial arbitration industry.” But governments like El Salvador’s agreed to have 
these cases heard by independent arbitrators, who are not selected by states or 
governmental organizations, to remove any appearance of governmental influence or pro-
government bias. 
 
Van Harten’s suggestion that the “business interests” of the independent arbitrators who 
hear these cases are unknown -- possibly raising conflicts of interest -- is inaccurate. Each 
side typically picks an arbitrator, and the chair is usually appointed upon agreement of the 
parties. The arbitrators and their backgrounds are well known to the parties. Indeed, the 
parties and lawyers who use the system have effectively created a de facto list of 
arbitrators with significant experience in these cases. It includes former judges and 
government officials, law professors and private lawyers. In the PacRim case, the three 
arbitrators (an Argentine lawyer, a French law professor and an English barrister) not 
only have diverse backgrounds; they have collectively served as arbitrators in over 
twenty investor-state cases. 
 
While Van Harten is correct that there have been some inconsistent and contrary rulings 
issued by tribunals in these cases, the same is true for virtually any court and any legal 
system. For the most part, the arbitrators are acutely aware of their obligation to create a 
consistent, transparent and predictable body of investment laws. Van Harten is also 
correct that there is room for improvement. But much has been accomplished and 
improved in a system that was hardly used ten years ago. The drafters of CAFTA (which, 
along with El Salvador’s Investment Law, provides the basis for PacRim’s claims) and 
other so-called “new generation” treaties have attempted to address various critiques of 
earlier treaties. Among other things, CAFTA provides for great transparency, in which all 
of the pleadings and briefs, as well as the hearing, are public. In PacRim, the hearings 
have been broadcast live via the Internet (and can still be watched on ICSID’s website). It 
is difficult to envision a better way to resolve the factual (and legal) dispute between 
PacRim and El Salvador -- and perhaps to improve the system through a candid, open and 






The public law challenge: Killing or rethinking international investment 
law? 
 
Stephan W. Schill* 
 
At the heart of the so-called “legitimacy crisis” of international investment law, 
prominently reflected in the Public Statement on the International Investment Regime,1 is 
what I call the public law challenge. It builds on the observation that one-off appointed 
arbitrators, instead of standing courts, review government acts and reach far into the 
sphere of domestic public law by crafting and refining the standards governing investor-
state relations. Arbitrations against Uruguay and Australia concerning cigarette 
packaging are the most recent examples of genuinely public law disputes now settled in 
arbitration. The disputes about Argentina’s emergency legislation and Canada’s ban on 
pesticides are others. These arbitrations create friction with domestic public law as 
arbitrators, having little democratic legitimacy, often operate in non-transparent 
proceedings and produce increasing amounts of incoherent decisions. 
 
Many domestic public lawyers, and also some international lawyers, therefore view 
investment treaty arbitration as a threat to public law values, such as democracy and the 
rule of law.2 Comforted by the recent trend among states to recalibrate their investment 
treaty policies, or even to withdraw from the ICSID Convention, some demand a return to 
domestic law and domestic courts.3 This, however, is not desirable when domestic 
systems do not offer sufficiently independent and effective protection against undue 
government interference. Notwithstanding, international investment law will continue to 
face calls for increased transparency and for leaving states sufficient policy space -- 
precisely because of the impact of investment treaties on domestic public law. Unless 
international investment law and investment arbitration allow public law values to thrive, 
the present system may succumb to the public law challenge. That is why international 
investment law should tackle this challenge by enculturating public law thinking. 
 
We should thus explore how public law can help rethink rather than kill investment 
arbitration, namely by expanding public law thinking into international investment law.4 
Along these lines, investment treaty standards should be understood as standards of 
public law that can be further concretized by comparative law methods. Investment 
tribunals, in turn, should understand themselves as exercising a form of, albeit 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank José Alvarez, Giorgio Sacerdoti, Michael Waibel and André von Walter for 
their helpful comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on January 30, 2012. 
1  “Public statement on the international investment regime,” August 31, 2010, available at: 
http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public_statement. 
2 See Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford: OUP, 2007); David 
Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization: Investment Rules and Democracy’s Promise 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
3 See supra note 1. 




internationalized, judicial review, similar to that of administrative or constitutional courts, 
and as being engaged in public law adjudication rather than pure commercial arbitration. 
After all, investment arbitration is not only about settling individual disputes under the 
principle of party autonomy, but about implementing principles of good governance and 
the rule of law for international investment relations.  
 
Given that the global nature of international investment law prohibits solutions tied to 
singular national laws, arbitral tribunals should draw on comparative public law, both 
domestic and international (for example, WTO law, human rights law, EU law), and on 
that basis develop general principles of public law applicable as a recognized source of 
international law.5 This should promote the use of proportionality analysis to balance 
investors’ rights and host states’ regulatory interests, and help to relate investment law 
concepts, such as the protection of legitimate expectations, to principles of public law. 
Similarly, comparative public law can help rethink investment arbitration procedure, for 
example, by outlining appropriate public law standards of review, or by developing a 
convincing conceptual basis for transparency and third-party participation.6 All this 
should reinject legitimacy into investment law by stressing parallels with domestic public 
law. 
 
The utility of such an approach has already fallen on fertile ground in practice. The 
tribunals in Total v. Argentina7 and Lemire v. Ukraine8 interpreted the fair and equitable 
treatment standard by drawing on domestic and international public law. As these 
decisions show, comparative public law is a useful tool because traditional methods of 
treaty interpretation and recourse to customary law face limits in concretizing investment 
law principles for the modern regulatory state. Taking the public law challenge seriously, 
therefore, does not mean killing international investment law. What is needed is not so 
much institutional change of the present system nor a return to domestic law, but a 
change in the mindset of those active in the field. Arbitrators, to start with, should draw 
more extensively on comparative public law concepts when applying and refining 
investment treaty standards and should reconsider their own role, and their 
responsibilities, as public law adjudicators who have an impact not only on the dispute 
before them but on the entire system of international investment protection. 
  
                                                
5 See Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
6 These issues, amongst others, are explored in the book referred to supra note 4. 
7 Total S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, decision on liability (December 27, 2010), at 111 
and 128-134. 










As arbitration has grown by leaps and bounds, so has the role of the party-appointed 
arbitrator. Surprisingly, this has not led to increased inquiry into the appropriateness of 
having arbitrators appointed by the parties in general, or in arbitrations against states in 
particular. In my judgment, party-appointed arbitrators should be banned unless their role 
as advocates for the party that appointed them is fully disclosed and accepted. Until this 
is done, arbitration can never meet its aspiration of providing dispassionate adjudication 
by those with special skills and experience in a process designed to combine efficiency 
with expertise. 
 
The incentive of the party and its counsel is to appoint an arbitrator who will win the case 
for them. That incentive will be particularly strong when its case, on its merits, is not 
particularly strong. It may well be argued that it is a lawyer’s duty to appoint someone 
who is most likely to obtain the best result for the client, regardless of whether, 
objectively, the law and the facts favor its case. Once selected, an arbitrator’s personal 
incentive is to secure reemployment by providing his or her party with a favorable 
outcome. This is not necessarily bad. In US domestic arbitration, a party-appointed 
arbitrator is exactly that: an advocate on the panel. If that is clear, fully disclosed and 
accepted, it adds another option to the arbitral process. But in international arbitration, the 
party-appointed arbitrator is expected to be objective and impartial. I believe the reality is 
that many, if not most, of those party-appointed arbitrators respond to their personal 
incentives and become to a certain extent party advocates within a system that expects 
them to behave objectively. The subject of repeat arbitrators, irrespective of who appoints 
them, poses additional difficulties to the international arbitrations system that cannot be 
discussed in this short article.1 
 
I believe true objectivity is possible only if all arbitrators are prepared to rule against the 
party that appointed them exactly as if they had been sitting as sole arbitrators. In my 
experience, that condition is not met in most cases. I have personally encountered this 
pressure. While I made clear to the lawyer who selected me that I would decide the case 
on its merits, I could not help feeling influenced by the knowledge that the lawyer who 
appointed me had done so because he had judged that that would best serve his client’s 
interests. While Alexis Mourre argued that party-appointed arbitrators are selected for 
their reputation of impartiality,2 I disagree. I believe that lawyers feel that their duty to 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank Ed Kehoe, Jan Paulsson and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful 
comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on December 14, 2010. 
1 For further discussion of repeat arbitrators see Fatima-Zahra Slaoui, “The rising issue of ‘repeat 
arbitrators’: a call for clarification,” Arbitration International, vol. 25, no. 1 (2009), pp. 103-119. 
2 Alexis Mourre, “Are unilateral appointments defensible? On Jan Paulsson’s moral hazard in international 
arbitration,” Kluwer Arbitration Blog, Oct. 14, 2010, http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2010/10/05/are-
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advocate for their clients’ interests takes precedence over institutional concerns. 
 
Even if arbitrators are willing to rule against the party that appointed them, there are still 
ways in which they can influence the final outcome of a case to favor their party. For 
example, they may try to persuade the other panel members to reduce the award in favor 
of their party in return for joining them in a unanimous award. This compromise will 
ordinarily be attractive to the chair of the panel, for his or her reputation for obtaining 
unanimous awards may increase the likelihood of being appointed to future panels. Even 
if the award is not affected, the party-appointed arbitrator may bargain for not awarding 
counsel fees. The panel has a great deal of leeway in that regard, and party-appointed 
arbitrators may save the parties that appointed them a great deal of money by eliminating 
counsel fees or reducing the size of the awards. 
 
It might be argued that these are relatively minor disadvantages, that there is virtually 
always reason for compromise and that this is an acceptable price to be paid. But it is not 
only untoward compromises that the institution of party-appointed arbitrators promotes. 
The presence of a partisan arbitrator on a panel will normally reduce, if not eliminate, the 
free exchange of ideas among the members of the panel. The chair will be less receptive 
to arguments that appear to be moved by partisan considerations or may join one of the 
arbitrators, with the result that the other party-appointed arbitrators feel excluded from 
the deliberations. The Lauder arbitration against the Czech Republic provides an 
excellent example of these dynamics. In that case, a party-appointed arbitrator stated that 
he had been excluded from the panel discussion. I believe it was the response of a party-
appointed arbitrator to these structural incentives that caused one of the great failures of 
international arbitration, the Multinovic arbitration. 
 
This conflation of personal and professional incentives is particularly inappropriate in 
international investment disputes, in which arbitral decisions can affect the state and its 
people. Decisions binding them should not be rendered by privately selected arbitrators, 
but by arbitrators selected by truly neutral institutions. The drafters of the ICSID 
Convention realized this by reserving for the ICSID Secretariat the power to appoint the 
members of the panels that review first-instance decisions. In my judgment, all arbitrators 
sitting in investment disputes should be appointed by a neutral institution; bilateral 
investment treaties should be amended to achieve this. International investment 
arbitration would thus set a potent example for general emulation in international 
arbitrations. 
  







Is the party-appointed arbitrator a “pernicious institution”? A reply to 




Some readers of the Columbia FDI Perspective No. 33 of December 14, 2010 may have 
been surprised to read Hans Smit’s contribution against party-appointed arbitrators. The 
opening of his Perspective could not be expressed in more sweeping terms: “In my 
judgment, party-appointed arbitrators should be banned unless their role as advocates for 
the party that appointed them is fully disclosed and accepted. Until this is done, 
arbitration can never meet its aspiration of providing dispassionate adjudication...” 
 
Criticisms of the appointment of arbitrators by parties are not novel, but it is surprising to 
see them raised by such a highly regarded and senior member of the international arbitral 
community as Professor Smit. I consider his views too negative: appropriate safeguards 
exist to take care of his concerns. He considers that, while in international commercial 
arbitration party-appointed arbitrators are expected to be objective and impartial (and not 
become advocates of the parties appointing them, as he claims is the reality in the US), 
party-appointed arbitrators “respond to their personal incentives and become to a certain 
extent party advocates.” I do not believe that the responsible, reputable lawyers available 
for such appointments are amenable to these temptations, especially considering the 
control that arbitral institutions exercise. 
 
The first argument for retaining the current system is based on the very nature of 
arbitration that distinguishes this process from adjudication by permanent courts endowed 
with ex-ante jurisdiction on litigants. 
 
By contrast, arbitration remits to the parties the choice of adjudicators. Internationally, 
this approach is even more attractive. Arbitration allows the parties to agree on such basic 
issues as applicable laws and jurisdiction, language and seat of the arbitration, avoiding 
hurdles that hamper the judicial solution of a transnational dispute and its enforcement. 
The ability to select arbitrators is prominent among the elements favoring arbitration as it 
reflects the expectations of the appointing party regarding nationality, language, cultural 
background, and legal and technical expertise. Acceptance of the ultimate result (the 
award) by the parties is enhanced by their trust in the arbitral process where consent -- 
including consent regarding the adjudicator -- replaces judicial authority. Various 
precautionary devices have been introduced, mostly through practice, to ensure that these 
advantages are not undermined by the parties’ abuse of power. 
 
The first such device is the general recognition that arbitrators are not agents of the 
parties appointing them but rather trustees who have to decide the dispute fairly, 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank Emmanuel Gailllard, Loretta Malintoppi and Catherine Rogers for their 
helpful comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on April 15, 2011. 
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according to applicable substantive and procedural rules reflecting the common intention 
of the parties to resort to arbitration. 
 
Secondly, the rules of arbitral institutions often provide for a monitoring of the selection 
of arbitrators by the parties. Local courts, or foreign courts under the New York 
Convention of 1958 where recognition is sought, are empowered to control whether basic 
rules of due process have been respected. 
 
Thirdly, arbitration rules require that arbitrators be impartial and independent in general, 
including as regards party-appointed arbitrators toward the parties appointing them. 
Arbitration rules also require that arbitrators disclose situations giving rise to potential 
conflicts of interest. The IBA Guidelines on Conflict of Interest in International 
Arbitration of 2004 are intended to enhance standards as part of the development of 
uniform best practices. Their first General Principle states that “[e]very international 
arbitrator shall be impartial and independent of the parties at the time of accepting an 
appointment and shall remain so until the final award has been rendered.” 
 
Prof. Smit fears nonetheless that the lack of impartiality of a party-appointed arbitrator 
may unduly influence outcomes. Thus, in order to reach a unanimous award, a tribunal 
might incline toward the argument put forward by one of the parties without proper 
justification. Empirical evidence from the rejection of most disqualification requests 
confirms that the great majority of arbitrators are serious professionals who take care and 
pride in being independent and impartial. If a party-appointed arbitrator is biased he or 
she will end up in the minority. On the other hand, there is nothing wrong if such an 
arbitrator shares in good faith the position of the party who has made the appointment. 
 
Finally, one has to consider the alternatives to the appointment of arbitrators by the 
parties. Who would systematically make all appointments? In ad hoc arbitration, the issue 
would have no easy solution. In administered arbitration, the task entrusted to the 
institution in charge of the process would be challenging. Lists would have to be kept, 
transparency requirements for the choices would become paramount and other types of 
influences and pressures might derail the fairness of the process. More decisively, 
international commercial arbitration would lose one of its fundamental features, 
becoming a kind of international quasi-judicial mechanism. Such a system could not be 
compelled on parties that could migrate to institutions more deferent to their choices. 
 
As to investment arbitration, Prof. Smit’s argument that arbitral decisions that can affect 
the State and its people “should not be rendered by privately selected arbitrators but by 
arbitrators selected by truly neutral institutions” carries more weight. In selecting an 
arbitrator in such disputes, parties may wish to look more closely at the general profiles 
of candidates and at their positions on relevant issues. To avoid a “conflation of personal 
and professional incentives” in investment arbitration that institutions can detect, it has 
been suggested that advocates be barred from acting as arbitrators. 
 










The legitimacy of investment arbitration becomes increasingly questioned, with liberal 
states like Australia moving away from the regime. Defenders seek to ensure the survival 
of this regime of asymmetric investment protection, using a variety of techniques. The 
conservation of the gains of property protection has resulted in novel arguments relating 
to the existence of a global administrative law and standards of global governance.1 
These arguments seek to preserve an approach associated with the failure of market 
fundamentalism and global economic crises. As long as the inequity contained in 
regulatory restraints of the system affected only the powerless states, it operated with 
vigor; but with powerful states feeling the effects of regulatory restraints of investment 
treaties, there has been movement away from the earlier premises of the established 
regime. 
 
The idea that international investment agreements (IIAs) had brought about a standard of 
governance began to recede when the United States, the proponent of strong standards of 
investment protection, began to retreat, in its own model treaty, by providing that 
regulatory expropriations are not compensable “except in rare circumstances;”2 the fair 
and equitable standard is nothing more than the customary international minimum 
standard; national security preclusion is a matter for subjective assessment; and measures 
taken to promote health and welfare of society are justifiable. The US policy and its 
newer treaty provisions (e.g. in the US-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement) states that the 
standards of protection are the same in domestic law as well as in its treaties; this is an 
espousal of the consistently rejected Calvo doctrine. The US Model Treaty (2012) 
confirms these trends.3 The uncertainties introduced into US treaties have made the 
outcome of arbitration less predictable for foreign investors. 
 
These developments are beginning to be replicated in the treaty practices of other states. 
In this context of change, it is futile to argue that the old neo-liberal system of investment 
protection can be kept alive through constitutional or public law principles. When the US 
and Canada, two states sharing a language and culture, cannot agree on the domestic 
public law standards of property, it would be futile to search for a common universal 
standard of public law on a subject that attracts many ideological, cultural and even 
religious divisions. International law must not, as in the past, become the means by which 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank David Schneiderman and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful 
comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on July 16, 2012. 
1 See generally, Stephan Schill, ed., International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (New 
York: OUP, 2010). 
2 2004 US Model BIT, annex B, section 4(b), available at: 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf. 
3 The text is at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf. 
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hegemonic states impose principles on the basis of a pretense such as a higher standard of 
civilization or better standards of governance. 
 
It is best to start anew in the context of the developments that have taken place, such as 
the recognition of competing interests of the sustainable use of resources, the pursuance 
of social interest in the health and welfare of communities, human rights considerations 
in the conduct of business, and corporate social responsibility. The existing regime 
suffers from inconsistent awards, allegations of bias against the limited number of 
arbitrators who are called upon and the efforts of law firms to develop strategies of 
litigation that states hardly contemplated when negotiating investment treaties. 
 
A truly justice-centered regime that shows concern for the interests of the poor is better 
than a regime that is geared to promote the narrow interests of the rich. The new regime 
should not restrict the regulatory space of governments to take measures for the 
advancement of its people, their environmental and human rights interests and their 
economic development. A regime must be constructed that gives rights to foreign 
investors while respecting the needs of the people of the host state of which the foreign 
investor has, by consent, become a part. The past, prior to the neo-liberal approach, had 
solutions. In fact, the early treaty regime was in itself such a solution. It could be 
improved, with states retaining greater control over the interpretation of treaties rather 
than abdicating that function to arbitrators. There were contractual solutions that, due to 
greater access to information, can be more transparent than before. Diplomatic protection 
still remains a possibility. A system of dispute settlement with adequate controls over the 
interpretation of treaties by the state parties and manned by designated government 
lawyers could be devised to deal with egregious instances of denial of justice to foreign 
investors by domestic courts. Foreign investors may be given standing to plead before 
such a system through a nominated body of lawyers. Contract-based systems in which the 
rights of foreign investors could be specified are preferable. The parties could then 
negotiate their own protection subject to rules of transparency and devise their own 
methods of dispute settlement, subject to constraints in local laws and to the primacy of 
local courts to first deal with the dispute. 
 
The Osgood Hall Public Statement on International Investment Law makes a good 
beginning for this venture.4  
                                                







The (lack of) women arbitrators in investment treaty arbitration 
 
Gus Van Harten* 
 
Investment arbitration has a remarkably poor record on representation of women. This 
calls for reform of the appointments process for arbitrators, who make important policy 
choices in the context of global governance. 
 
In 249 known investment treaty cases until May 2010, there were 631 appointments. Of 
these, 41 were appointments of women -- just 6.5% of all appointments. Worse, of the 
247 individuals appointed as arbitrators across all cases, only 10 were women. Women 
thus comprised 4% of those serving as arbitrators (annex table). 
 
The story is also almost entirely that of two women, Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and 
Brigitte Stern, who together captured 75% of appointments of women. In contrast, the 
two most frequently appointed men accounted for 5% of the 593 appointments of male 
arbitrators (for more on the data, see below). 
 
Representation of women is important, not because women would necessarily make 
different choices than men, but because arbitrators who make decisions of public 
importance should reflect the make-up of those affected by their decisions. 
Representation of women is among the most obvious components of this principle. 
Reflecting this, states have well-established obligations to take appropriate measures to 
ensure equality between women and men and to afford women the same employment 
opportunities as men.1 
 
To their credit, a few states appear to have driven appointments of women arbitrators. 
These include Argentina (5 women of 29 appointments), Turkey (2 of 6), the United 
States (2 of 9), Bolivia (1 of 2), and Georgia (1 of 2). 
 
On the whole, though, the system’s performance has been abysmal. By comparison, 
women have been much better represented among international (and many domestic) 
judiciaries. For example, women made up 32% of European Court of Human Rights 
appointees (26 of 82 judges) since 1995 and 19% of Appellate Body members (4 of 21 
members) in WTO history. Incidentally, on a perusal of the data, the system’s record on 
racial and regional representation also appears poor. 
 
The record thus gives reason to doubt the existing appointments process in international 
investment arbitration. Based on that process -- which is ad hoc, partly-privatized and 
conducted under acute litigation pressure -- men have devoured the opportunities. 
 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank George Bermann, Ken Davies, Anthea Roberts, and Detlev Vagts for their 
helpful comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on February 6, 2012. 
1 CEDAW Convention, Articles 3 and 11b. 
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Although not the only option, a direct and practical solution is to adopt a mandatory 
roster system. This would permit a publicly accountable and deliberative process of 
appointments, free from the strategic pressures that arise after a dispute has been 
registered. It would also enable more detached attention by states to representation, 
including ways to overcome possible barriers to participation by women, such as the 
concentration of men in major law firms or differential family responsibilities of women. 
 
Likewise, a roster system would improve quality, if based on an open and merit-based 
process, including consultation with investor organizations and other interest groups. 
Advice on suitable candidates could be sought from organizations such as the 
International Association of Women Jurists, the International Federation of Women 
Lawyers or Arbitral Women. Besides tapping the knowledge and networks of these 
organizations, involving them directly would help loosen the hold of the boys’ club. If the 
roster itself did not achieve this end, then states could move to mandatory representation 
of particular groups on the roster. 
 
Importantly, a roster system would enhance the independence and public accountability 
of the system, especially if all arbitrators had to be selected from the roster (preferably by 
lottery or rotation). Related to this, the roster would need to be kept to a reasonable size 
(unlike the ICSID roster) in order to ensure a reasonable distribution of appointments 
among its members. 
 
Alternative options to enhance representation appear less effective or less comprehensive. 
For example, one could introduce annual quotas for the appointing bodies under the 
treaties, but this would require acceptance by a range of public and private bodies or 
would depend on a claimant’s choices of arbitration rules. Also, this alternative would 
cover only some presiding members of tribunals and very few, if any, party-appointed 
arbitrators. 
 
On the other hand, a roster could be designed to cover all investment treaty arbitrations 
based on a separate agreement to clarify or supersede existing investment treaties. An 
expert advisory body could be charged with recommending candidates based on merit. 
Further, to avoid possible frustration of the roster by one or a few states, an ultimate 
decision-maker -- such as the President of the International Court of Justice -- could be 
designated as the final appointing authority. 
 
To summarize, the reliance on ad hoc appointments by the disputing parties has failed to 
ensure adequate representation of women. A mandatory roster would permit states to 
address this directly. It would also enhance public accountability and independence by 
giving states the responsibility to select those eligible for appointment and by providing a 
degree of secure tenure for the arbitrators. 
 
Of course, there would be challenges in designing and implementing a roster system. But, 
as an outside observer, I see no clearer way to address this and other problems plaguing 
the status quo. 	   	  
 
195 
Annex table. Appointments of women arbitrators in known investment treaty cases, to May 2010 
 
Note: Data were collected from all known investment treaty cases that had led, by May 1, 2010, to a 
confirmed award on jurisdiction or, in the case of the North American Free Trade Agreement, to the filing 
of a notice of claim. The data track changes in tribunal membership at the stage of the establishment of a 
tribunal, an award on jurisdiction, an award on the merits, and an award on damages. In some cases, it was 
not possible to identify who was appointed as arbitrator based on publicly available primary documents. 
	  
Arbitrator Appointment history Total 
appointments 
Giuditta Cordero Moss Bogdanov v Moldova (sole arbitrator) 1 
Susana Czar de Zaluendo Vieira v Chile (investor) 1 
Tatiana de Maekelt LG&E v Argentina (presiding) 1 
Merit E. Janow Mobil v Canada (unconfirmed) 1 
Gabrielle Kaufmann-
Kohler 
Saipem v Bangladesh (presiding) 
Chemtura v Canada (presiding) 
Burlington Resources v Ecuador (presiding) 
Duke Energy v Ecuador (presiding) 
Noble Energy v Ecuador (presiding) 
Jan de Nul v Egypt (presiding) 
Bayinder v Pakistan (presiding) 
Austrian Airlines v Slovakia (presiding) 
AWG v Argentina (investor) 
CGE/ Vivendi v Argentina (No 2) (investor) 
EDF v Argentina (investor) 
Suez & InterAguas v Argentina (investor) 
Suez & Vivendi v Argentina (investor) 
Mobil v Venezuela (investor) 
PSEG v Turkey (state) 
Quiborax v Bolivia (unconfirmed, presumed presiding) 
Vattenfall v Germany (unconfirmed) 
17 
Carolyn Lamm ADF v United States (state) 1 
Lucinda Low CCFT v United States (state) 1 
Sandra Morelli Rico Anderson v Costa Rica (presiding) 
Sempra v Argentina (state) 
Camuzzi v Argentina (No 1) (state) 
3 
Fern M. Smith Apotex v USA (unconfirmed) 1 
Brigitte Stern  Pheonix Action v Czech Republic (presiding) 
BP America v Argentina (state) 
El Paso v Argentina (state) 
Pan American v Argentina (state) 
Burlington Resources v Ecuador (state) 
Occidental Petroleum v Ecuador (No 2) (state) 
Jan de Nul v Egypt (state) 
Alapli Electrik v Turkey (state) 
Vannessa Ventures v Venezuela (state) 
Barmek v Azerbaijan (unconfirmed) 
Quiborax v Bolivia (unconfirmed, presumed state) 
Itera v Georgia (unconfirmed, presumed state) 
Gustav Hamester v Ghana (unconfirmed) 
AES Summit v Hungary (No 1) (unconfirmed, presumed 
state) 
14 
Total appointments: 631 
Men: 590 
Women: 41 (16 state, 7 investor, 13 presiding, 5 unknown) 





State-controlled entities as claimants in international investment 
arbitration: An early assessment 
 
Michael D. Nolan and Frédéric G. Sourgens* 
 
State-controlled entities (SCEs) are increasingly important participants in international 
investment flows and international trade. Cumulative FDI by sovereign wealth funds has 
reportedly reached US$ 100 billion. SWFs are significant equity investors in, and provide 
significant debt financing to, every kind of company, from professional sports franchises 
to container ports. In addition to the role of these funds, national oil companies are 
growing in regional and international importance. In many countries, other industries are 
also increasingly government-owned. 
 
Not surprisingly, SCEs already act as claimants in contractual arbitrations, frequently 
conducted ad hoc or under the UNCITRAL arbitration rules. Examples from the 2009 
American Lawyer Arbitration Scorecard include arbitrations instituted by the National 
Property Fund of the Czech Republic against Nomura Bank, as well as by Sonatrach, the 
Algerian national gas company, against Repsol and British Petroleum.1 Contractual 
arbitration thus may sidestep many of the complex issues treaty arbitrations may raise for 
SCEs. With that said, SCE cases may encounter some unique issues at the enforcement 
stage. The New York Convention allows the following reservation by member states: 
“This State will apply the Convention only to differences arising out of legal 
relationships, whether contractual or not, that are considered commercial under the 
national law.” This reservation has been made by such diverse states as Argentina, China, 
Cuba, Ecuador, Greece, India, Nigeria, the Philippines, the United States, and 
Venezuela.2 Whether a dispute involving an SCE as Claimant would be considered 
“commercial” under the national law of these states may differ from situation to situation 
-- leaving some SCE claimants with potential enforcement issues depending upon the 
case and jurisdiction in which enforcement might be sought. 
 
How and when SCEs can participate in international investment arbitration, as opposed to 
strictly contractual arbitrations, likely soon will emerge as a complex question. SCEs 
facing a dispute with a host state government to which an international investment 
agreement (IIA) could apply may wish to use treaty arbitration as an alternative or 
additional means of dispute resolution. SCEs may prefer the enforcement mechanisms of 
                                                
* This chapter benefited from the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment’s 
Roundtable on State and State-Controlled Entities as Claimants in International Investment Arbitration on 
March 19, 2010 (for the report of that Roundtable, see www.vcc.columbia.edu). The authors also wish to 
thank Efi Chalamish, Robert Howse and Edward Kehoe for their helpful comments on this chapter, which 
was first published as a Perspective on December 2, 2010. 
1  Michael D. Goldhaber, American Lawyer Arbitration Scorecard 2009 – Contracts, available at: 
http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202431683613&hbxlogin=1. 
2 See Status, 1958 - Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, (b), 
available at: http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last 
visited September 16, 2010) (listing both the reservation and the states that have made it). 
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the ICSID Convention. SCEs may consider that host state treatment violated a treaty 
provision without breaching the underlying contract. Finally, SCEs may seek to invoke 
access to market provisions in bilateral investment treaties if an investment contract is not 
concluded or revoked at an early stage in a transaction for the SCEs deems to be 
improper political reasons. 
 
SCE treaty claims face two different types of jurisdictional hurdles: first, a SCE must 
satisfy the requirements of the underlying IIA; second, in the case of ICSID arbitration, 
the SCE also must fall within the scope of the ICSID Convention. SCEs can invoke IIAs 
only if they are qualifying “investors.” Most definitions of “investors” in IIAs were 
drafted prior to considerations of SCE claimants. Some refer to “legal entities, including 
company, association, partnership and other organization, incorporated or constituted 
under the laws and regulations of either Contracting Party and have their headquarters in 
that Contracting Party.”3 Others, such as the definition of Saudi investors in the bilateral 
investment agreement between Saudi Arabia and the People’s Republic of China, include 
expressly “Institutions and authorities such as the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 
Public Funds, Development Agencies and other similar governmental institutions having 
their head offices in Saudi Arabia.”4 This issue will have to be parsed on a case-by-case 
basis. But as the Saudi example shows, treaties may expressly include some SCEs in the 
definition of investor. 
 
The ICSID Convention may present additional hurdles. The ICSID Convention applies to 
disputes of host states and nationals of other states and not to disputes between two states. 
Whether an SCE is a “national” may be subject to a formal or a functional analysis. Many 
ICSID tribunals have applied a functional test that looks to whether the SCE acted as an 
agent of the state or performed a state function. This question also must be addressed on a 
case-by-case basis.5 
 
The role of SCEs as claimants in international investment arbitrations likely will evolve 
in the near future. It can be anticipated that, in some instances at least, these arbitrations 
will run in parallel to contract arbitrations. A key question in treaty arbitrations will be 
whether the SCE qualifies as an “investor” under the treaty. Similarly, SCE claims will 
explore the limits of disputes between two states and disputes between a state and a 
national of another state under the ICSID Convention. The answer to both questions will 
                                                
3 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Government of the People's 
Republic of China concerning Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Art. 1(2)(b), IC-BT 525 (2004). 
4 Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Art. 1(2)(b)(3), IC-BT 462 (1996). SCEs were 
of particular importance to that agreement. 
5See Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, (January 25, 2000), paras. 
74-79, IIC 85 (2000) (dealing with a SCE as a defendant); Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka AS v Slovakia, 
Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No ARB/97/4, para. 17, IIC 49 (1999). So far, at least 
two ICSID cases have been commenced by SCEs. See Government of the Province of East Kalimantan v. 
PT Kaltim Prima Coal (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/3) (the Award rendered in that case is not publicly 
available); Tanzania Electric Supply Company Limited v. Independent Power Tanzania Limited (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/98/8) (that case is currently subject of an interpretation proceeding). 
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inform the ongoing global policy debate about the proper role of SCEs in international 
investment flows. 
 
Given that jurisprudence and scholarship are still in an early stage of development, the 
challenge may be resolved first at the treaty drafting stage. As the example of the Saudi 
treaty shows, treaty parties may, if deliberate about the potential issues associated with 
SCEs acting as claimants, reflect their specific intentions in their negotiated definition of 
the term “investor.” With progress on the treaty front, it is to be expected that the issues 
faced by tribunals applying IIAs, as well as the ICSID Convention, similarly would 
become clearer. Until that time, however, each case will have to be examined on its own 
merits. What can be said at this point is that it is likely that some SCEs would pass muster 







The standing of state-controlled entities under the ICSID Convention: 




The ICSID Convention, under Article 25(1), applies only to those investment disputes 
that are between a contracting state and a “national” of another contracting state. Given 
that limitation, and in light of the significant and growing amount of foreign investment 
by state-controlled entities (SCEs),1 ICSID tribunals likely will need to address one 
fundamental issue with greater frequency: whether disputes arising from SCE 
investments constitute investor-state disputes falling within, or state-to-state disputes 
falling outside of, the scope of the ICSID Convention.2 
 
For claims submitted to ICSID arbitration by SCEs, arbitral tribunals consistently have 
found that such entities meet the “national” requirement under Article 25(1), often 
without analysis of how investor-state and state-to-state disputes should be distinguished 
under the provision.3 
 
One tribunal, however, has addressed that distinction. In the CSOB v. The Slovak 
Republic case, the tribunal first observed that Article 25(2) defines “National of another 
Contracting State” to include both “natural” and “juridical” persons, but that neither of 
those terms is “defined as such in the Convention.”4 The tribunal then turned to “the 
accepted test” -- formulated by Aron Broches -- for analyzing the “national” requirement 
with respect to a “mixed economy company or government-owned corporation”: whether 
the entity acts as an agent for the government or discharges an essentially governmental 
function.5 
 
Applying that test, the CSOB tribunal concluded that, so long as a state-controlled 
claimant’s activities are commercial in nature, the claim does not give rise to a state-to-
state dispute, even if the claimant’s activities are “driven by” governmental policies and 
even if the entity is controlled by the state such that it is “required” to do the state’s 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank Tom Johnson, Bart Legum and Jeremy Sharpe for their helpful comments on 
this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on April 16, 2012. 
1 See, e.g., Karl P. Sauvant and Jonathan Strauss, “State-controlled entities control nearly US$ 2 trillion in 
foreign assets,” Columbia FDI Perspective, No. 64 (April 2, 2012). 
2 For fuller discussion of the issue, see Mark Feldman, “The standing of state-owned entities under 
investment treaties,” in Karl P. Sauvant, ed., Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 
2010/2011 (New York: OUP, 2011). 
3 See, e.g., Hrvatska v. Slovenia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24, decision on the treaty interpretation issue 
(June 12, 2009); CDC v. Seychelles, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/14, award (December 17, 2003); Telenor v. 
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, award (September 13, 2006). 
4 CSOB v. The Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, decision on objections to jurisdiction (May 
24, 1999), at 16. 
5 Ibid., at 17. 
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“bidding.”6 According to the CSOB tribunal, the purpose -- as distinguished from the 
nature -- of a state-controlled claimant’s activities is not relevant when determining 
whether the claimant meets the “national” requirement under Article 25(1).7 
 
That finding is in tension with two key aspects of the ICSID Convention. First, the ICSID 
Convention was intended to apply to private, but not public, foreign investment. Second, 
the ICSID Convention was intended to respond to a procedural gap that existed between 
state-to-state disputes (which could be resolved in, among other fora, the International 
Court of Justice), and disputes between private entities (which could be resolved through 
domestic courts or commercial arbitration).8 Each of those factors supports consideration 
of not only the nature, but also the purpose, of a state-controlled claimant’s activities 
when determining whether the claimant meets Article 25(1) requirements. 
 
First, regarding private foreign investment, the World Bank had considered, prior to the 
adoption of the ICSID Convention, how to contribute to the investment climate in light of 
the quantitative and qualitative importance of private foreign investment for 
development.9 That contribution ultimately took the form of the ICSID Convention, 
which opens by recognizing “the need for international cooperation for economic 
development, and the role of private international investment therein....” Consistent with 
that preambular clause, “States acting as investors have no access to the Centre in that 
capacity.”10 
 
Second, regarding the ICSID Convention’s role in addressing a procedural gap between 
state-to-state and purely private disputes, “there was general agreement” from the outset 
of ICSID Convention negotiations that state-to-state, as well as purely private, disputes 
should be excluded from ICSID jurisdiction.11 That exclusion is reflected not only in 
Article 25(1), but also Article 27, which prohibits diplomatic protection and thus denies 
the investor’s state of nationality access to the Centre.12 In addition, a proposal by “a 
number of governments” to create a limited exception to the state-to-state exclusion -- 
which would have permitted contracting states to submit subrogation claims to ICSID 
arbitration -- faced “vigorous” opposition and ultimately “was dropped.”13 
 
Given the above two factors, the motivations driving the activities of a state-controlled 
claimant should be considered under Article 25(1). A failure to consider such motivations 
risks sweeping into ICSID arbitration public foreign investment disputes between states, 
which would exceed clear ICSID Convention boundaries. 
  
                                                
6 Ibid., at 20 and 24. 
7 Ibid., at 21. 
8 See Aron Broches, Selected Essays: World Bank, ICSID, and Other Subjects of Public and Private 
International Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), p. 167. 
9 Ibid., p. 193. 
10 Christoph Schreuer et al., The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), p. 161. 
11 Broches, op. cit., p. 167. 
12 Schreuer et al., op. cit., pp. 186–187. 





State-controlled entities as “investors” under international investment 
agreements 
 
Jo En Low* 
 
A review of the definition of “investor” and investor-state dispute resolution clauses in 
851 international investment agreements (IIAs)1  reveals that, except in two, state-
controlled entities (SCEs) (sovereign wealth funds and state-owned enterprises (SOEs)) 
have equivalent standing to their purely private counterparts as investors under such IIAs. 
 
In particular, of the 851 IIAs reviewed:2 
 
• 691 IIAs do not define “investor” such that it would exclude SCEs as the definition is 
not based on the nature of ownership but, rather, on whether a legal person was duly 
constituted, incorporated, established, or organized in accordance with the law of a 
contracting party. Therefore, if an SCE is established as required under the law of a 
contracting party, it qualifies as an “investor.” 
• 81 IIAs define an “investor” to include a “state enterprise” as well as entities that are 
government owned and controlled, thereby expressly capturing SCEs. 
• 52 IIAs explicitly provide that an “investor” includes the government of a contracting 
party and/or such contracting party itself. Such IIAs do not preclude a contracting 
party from acting in the capacity of an investor through an SCE. 
• None of the IIAs exclude SCEs from the definition of an “investor” on the basis that 
such entities have not been organized primarily for the purpose of profit or do not 
carry out investments motivated by pecuniary gain. Thus, the IIAs do not appear to 
disqualify certain SCEs, such as government institutions, development funds and 
monetary agencies that may not strictly be established for pecuniary gain. 
• Only two IIAs expressly exclude the SOEs of one contracting party.3 Both IIAs were 
concluded in 1983 and are otherwise silent on the status of SOEs. 
• 33 IIAs do not contain a definition of “investor.” 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank Stanimir Alexandrov, Mark Feldman and Thomas Johnson for their helpful 
comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on October 8, 2012. The author also 
wishes to thank Loren Anderson, John Coleman, Martin Delaroche, Tomasz Koziel, Rabih Maalouf, and 
Vera Shikhelman for their assistance in reviewing the non-English IIAs. 
1 The IIAs reviewed include the bilateral investment treaties (BITs) of countries that account for 70% of 
world foreign direct investment outflows in the period 2008-2010; BITs of certain countries, such as the 
United Arab Emirates, that are home to the top ten largest SWFs as ranked (by assets under management) 
by the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute; the model BITs of Canada, France, Germany, Norway, United 
States, and United Kingdom; a cross-section of regional free trade agreements (FTAs) with investment 
chapters, such as the North-American Free Trade Agreement and the Association of South East Asian 
Nations Comprehensive Investment Agreement; as well as bilateral FTAs to which at least one of the 
sample states is a party; and multilateral agreements such as the Energy Charter Treaty. 
2 The figures below do not add up to 851 as the IIAs falling in the second and third category below overlap 
in some cases. 




Therefore, SCEs generally have recourse to the investor-state dispute resolution 
provisions of IIAs as “investors.” In particular, as approximately 78% of the IIAs 
surveyed allow for investor-state dispute resolution before the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) pursuant to the Convention on the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID 
Convention), in most cases, SCEs will have recourse to the ICSID dispute resolution 
framework as “investors.” 
 
There is some debate among scholars regarding whether SCE access to the ICSID 
framework as investors should be limited if the IIA otherwise covers SCEs in the 
definition of an “investor.” The text and negotiating history of the ICSID Convention do 
not unequivocally address the standing of SCEs as a diverse class of investors. In 
addition, the handful of ICSID arbitral decisions which have addressed this issue did not 
establish clear guidelines regarding the extent to which SCEs are able to initiate claims as 
investors under IIAs.4 
 
We should be mindful that if indeed SCE access to the ICSID framework as investors is 
somehow limited as suggested by certain scholars,5 SCEs might well turn to other 
avenues of dispute resolution. The majority of IIAs that grant SCEs access to ICSID also 
enable SCEs to elect to refer an investment dispute to an arbitral institution other than 
ICSID, such as the International Chamber of Commerce, and/or pursuant to arbitral rules 
other than the ICSID Convention, such as those of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law. 
 
As the number of treaty-based investment arbitrations is growing alongside increased 
levels of foreign direct investment by SCEs,6 it is likely that investment disputes 
involving SCEs as claimants will occur with greater frequency going forward. Thus, in 
the long term, any limits on the access of SCEs to ICSID may diminish the institutional 
significance of ICSID.  
                                                
4 See e.g. Československa Obchodní Banka, A.S. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, decision 
on objections to jurisdiction (May 24, 1999). 
5 See e.g. Paul Blyschak, “State-owned enterprises and international investment treaties: When are state-
owned entities and their investments protected?,” Journal of International Law and International Relations, 
vol. 6 (Spring 2011), pp. 1-52, at 29-34; and Mark Feldman, “The standing of state-owned entities under 
investment treaties,” in Karl P. Sauvant, ed., Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 2010-
2011 (New York: OUP, 2011), pp. 615-637. 
6 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2011 (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2011) and UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note, no. 





The world economic crisis as a changed circumstance 
 
Hermann Ferre and Kabir Duggal* 
 
In September 2008, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers sent financial markets in the 
United States into a spin. Credit markets froze as banks began to mistrust counterparties, 
not knowing the extent of toxic assets in loan portfolios that could lead to another major 
bank collapse. The crisis quickly spread around the world. Governments were urged to 
take drastic measures. Experts discussed the possible nationalization of portions of the 
US banking industry and other sectors. Other countries also considered measures to save 
key industries. 
 
In the world of investor-state arbitration, many predicted that national measures to 
combat the economic crisis would result in treaty claims.1 Commentators also warned 
states to heed the lessons of Argentina, which was unable to escape its treaty obligations 
by invoking a state of necessity. Predicted investor claims included violations of non-
discrimination, fair and equitable treatment (FET) and expropriation provisions. 
 
There is little evidence that the investment treaty regime anticipated the possibility of a 
worldwide economic crisis like that of 2008-2010. While claims against states responding 
to the crisis have yet to materialize, most investment treaties are silent with respect to a 
limitations period. Such claims may appear long after the crisis. States have, however, 
another defense: changed circumstances.2 
 
The defense typically has arisen in the context of treaty termination, but an unexplored 
aspect is a temporary suspension of treaty obligations. Different from necessity and force 
majeure, the defense of changed circumstances, classically known as rebus sic stantibus,3 
is tailor-made for this crisis. Its literal meaning -- “things standing thus” -- refers to the 
expectations of the parties and the circumstances existing at the time a treaty was 
negotiated. In the context of investor claims arising from governmental responses to the 
crisis, the crisis itself is a fundamental change, not anticipated under the economic model 
                                                
* The authors wish to thank Pieter H.F. Bekker, August Reinisch and M Sornarajah for their helpful 
comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on August 1, 2011. 
1 See Anne van Aaken and Jürgen Kurtz, “The global financial crisis: Will state emergency measures 
trigger international investment disputes?” Columbia FDI Perspectives, No. 3 (March 23, 2009); Joshua 
Fellenbaum and Christopher Klein, “Investment arbitration and financial crisis: The global financial crisis 
and BITs,” 3(6) Global Arbitration Review (2008). 
2 International law has recognized thisdefense; see, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT), Article 62. 
 
3 The portion of the doctrine raised here focuses on the legitimate expectations of the parties, rather than 
excuses for non-performance. Provisions regarding necessity and force majeure are generally addressed in 





on which the current treaty system is based, i.e., the “circumstances” existing in the 
1990s. Some states can argue credibly that they did not cause the crisis, yet their 
economies were greatly affected. Under these changed circumstances, a state should be 
able to enact emergency economic measures to sustain critical national industries. 
 
If the investment treaty regime is to remain sustainable, should a state not be permitted to 
suspend its treaty obligations during exceptional circumstances? Article 62 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) permits temporary suspension but provides 
no guidance.  The circumstances that have changed must have constituted an “essential 
basis” of the parties’ consent, and the change must “radically transform” the extent of 
obligations. The VCLT permits the state to terminate the treaty entirely or temporarily 
suspend its obligations.  A temporary suspension -- a more limited response -- logically 
should require a lower standard.  The VCLT uses the same standard for both 
actions.  This is perhaps the reason why Article 62 has been invoked rarely by states 
seeking to defend against claims relating to measures taken to address unanticipated 
crises. A mere suspension of treaty obligations would strengthen the treaty system by 
making it resilient. The standard for suspension, while remaining high, should take into 
account exceptional circumstances. A workable approach might include: (i) an 
unforeseen global crisis; (ii) causing considerable hardship to significant populations; (iii) 
not a consequence of the state’s own actions; (iv) suspension is made in good faith with 
the expectation of resuming obligations; and (v) suspension is reasonable under the facts 
and circumstances. 
 
As the economic crisis has required many countries to undertake protective measures, the 
suspension of rights and obligations might be the most desirable option. The risk of not 
permitting suspension might cause states to consider less desirable alternatives when 
claims are asserted.4 Questions regarding the length of suspension, and which rights and 
obligations are suspended, are subjective. Arbitrators could make such determinations in 
light of facts and circumstances. Recognition that suspension of treaty obligations might 
be appropriate under certain circumstances will not weaken the treaty system but 
strengthen it. 
  
                                                
4 States already have shown skepticism toward this treaty regime. See Osgoode Hall Law School, York 
University, Public Statement on International Investment Regime, (2010); George Kahale, III, “A problem 





The global financial crisis: Will state emergency measures trigger 
international investment disputes? 
 
Anne van Aaken and Jürgen Kurtz* 
 
Several developed countries have introduced emergency measures to mitigate the effects 
of the global financial crisis, including Australia, Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. Although the measures taken are still undergoing changes by the 
executive branch and are thus a “moving target,” our survey reveals early evidence of 
differentiation between foreign and domestic actors in the emergency plans adopted by 
this sample grouping. It is this differentiation that may give rise to liability as breaching 
guarantees against discrimination of foreign investors under international investment law. 
 
In general, the emergency measures passed to date can be grouped into three broad 
categories: (1) measures designed to bolster the stability of the financial services 
industry; (2) measures directed at the financial services industry but structured to increase 
the availability of credit to other sectors of the economy; and (3) general fiscal measures 
designed to boost public spending and targeting select and strategic industries (including 
the automotive industry). Our focus is on the first and second categories, which we regard 
as presently most likely to engage international investment law. 
 
The emergency measures 
 
The extensive measures undertaken in this first category are designed to increase the 
confidence of market participants and to ensure the continuation of bank funding. They 
encompass liquidity support, recapitalization (through share purchases or otherwise), 
purchase of specific assets (including “toxic” bank assets), inter-bank (wholesale) lending 
guarantees and increases in retail deposit guarantees. 
 
Australia and Ireland have introduced new insurance schemes for retail deposits, 
wholesale lending, and, in Ireland’s case, guarantees for covered bonds, senior and dated 
subordinated debt. Both measures triggered flight of wholesale capital from excluded 
foreign bank branches to domestic guaranteed institutions. Those countries are not alone 
in building adverse incentives for regulatory arbitrage. The financial stabilization 
programs in Germany and the United Kingdom cover only financial institutions with their 
seat in the respective country and also exclude branches of foreign institutions (as 
authorized deposit takers). In contrast, Switzerland has elected to bail out specific 
institutions taken to be of systemic importance. To date, the benefits of this program have 
only been extended to one Swiss bank -- UBS -- with a promise to do the same for 
another, Credit Suisse. The US Emergency Economic Stabilization Act authorizes 
purchase of distressed assets (especially mortgage-backed securities) in financial 
                                                
* The authors wish to thank Jose Alvarez, James Mendenhall, and Christoph Schreuer for their helpful 
comments on this chapter, which was first published as a Perspective on March 23, 2009.  
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institutions if they have “significant operations” in the United States. Early reports 
suggest that domestic US institutions are the majority if not exclusive recipients of capital 
injections under the scheme. If this trend continues, there may be differentiation against 
foreign institutions as a matter of fact, even if not on the face of the law. The second 
category of emergency measures also targets the finance sector but is designed to directly 
foster the provision of credit throughout the economy. Both the United Kingdom and 
Germany have structured their plans so that participants must support lending to credit 
worthy borrowers -- mainly small to medium sized enterprises -- as a condition of the 
receipt of governmental support. Much again will depend on how this aspect of the 
scheme is implemented in practice. If this condition leads to the provision of credit solely 
to national industry, this too will evidence differentiation against foreign actors as a 
matter of fact, even if not on the face of the law. 
 
Implications under international investment law 
 
There are approximately 2800 bilateral and regional investment treaties (including 
investment chapters in free trade agreements) in operation across the globe. Except for 
Ireland, the countries we have surveyed have all entered into multiple investment treaty 
commitments. Most of the newer investment treaties of the sample grouping have been 
signed with developing countries and Eastern European states. On first view, this might 
preclude claims by foreign investors of OECD countries against other OECD countries 
since there are almost no investment treaties in operation among them, although they are 
both the source and the target of the major financial transactions. However, treaty 
shopping might enable investors to make use of an investment treaty by channeling their 
investment through any other country that has concluded a BIT with an OECD country.  
Furthermore, older investment commitments -- including Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation treaties -- remain in operation across a range of OECD countries (including a 
number of countries we have surveyed). These treaties usually allow disputes to be 
brought before the International Court of Justice and, at least in the case of the US, may 
be self-executing as a matter of US constitutional law giving investors of a state-party the 
ability to initiate claims before US courts.1 
 
Newer investment treaties normally confer direct rights of international dispute 
settlement on foreign investors of a signatory state. The ability to do so will depend 
initially on whether the measures in question fall within the scope of a given treaty 
instrument. Investment treaties commonly structure their operations on an expansive 
“negative list” system (whereby all government measures including those relating to the 
finance sector are covered unless specifically exempted). This is in contrast to more 
conservative scheduling systems such as the “positive list” method of the WTO General 
Agreement on Trade in Services. 
 
If action is brought, there is a possibility that the measures we have surveyed may attract 
liability under investment treaty commitments or in certain national courts. In particular, 
we see a case for breach of the obligation to accord national treatment. These measures 
may also breach the “fair and equitable” standard, most notably its limitation on 
                                                
1 Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 US 332 (1924). 
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discriminatory conduct on the part of a signatory state. There is, however, considerable 
uncertainty both in arbitral jurisprudence and among commentators on the precise outer 
contours of the “fair and equitable” guarantee. With that in mind, we focus our analysis 
on national treatment. 
 
National treatment proscribes “less favorable treatment” of a foreign investor that stands 
“in like circumstances” or “like situations” with a domestic actor. The fact that a measure 
is temporary and triggers loss but is then removed (as in Australia) does not excuse legal 
liability, per se. Moreover, the obligation to accord national treatment will cover 
instances of both de jure (in law) and de facto (in fact) discrimination. The latter covers 
measures that may not explicitly distinguish on nationality but pose a greater adverse 
burden on foreign actors in the host state. The non-binding OECD National Treatment 
Instrument is a relevant source for guidance on the constituent elements of the national 
treatment obligation. Investor-state arbitral tribunals have drawn on the OECD National 
Treatment Instrument in looking to competitive interactions as a necessary condition of 
finding that domestic and foreign investors operate “in like circumstances.” They have 
also, on occasion, interpreted these parameters rather broadly, which might see the whole 
financial sector (rather than a specific industry grouping) as the basis for comparison 
between foreign and domestic actors. Ultimately however, the question of breach will 
come down to whether a tribunal requires evidence of some malign governmental 
purpose, particularly on claims of de facto discrimination. Certain cases have explored -- 
with different emphases -- whether the distinction is based on legitimate policy grounds 
and justifiable or solely as a means of conferring protection to domestic actors and thus 
impermissible. Much will depend here on the indicia employed by a tribunal in a test for 
protectionist purpose. Even on a test requiring evidence of constructed purpose, some of 
these measures may not withstand scrutiny. Indeed, similar forms of discrimination to 
those we have surveyed were employed by the Czech Republic -- in response to a 
domestic financial crisis in the late 1990s -- and were ruled to be in breach its investment 
treaty obligations.2 
 
There are exceptions for host country conduct in the event of a finding of liability for 
breach of national treatment. Some investment treaties include qualified exemption for 
prudential measures in the finance sector (modeled on the GATS). But one should keep in 
mind that the most-favored nation clause in those treaties may afford claimants better 
treatment if their host country has concluded other treaties without those carve-outs. 
Older investment treaties typically only exempt measures necessary to maintain “public 
order” or protect “essential security interests.” While newer iterations of these exceptions 
are self-judging, most of the older formulations clearly contemplate a role for an 
adjudicator in the application of the exception. Indeed, the scope of this vague exemption 
was assessed in a range of cases brought against Argentina in the aftermath of its 2001-
2002 financial crisis. In those cases, particular tribunals were prepared to find that the 
adverse societal effects of financial crisis might engage a country’s “essential security 
interests.” On the whole though, it is unlikely that the current measures will fall within 
the exemption. In particular, it will be difficult to make the argument that discrimination 
directed against foreign bank institutions (with domestic depositors) was indeed 
                                                
2 Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL (Partial Award of March 17, 2006). 
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“necessary” to protect those “essential security interests.” Argentina has also been unable 
to escape its treaty obligations by invoking the customary plea of a state of necessity. We 




We draw two tentative conclusions, implicated in our analysis of potential liability under 
international investment treaties. First, there is clear evidence of widespread 
discrimination directed at foreign actors in the laws we have surveyed despite the public 
commitment of state parties to free market principles, including the rule of law, respect 
for private property, open trade and investment and competitive markets, expressed at the 
G-20 meetings. This is not confined to any individual state or select grouping; it is a 
marked characteristic of emergency responses to the financial crisis across a significant 
proportion of the globe. This then is a timely reminder to revisit the lessons associated 
with the outbreak of protectionism leading to the Great Depression in the inter-war 
period. Protectionism is the result of a prisoner’s dilemma understood in game theory 
terms. Cooperation would make every country better off, but it is individually rational for 
countries to pursue their self-interest (and protect domestic industry) at least in the short 
term. While protectionist instincts are now more nuanced, it is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that countries are failing to cooperate in the current crisis, with possible 
cascading consequences. 
 
This leads to our second, tentative concern, namely whether international law will fulfill a 
key function in the contemporary period. The framers of the post-Second World War 
architecture of international economic law were deeply influenced by the lessons of the 
inter-war period. They had drafted rules hoping to embed a loose form of cooperation and 
constrain the freedom of countries to resort to short-term protectionist measures. The 
preparedness and rapidity by which countries are now moving in that direction raise 
serious questions of whether our existing system is a sufficient check against these 
problematic tendencies. 
 
Ultimately, these sensitive issues may be addressed -- in less than optimal ways -- in legal 
rather than diplomatic fora. The 2001 Argentine financial crisis triggered a wave of 
international litigation against that state. If current trends continue, there is no reason to 






The response to the global crisis and investment protection: Evidence 
 
Kathryn Gordon and Joachim Pohl* 
 
The chapter above, first published in March 2009, carried an early analysis of investment 
policies in response to the financial crisis that began in early 2008.1 At that time, the 
authors, Anne van Aaken and Jürgen Kurtz, found “clear evidence of widespread 
discrimination directed at foreign actors” in the emergency response to the crisis. 
 
One year on, OECD analysis suggests a more nuanced assessment of investment policy 
making during the crisis. The findings of a series of OECD reports tracking investment 
policy trends in 49 developed and emerging markets since November 2008 challenge the 
wholesale claim that investment policy measures taken during the crisis were driven by a 
protectionist agenda involving significant discrimination against foreign investors. 2 
However, in the current context, the OECD inventory of investment measures also shows 
that crisis response and exit policies (that is, policies that unwind crisis response 
measures) pose a major threat to the openness of international investment. 
 
Fears of a destructive spiral of investment protection and retaliation have not materialized 
  
As the crisis deepened in 2008, fears took hold of a destructive cycle of protectionist and 
retaliatory policies of the type experienced in earlier deep crises.3 In retrospect, these 
fears proved largely unfounded. General investment measures -- those not covered by 
national security or crisis exceptions -- taken since the outbreak of the global crisis point, 
with few exceptions, toward greater openness and transparency for foreign investors. 
Governments have streamlined investment review procedures, loosened limits on foreign 
ownership in domestic companies and abolished monopolies that had previously limited 
foreign investments. The OECD found several dozen general investment measures, of 
which only a few restrict inward or outward investment. 
 
Crisis measures have pervasive impacts on inward and outward capital flows 
 
While general investment policy changes tended to promote international investment, the 
many crisis response measures that governments introduced to rescue or support 
companies bear significant potential for discrimination against foreign investors. Except 
for a few emerging markets, almost all countries in the OECD inventory established such 
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1 See chapter 79, Anne van Aaken and Jürgen Kurtz, “The Global Financial Crisis: Will State Emergency 
Measures Trigger International Investment Disputes?” 
2 The reports are available at: www.oecd.org/daf/infestment/foi. A series reports on G-20 trade and 
investment policies jointly produced by the WTO, OECD and UNCTAD are also available at this address. 
3 See “Keeping markets open at times of crisis,” OECD Policy Brief (April 2009) for a discussion of 




schemes since late 2008, and new measures were still being introduced in early 2010. A 
conservative OECD estimate found that, by September 2009, G-20 governments alone 
had made combined public expenditure commitments of more than US$ 3 trillion to assist 
companies in difficulty -- roughly US$ 10 billion per day on average since the dramatic 
deepening of the crisis in autumn 2008. By early 2010, several thousand companies had 
received financial support or were expected to benefit from support schemes. The 
massive support measures influence worldwide capital flows in various ways: by 
affecting the pattern of entry and exit in globalized sectors such as finance and 
automobiles or via direct governmental participation in firms’ investment decisions by 
virtue of control rights conferred by shareholdings acquired as part of crisis response 
policies. 
 
Emergency measures pose a serious threat to open investment 
 
While emergency measures have almost certainly influenced international capital flows, 
their discriminatory or protectionist intent or effect is less certain. Indeed, the design and 
implementation of emergency measures varies significantly among countries. In addition, 
the determination of what is non-discriminatory treatment can be a subtle one, especially 
in the financial sector. Under OECD investment dialogue, policies such as "fit" and 
"proper" tests of general application, financial requirements for non-residents’ branches 
equivalent to levels applied to domestic entities, rules for consolidated supervision and 
the non-extension of emergency lending facilities to non-residents' branches are not 
necessarily considered discriminatory. Under this approach,4 the OECD inventory finds 
that most crisis response schemes are designed to be non-discriminatory (i.e., they are de 
jure designed to be open to participation by foreign-controlled companies). 
 
However, even those support schemes that are de jure open to foreign controlled 
enterprises may be administered in a discriminatory manner. Crisis response poses a 
dilemma for policy makers -- they need to take action, but most options for crisis 
response pose grave risks for public sector transparency and market competition. The 
implementation of most schemes involved significant discretion for the implementing 
authorities; many governments participated directly in one-on-one negotiations with 
companies on conditions for rescue or mergers -- over 100 business-government 
negotiations are recorded in the OECD inventory. While confidential, one-on-one 
negotiations may have helped protect companies involved in rescue negotiations, they are 
also inherently non-transparent and may cover discrimination and complicate public 
scrutiny of such measures. 
 
The risk of discrimination has not abated -- "exit" is the next challenge 
 
                                                
4 The OECD methodology does not assume that prudential measures (and measures taken to safeguard 
essential security interests) are protectionist -- such measures may be taken to address legitimate concerns, 
but they may also be used to camouflage protectionist intent. Because these measures exist in a kind of grey 
zone in terms of motivation, they are subject, under OECD rules, to enhanced scrutiny and to peer review. 
The OECD treatment of such measures, which differs from earlier studies, may explain some of the 




The “exit” phase of crisis response involves the dismantling of policies and the 
unwinding of stakes in companies acquired in the course of crisis management. The 
OECD inventory shows that the introduction of new crisis response schemes has 
significantly slowed, and exit from emergency measures, especially in the financial 
sector, has begun in some countries. However, the risks of discriminatory treatment of 
foreign controlled enterprises have not declined. 
 
Ongoing implementation of rescue and support schemes perpetuates the abovementioned 
risks, albeit arguably at a smaller scale as rescue operations of most large companies are 
concluded. New risks arise in the exit phase that is only just beginning: governments that 
have acquired financial positions will decide on the timing and modalities of divestments 
and will have to select from among the potential acquirers of the assets. The risks from 
governments’ discretion in administering the exit process raise concerns similar to those 
of the rescues of large financial institutions in the early stages of the crisis. Furthermore, 
until the public financial positions in companies are unwound, governments will also 
need to manage tensions between their roles as owners of companies and their roles in 
regulation, taxation and law-enforcement. 
 
